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Abstract 
 
This research analyses the relationship between the UK and the EU in context to external migration 
control. It has used a combination of Constructivism and Bourdieu to deconstruct the field of analysis 
and understand how an actor’s behaviour can affect the structure of the external migration control 
field. Bourdieu was chosen to inform the theoretical framework as his field theory allowed a number 
of actors to be explored. It also recognises the importance of historical relationships impacting upon 
current interactions. Bourdieu explain these interactions as habitual or doxical. Habitual behaviours 
are learnt behaviours that adhere to the norms of the field. Doxical behaviours act against the norms 
and are used by actors, like the UK, to gain a higher status within the field and increase key capital. 
The three behaviours that have been explored are; securitization, manipulation and cooperation. In 
order to identify these behaviours policy documentation from key actors, like Frontex, have been 
qualitatively coded. The analysis uses three key moments in the history of the UK and the EU to guide 
the exploration of the data, these are; the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) and 
the UK Immigration Act 2014. The documentation chosen for analysis ranged from unilateral, bilateral 
and multilateral political agreements. Other documentation includes reports from associated actors 
that are part of the external migration control field. The documentation reveals the extent to which 
habitual behaviours dominate the relationship between the actors.  
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Introduction 
 
For Englishmen to boast of generation,  
Cancels their knowledge and lampoons the nation.  
A true-born Englishman’s a contradiction,  
In speech an irony, in fact a fiction. 
Daniel Defoe 
 
Human migration control is an issue that commands strong reactions from international actors at all 
levels of governance. An example of this is an increase in migrants from North Africa and the Middle 
East throughout the Arab Spring and the Syrian Civil War over the past decade. Industrialisation and 
globalisation have encouraged and facilitated the movement of millions of humans to seek 
employment and new opportunities in expanding cities across the world. The push factors of migration 
are, however, not always positive. Asylum seekers and refugees undertake journeys to avoid war or 
persecution. Human trafficking victims and smuggling victims often do not have a choice in their 
eventual destination or may not have chosen to leave their country of origin at all (Selm, 2005). As 
different as each migration story is, their movement is shadowed by a tangible structure designed to 
carefully control movement across international borders.  
The EU was chosen as one of the key units of analysis in this research because of the complex 
structures it maintains. The control of migration was, and still is to some extent, the heart of the EU 
project, a way of enabling EU citizens to benefit from the states around them. The inspiration for this 
project came from a tenacious interest in the relationship between the UK and the EU. Since the 
earliest beginnings of negotiations to create a regional power, the relationship between the UK and 
the EU has been unpredictable. This unpredictability has come from outside influences, for example 
the Cold War, as well as internal disputes between member states. The UK has been afforded a special 
relationship with the EU from the beginning and what this research achieves is an insight into how this 
relationship is sustained through turbulent periods of history and great change in the political 
landscape of the region. More specifically it will investigate the periods of negotiation around the 
Maastricht Treaty (1992), the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) and the UK Immigration Bill (2014). The 
analysis goes no further than the enactment of the Immigration Bill on the 14th May 2014.  
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This topic was chosen as there is little to no literature that explores the complex relationship between 
the UK and the EU in relation to external migration control. What literature there is focuses on the 
securitizing mechanisms and behaviours of both actors. What exists in fact is a complex web of 
behaviours that contribute to the fractious relationship between the UK and the EU. Beyond the 
interest in the diplomatic and political makeup of the EU and its relationship with the UK there is a 
specific interest in the migration control mechanisms and structures that the two actors have created. 
It is one of the most debated issues that dominates discussion and negotiations between the two 
actors. Understanding the discussions around external migration control is key to understanding many 
of the other complex elements of the relationship. The development of external migration control 
policy from both actors over the past 70 years is a testament to the importance of migration as a 
political issue.  
As the relationship between the UK and the EU becomes more tenuous this thesis is relevant as it 
exposes more complex behaviours beyond that of just securitization, allowing for a more thorough 
investigation into the relationship. The literature and analysis of external migration control has 
stagnated into a discussion of security rather than an exploration of other behaviours such as 
cooperation and manipulation which, is what this research focuses on. By exposing more complex 
relationships within and between actors we can begin to better understand how and why external 
migration control is so important for actors and how it shapes policy. The relevance of this topic is to 
better understand the UK as an actor within the field of the EU and external migration control. At 
times the UK can be a contradictory actor in relation to wider EU relations as well as more specifically 
external migration control. This research specifically examines the policies that control external 
migration control. This is migration from third country nationals that do not have the right to freedom 
of movement in the EU. Firstly, external migration control is distinctly different from internal migration 
control in the EU. This can be attributed to the normalization of internal movement and the 
frameworks which protect the rights of EU citizens. The movement of third country nationals is 
different as they are not afforded the same rights automatically upon gaining a visa. Secondly, external 
migration is treated more aggressively in terms of the controls created. 
 Politically to move beyond a narrative of negativity is extremely important. The media and societal 
perception of external migration is one of a security threat, which has been perpetuated by the 
political narrative, in which neither actor can come together to “control the threat”. However, this 
research aims to dispel the myth that the field of external migration control is more than just a security 
driven field. This is relevant because the relationships in the field are a lot more complicated than that, 
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manipulation and cooperation are important elements in the relationship, in particular cooperation, 
especially as manipulation is considered a deviant behaviour. The societal perception of the EU by UK 
citizens could be altered if there was a wider understanding of how the two actors work together to 
control external migration. From another point of view it is also important to demonstrate that often 
the “threat” of external migration control is often over exaggerated by actors.  
The progression of knowledge in relation to member state interactions when creating and maintaining 
external migration control structures was not the only inspiration to conduct the research. The UK and 
the EU use other associated actors and policies to control external migration such as Frontex and the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). This project will examine their function and gain insight into 
the subtler relationships within the EU. The importance of these mechanisms in maintaining or 
damaging the relationships of actors that take part in these structures is under-researched. This thesis 
will uncover how Frontex and the ENP are interesting units of analysis as they act as key actors in the 
external migration control field. Through the analysis of these actors you can disassemble the 
relationships between more dominant actors such as the UK and the EU, revealing the differing levels 
of governance which has informed the research question of this project.  
Another interest is in the expansion of International Relations theory by using a unique theoretical 
framework. Current theoretical frameworks are unable to analyse the complexities of relationships 
around the topic of external migration in the EU and in particular how the UK manages its relationship 
with in that field. The use of Pierre Bourdieu (1986, 1991, 1996 and 2010) has been tentatively used 
by other IR scholars and this project highlights how his theoretical and methodological frameworks 
could progress the study of international relations (See Adler-Nissen (2012a and 2012b), Bigo (2000, 
2002 and 2011) and Hamati-Ataya, (2012)). His theoretical framework considers the historical 
relationships between actors to explain current interactions, contextualising decisions that may seem 
out of place without the historical understanding. His work will be discussed in greater detail 
throughout the thesis. This thesis will, like Adler-Nissen (2012a and 2012b), seek to expand the 
boundaries of IR theory, however what this research achieves is a practical application of Bourdieu’s 
themes and concepts. 
The study of human migration, whether it be economic, illegal, clandestine, smuggling or trafficking 
and the controls which encourage, or limit movement have been the focus of many studies from 
varying disciplines for example Campesi, 2011, Hortsmann, 2014 and Geddes, 2000 and 2008. Some 
research centres on what drives people to move, others look at the impact migrants have on the 
economy (see Anderson 2001 & Czaika and Vargas-Silva 2012). Their projects range from longitudinal 
studies to the immediate impact on receiving states. Research also looks at governmental policy 
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towards migrants and how this impacts their movement. This research looks at all levels of 
governance, from local housing of asylum seekers, international student visas to voluntary removal of 
migrants who have overstayed. As vast as the research is on migration there are still areas of study 
where little research into how the creation and maintenance of migration control has affected the 
relationships of the actors that produce it.  
The main aim of this research therefore is to understand the behaviours of the UK and the EU in 
relation to external migration control, specifically looking at the mechanisms at the EU’s southern 
border, and how these behaviours effect the relationship of these actors. To achieve this aim, the 
research question for this thesis is: How does the UK engage with EU external migration control 
structures and how does this impact on its relationship with the EU? 
The literature that is reviewed in the proceeding chapter informed the research question and aims of 
this research, especially the literature on the concepts of borders and securitization. The review of the 
literature begins with a discussion of classical IR theories and migration then explores the move into 
post-positivism, more specifically at the work of Constructivist thinkers such as Ole Wæver (1995) who 
began the academic conversation around securitization and migration. The discussion then moves on 
to literature that investigates the more specific concepts such as borders and the relationships 
between the different actors. Alongside literature that relates to the themes, there will also be a 
discussion of how this project fits in with existing IR literature that examines the international relations 
of migration. This thesis challenges the standard Constructivist approach to the securitization of 
migration which lacks the capacity to understand the complex web of relationships between the 
differing actors and how certain behaviours can change an actor’s position in the field. Alongside the 
research question there is a qualitative coding framework to answer the aims of the research. The 
coding structure has allowed the research to examine many different types of policy documentation, 
including those from states as well at NGOs and EU control structures such as Frontex. The codes also 
helped to structure the way in which the data was approached as it allowed the data to be clearly 
recorded, as data that had a code was then marked to allow cross referencing between documents 
(Saldana, 2009). A full discussion and demonstration of the theoretical framework will be discussed in 
the Theory and Methodology chapters. 
The Theory chapter will discuss the key IR theorists that have informed this research and how they 
will be adapted to answer the research questions to fill the gaps in the literature. The works of key 
theorists such as Buzan and Wæver (1993) will be deconstructed and placed within the context of this 
research as they were some of the first academics to study securitization and migration. This chapter 
also discusses the work of Bourdieu at length and how his framework of analysis has been modified 
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to fit within an IR theoretical context and how key elements of his theory have informed the 
Methodological approach. Theoretical texts from the field of security studies will also be discussed as 
these are important in informing and analysing the data especially as one of the core themes is 
securitization, such as Bigo (2000, 2002 and 2011).  The Methodology chapter will then have an in-
depth discussion into the data collection, handling and eventual analysis. There will be an illustration 
of the coding framework and how it was applied. The next chapter will be a historical insight into the 
construction of the field of migration control, using pre-1992 migration policies to illustrate how the 
relationship between the UK and the EU evolved from the Treaty of Rome (1957) onwards. The 
theoretical framework requires an understanding of the historical relationships between actors in the 
field as previous associations will affect the current structures of migration control. Decisions made at 
early negotiations for treaties such as Maastricht (1992) and the Dublin Convention (1997), that the 
UK and the EU took part in, have had an effect one the negotiation and actions of members of the 
field. An in depth understanding of the political impact of post war migrant recruitment and latter 
restrictions must therefore be examined.  
The thesis will then be structured around the core concepts as identified by the data collection and 
analysis; securitization, manipulation and cooperation. These three chapters will house the analysis of 
the data outlined in the Methodology chapter. They will examine modern policies and treaties 
established by the UK and the EU after the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and how these treaties impacted 
upon the management of external migration control. As well as the treaties and policies themselves, 
special attention has been paid to the supporting documents such as parliamentary readings and 
communiques between Ministers in the UK and the EU commission.  This is because they reveal more 
information than the finalised documents they support. The parliamentary readings demonstrate the 
opinions of MP’s rather than the policy that defines the broad political consensus. Documents from 
Frontex are also best understood whilst using supporting documentation from both actors. The 
documents will be discussed in relation to the theoretical framework and assessing if the UK and the 
EU are demonstrating the behaviour that is being discussed in that chapter.  
From Welcome Workers to Security Threat Chapter 
The chapter titled From Welcome Workers to Security Threat will demonstrate the long history of 
external migration control in the UK and the EU. By looking at historical policy documents such as, the 
Immigration Act 1971, the chapter will show how policies like the Immigration Act has gone on to and 
continues to influence modern external migration control policy in the UK and in the EU. As well as 
this it demonstrates the awkward relationship between the UK and the EU has always been fractured, 
even from the UK entry into the EEC. However, it also demonstrates that UK and the EU have the 
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capacity to agree on policy explicitly as well as implicitly have the same goals in what policy should 
look like, creating a cooperative environment.  
This chapter underpins the theoretical framework of the thesis. By illustrating the historical journeys 
of the key actors of the research, the UK and the EU, its shows how the field of external migration 
control has been established since the Treaty of Rome. This establishes how early relationships and 
the habitual behaviours of actors in the field have now become doxical, for example, the perception 
of the threat of the external migration. Without the understanding of this process it is challenging to 
establish why the UK has this very unique relationship with the EU. This chapter uses the Treaty of 
Rome as the starting point for the solidification of the field as it explicitly discusses the movement of 
people as a key areas for the EEC to manage. Whilst it was only a small part of the treaty and by no 
means demonstrates core policy, it does establish a field which has grown expeditiously over the past 
60 years. The UK also may not have joined fully at this point, however was a signatory of the Treaty.  
The chapter also illustrates that the joining of the UK to the then EEC was the beginnings of the UK 
attempting to gain a dominant position within the field of external migration control by gaining 
diplomatic capital and establishing itself as a loud voice within the EEC. It demonstrates that the UK 
mirrored the behaviour of those with the greatest power in the field of external migration control by 
restricting external migration and aligning itself with other actors in the field, such as, France and 
Germany. This chapter also establishes the external migration control mechanism, Frontex, as the 
“glue” which holds the field together, acting as a conduit between the actors of the external migration 
control field, allowing actors with lesser capital to gain power. In the case of the UK, they a 
perceptively less dominant as they are not part of the Schengen area, however they have been able 
to use Frontex as a key way of being able to gain more diplomatic capital within the field.  
Securitization: The Habitus of External Migration Control  
The securitization chapter is based around demonstrating the doxical behaviours that the external 
migration control field has. It also establishes how securitization became such a norm within the field, 
following on from the discussions in the previous chapter. This chapter delves into how external 
migration is perceived by actors in the field and how this is then used to justify what is often 
reactionary policy and behaviours that go beyond the actuality of the “threat” and even discusses if 
the threat ever existed at all. Threat perception is extremely important when discussing the field of 
external migration control as more often than not the perception is not the reality.  
This chapter demonstrates how the UK uses securitization to gain advantage and diplomatic capital in 
the field. It also investigates how participation in mechanisms such as Frontex is following the doxical 
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norms of the field.  It also investigates other mechanisms and policies such as the UK’s 2014 
Immigration Bill. It uses this piece of domestic policy to reflect the wider aims of the external migration 
control field. Following on from the policies conception right through until its royal assent, it illustrates 
how securitizing language was built into the law in line with wider securitizing mechanisms that were 
being created and maintained across the EU at the time.  
This chapter also looks at how the stability of the field is essential for it to maintain its control over 
external migration. It will illustrate that stability allows for actors to gain more capital in the field as 
this would be difficult to do if they were always in conflict. This chapter also explores of the 
externalisation of external migration control exists but only as a habitual behaviour.  
Manipulation: How Deviant is the UK?  
The manipulation chapter explores how the behaviour of manipulation has shaped the external 
migration control field. It explores how manipulation allows for movement in the field and gaining of 
diplomatic capital, more specifically by the UK whose tenuous relationship with the EU has not always 
afforded it the best position in the field. For the UK manipulation is a learnt norm and behaviour which 
is has practiced since its relationship with the EU began in the 1970’s. This chapter demonstrates how 
the UK’s use of Frontex is not just about fulfilling obligations and can be described as manipulative as 
the UK gains are greater from its participation in Frontex than if it acted alone and especially when 
the high level of participation in Frontex is against the actual number of migrants entering the EU from 
outside of it. The chapter explores the idea that the UK’s participation in Frontex is a securitization 
norm which allows for deviations elsewhere. These deviations are risky to the UK’s position in the field 
however they are worth the risk as it allows for the UK to follow its own policy path as well as 
maintaining its position within the external migration control field and possibly even better it.  
The chapter also demonstrates that changes, however big or small, to bilateral relations in the field 
could cause a ripple effect to becoming more doxical behaviours across the field. For example, the 
UK’s bilateral agreement with Belgium regarding the Eurostar terminal could be the beginning of a 
trend of externalisation of migration across the EU. However, that chapter recognises that not all UK 
actions can be presupposed and that not all UK inactions with the field of external migration control 
can be viewed as manipulative. The chapter also looks at how manipulation can also favour other 
actors within the field and not just those who seek to gain more diplomatic capital. For example, EU 
can make financial gain from manipulation, for example, UK funding Frontex and its projects. From 
this the EU can maintain its dominant position with the field as well as no viewing the UK’s 
manipulative behaviour as a threat to their dominance.  Alongside these discussions there will be an 
exploration of how manipulative cooperation gives a stable field of external migration control. From 
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this we begin to explore the behaviours of cooperation and how actors in the external migration field 
are more likely to cooperate than anything else. 
Cooperation: An EU Dream or Existing Reality?  
Cooperation is not often a term attributed to the UK and the EU’s relationship in context to external 
migration control. However, this thesis dedicates a whole chapter to the behaviour of Cooperation. In 
this chapter it is discussed that cooperation is key to stable field which is able to evolve. Constant 
conflict in a field will not allow new policies and mechanism to be created or for habitual behaviours 
to become doxical as there would always be a consistent move towards not adopting norms fully or 
even not adopting them at all. Throughout this chapter cooperation will be shown to be evident at all 
levels of governance across the external migration control field, from domestic to regional including 
all mechanisms of control. It is important to demonstrate how deep-seated cooperation within the 
field as it is against the narratives that are more widely recognised in the literature and in society.  
Within the chapter the dominant narrative of cooperation impacts on all relationships in the field, 
including those whose wish to remain dominant and those that wish to gain more diplomatic capital.  
Whilst manipulation may demonstrate a move away from the doxical norms of the field, cooperation 
demonstrates established and adhered to doxical norms. These are important because disruptive or 
uncooperative behaviour can cause high instability in the field. This chapter analyses the mechanisms 
and policies which stabilise and perpetuate these norms and how the doxical behaviours are vital to 
the cooperation of all actions in the field. It also explores how each actor’s position in the field 
dependent on depth and breadth of cooperation. The chapter explores that even the smallest 
examples of cooperation can demonstrate wider solidarity, for example helping out on a Frontex 
mission that does not even traditionally concern the UK. Beyond physical actions be it security or other 
examples the chapter also explores how data sharing between actors is also evidence of cooperation 
and not just an actor adhering to policy. Sharing of information can be a way of securing more 
diplomatic capital if you can be seen to be willing to cooperative with other actors in the field at all 
level of interaction.  
This chapter further explores this by illustrating that if cooperation gives capital gains than an actor 
will adhere to the doxa. These capital gains maybe financial but diplomatic capital gains can be as 
powerful if it affords an actor, like the UK, a more dominant position in the field in which it can control 
the field more. The chapter also identifies the differences between active and passive cooperation in 
context to the external migration control field. It explores whether active or passive cooperation 
effects an actors place within the field as well as which of the two may damage the position of an actor 
in the field.  
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In the conclusion the research questions will be revisited to assess the extent they have been 
answered. Alongside concluding remarks in relation to the research aims and questions there will be 
a section dedicated to discussing the current crisis refugee crisis and the political challenges facing the 
UK and the EU since the referendum whereby the UK public chose to leave the EU. This discussion will 
explore the possibilities of applying the research frameworks of this thesis to the two situations and 
the future development of the theoretical framework.  
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Literature Review: Evaluating the Field 
The literature on the subject of EU external migration control is varied, with little literature focusing 
on the specifics of the UK’s relationship with the EU, in relation to the structures and controls of the 
field. This is attributed to the number of differing subject areas, such as International Relations 
European Studies, Cultural Studies, Politics that have researched the issue therefore a number of more 
specific concepts have been chosen in relation to the research framework. The first section of this 
chapter will discuss the existing IR literature in relation to human migration. The second section will 
explore the literature that exists on UK and EU migration policy, including how these policies effect 
the relationship between the two actors. The third section will be centred on the securitization 
literature as this is a core theme of the research. It will illustrate the need to look beyond the 
securitizing practice and explore other behaviours of actors. It will conclude with how this project is 
unique within the study of International Relations and human migration in Europe.  
The Evolution of International Relations and Migration Literature  
Prior to the mid-1980s, migration had been relatively ignored by IR and migration studies offered very 
little to the meta narratives. As Weiner (1985) suggests “literature on international relations says 
relatively little about population movements, except insofar as the refugee phenomenon is described 
as an outcome of conflicts” (Weiner, 1985, page 441). Until the mid-1980’s Liberalism and Realism 
were the two leading paradigms and it was not until the breakdown of these main paradigms that IR 
began to tentatively approach international migration as a serious subfield of study. Out of these 
changes small pockets of IR literature began to emerge that moved the subject away from positivist 
thinking about state security, centred on military capabilities and economic dominance, to a post-
positivist epistemology that attempted to understand the complex political landscape of the human 
migration management, in which issues of migration were problematized to include knowledge of 
areas such as humanitarian issues and environmental issues. A changed which mirrored other IR 
theories at the time such as Critical Theory and neo-Liberalism.  
The creation of literature around this period time discusses the links between migration and 
international relations in reference to the rising number of illegal immigrants that were coming to 
Western Europe from the former Soviet Bloc during the collapse of the USSR. It also shadows the 
creation of the Schengen area and the securitization of migration policy throughout Europe in the mid-
1980s. Weiner began to talk of migration in structural and political terms rather than a symptom of 
conflict. There are two elements of Weiner’s article that are most engaging, these are his discussions 
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on the element of sovereignty when making decisions concerning migration, and how states have a 
direct effect on migration in terms of the entry and exit rulings of that state.  
Weiner illustrates the conflicted interests that states and regions must balance, which is allowing 
migration and advocating the free trade principles and the free flow of capital, issues which are 
reflected within the EU. Weiner does highlight that even the most liberal of economic theorists would 
never encourage migration (Weiner, 1985). He likens migration to other modes of production in the 
economy, as something that needs to be controlled in order to get the most profit from it. If migration 
could be harnessed it could be a powerful mode of production for economies but Weiner also adds 
another factor into conflicting interests which is the sovereignty of a state. In hindsight, this research 
understands that the sovereignty of European states was about to change forever and the tensions 
this could bring, but Weiner manages to accurately predict the changes that the Schengen area would 
bring to Europe with ideas that can be correlated with the effects of the Maastricht treaty in 1992. 
 “The decision of the European Economic Community to permit citizens of member nations to 
move freely about represented a historic step toward the elimination of full member state 
sovereignty; it also represented a major step toward the redefinition and an enlargement of national 
identities to encompass a European nationality.” 
Weiner, 1985, page 443 
The passing of a small amount of sovereignty to the EU level also means the re-bordering of national 
boundaries not in a literal sense but in a diplomatic sense. This in turn changing the engagement of 
member states such as the UK. The re-ordering of national borders, as Weiner describes, begins to 
incorporate a European nationality, something which is often termed Europeanization (Headley, 
2008). The effect upon migration is that changes to sovereignty and borders, changes and indeed 
challenges the flow of migration. Instead of migrants facing the bureaucracy of a single state, 
immigrants to Europe now face a European system, a multifaceted governance of the border. This also 
changes how member states such as the UK engage with structures and mechanisms, however this is 
left out of the early narratives of migration literature. It is very important to understand how changes 
to sovereignty rebalance the field of external migration control as it has an effect on the relations 
between actors in that field.  
Mitchell (1989), unlike Weiner, is more concerned with international political economy and foreign 
policy of migration and his argument is based heavily on the US model of migration policy towards 
Mexico.  Much like Weiner, Mitchell reflects on the lack of scholarly writing from an IR perspective in 
context to migration and firstly reflects upon IR scholars that have made step towards theorizing 
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international migration. He assesses the functions of the nation-state and foreign policy and how it 
effects international migration and relations between states, which is a step forward to understanding 
how changes in international structures impact on the relationships of the external migration control 
field. He loosely uses the World Systems Theory (Wallerstein, 2004) to assess the relationships that 
‘core’ states have with ‘peripheral’ migration sending states. He argues that “Interstate migration 
dealings in the Western Hemisphere, one may note to underscore the value of interregional 
comparisons, are in some ways coming to resemble West Europe’s relations with its migration 
‘periphery’” (Mitchell, 1989, page 702). What Mitchell is claiming is that all across the world 
international relations effects migration in numerous ways for example the volume of migrants, the 
type of migrants and whether or not they are illegal or legal. He stresses the European bilateral links 
with sending states after World War Two, for example France and Algeria, demonstrate the 
relationship between the powerful receiving states who effectively use less developed sending states 
to receive the migrants that ‘fit’ the profile of what that particular state or regions wants and needs. 
However, what Mitchell does not achieve is an insight into how these bilateral links effect wider 
relations within the field, his argument is simply an extension of the world systems model.  
Hollifield (1992 and Bretnell and Hollifield, 2008) examines the varying theories of IR and their reaction 
and commentary of migration. He also asks the question: “How much conflict and cooperation in 
international relations have resulted in (or will result) from recent waves of migration?” (Hollifield, 
1992, page 592). The collapse of the Soviet Union, the Gulf War and the signing of the Maastricht 
Treaty (1992) are all examples of conflict and cooperation which had direct effects on the movement 
of people across international borders. The collapse of the Soviet Union had an especially large impact 
on migration with the level of migrants from Eastern Europe rising sharply. Relations between North 
Africa and Europe have always affected the flows of migrants from the Mediterranean region. Such as 
the Algerian War of Independence saw a peak of Algerian migrants travelling to France to resettle with 
family members (House, 2006). An example of cooperation is the creation of the EU and how previous 
emigration states such as Spain, Portugal and Italy have become immigration states (Koikkalainen, 
2011). The recognition of actor’s behaviour on their decision making towards external migration 
structures and mechanisms supports this research.  
Hollifield develops his arguments further along the line of migration and regional interdependence in 
Europe. He refers to the regional management of migration in Europe as a “weak international 
regime” (Hollifield, 1992). In hindsight we can now witness the securitization and criminalization of 
migrants within the EU as a large step towards a stronger international regime, changing the attitudes 
to external migration control and mechanisms. However, the same struggle for a region wide 
migration policy effects the relations that the EU has between member states, including the UK, and 
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its neighbours, instead the EU is opting for more strategic practices such as Frontex and the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Hollifield concludes that migration needs to be considered in both 
political and economic terms. A gap in the literature has formed, whereby the regional politics of 
securitization has been examined however it lacks the knowledge of how the external migration 
control structures directly affects its relationships with member states, namely the UK.  
There is literature that explores the UK’s relationship with external migration controls in relation to 
the EU. Vollmer (2014), for example, analyses historical domestic policies and recognises the impact 
of regional structures on the formation of policy within a domestic setting but does not go the step 
further and then reflect on how the effects the wider field. Marsh (2001) examines the globalisation 
of power, or more specifically the movement of power from “Whitehall and Westminster to Brussels” 
(page 209). Whilst the text is not exclusively regarding external migration controls and mechanisms, 
it does explore the Home Office’s relationship with the EU, in regards to migration more generally. He 
discusses the ambivalence of the UK to engaging with wider structures of EU policy making, however 
offers little insight into how this ambivalence actually impacts upon the UK’s relationship with the EU 
over external structures and or how it has directly impacted upon decisions made by either actor in 
the field.  
Somerville (2007) in his book titled Immigration under New Labour is a more detailed account of how 
the UK under Labour government in the early to mid-2000s managed all areas of migration. It is the 
closest the literature has come in achieving what this research achieves which is a detailed discussion 
on how the UK policies decision making effects it relationship in the external migration control field. 
Somerville discusses how the UK has continually been opposed to wider regional controls, led by the 
EU, and any cooperation was done solely to ensure the EU supported the UK on other initiatives 
(Somerville, 2007). However, he does recognise that the UK is willing to work alongside other member 
states on an operational level to curb unauthorised migration. Furthermore, he discusses the lack of 
competence at a regional level to manage external migration control which has effected the UK’s 
willingness to work alongside EU (Somerville, 2007). What Somerville lacks is a theoretical 
understanding of actions taken by the UK that are embedded in the historical context of the 
relationship between the two actors.  
Overall the literature surrounding international relations and migration is limited in its scope and 
analysis. Although the likes of Weiner sort to expand the relationship between the two academic fields 
but little progress has been made to complete the task he started. The problem lies in the lack of 
emphasis put on inter-EU relations and how this effects the wider regional relationships. Whilst 
Hollifield seeks to engage more laterally in the discussion regarding migration and IR it still lacks a 
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specificity in the rhetoric regarding member states, such as the UK, and how external migration 
influences the behaviours between actors and how it can cause imbalances in the field. The 
imbalances in the field cause unstable relations and particular actors could deviate from the norms. 
However, this is not reflected in the literature, even when you look at authors such as Vollmer (2014), 
Marsh (2001) and Somerville (2007), who discuss the UK and its relationship with the EU at length, 
however, do not seek to understand the influence of historically influenced norms in the UK decision 
making.  
Assessments of European Migration Policy  
The next section focuses on literature that explores European Migration Policy, which includes how 
this effects its relationships with other actors in the field. As the most dominant actor in the field it is 
important to understand how the EU manages its behaviour through the structures and mechanisms 
it produces and how these actions and behaviours have a wider impact in the field.  
At the beginning of the 1990’s as the European Economic Community (EEC) evolved into the EU, the 
literature began to engage with the different mechanisms of migration control. One of the strongest 
rhetoric’s is the external migration policy and/or strategy literature which centred on the concept of 
Fortress Europe. The idea of Fortress Europe is often discussed in two differing ways; first it is seen as 
keeping unwanted aliens from entering the union and the second rhetoric is based within economics. 
Economic academics and commentators discuss whether the EU alienated other economies from 
trading with them because member states became too interested in their own development rather 
than seeking relationships outside of the European Economic Area (EEA) (see Aho, 1994, Patterson, 
1992 and Linder, 1992). This thesis will look at the former and is a theme that will be developed 
throughout this thesis through the themes of securitization, manipulation and cooperation. This part 
of the chapter will be split into two discussions; the first will be a look at the broader sense of fortifying 
using the USA/Mexican border as a comparison to the European model. The second part will use more 
European specific literature to explain particular policy and strategy and their relation to ‘Fortress 
Europe’.  
One of the most interesting ways in which to explore the theme of ‘Fortress Europe’ is to compare it 
with other similar areas, which have stringent border controls. The easiest comparison is the American 
border with Mexico. The USA is attempting to build a fortress at its southern border much like the EU, 
as the USA is experiencing demographic deficits alongside the USA’s informal economy. There are also 
particular industries, such as domestic services, that rely on cheap and relatively quick turn over of 
immigrants (legal or illegal), which is reflected also in Southern Europe within agricultural industries 
in particular. The USA has also experienced a constant rise in illegal immigrant numbers even with 
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extremely stringent migration policy with immigrants that are willing to go to extreme lengths to enter 
the USA. Cho (2010) discusses the management of borders at a federal, state and local level. The 
disparities in the different levels of legislation are reminiscent of the many institutions of Europe with 
multifaceted governance through multiple actors for example the UK Immigration Bill (2014) 
introducing immigrant status checks to rent a property or open a bank account alongside the large 
controls such as the UK Visa and Immigration services (UKVI). It means that controls do not necessarily 
have to be at the external borders but the general mind set of the entire region, its states and its 
citizens. Cho’s recognition of the different levels of governance reflects the investigations of this 
research insofar as analysing how the maintenance of different borders effects the relationships of 
the field of external migration control (2010). 
Similarly, Ruiz (2006) argues that it is evident that fortification is very relevant to modern day Europe 
by the structures that have been built post-Maastricht treaty as well as ongoing border disputes 
between the USA and Mexico. One of the clearest comparisons that can be made is the status of 
Mexico not only being a country of origin for migrants but as a country of transit as well. “[Mexico] 
serves as a region of transit for others who have left their homes in other part of Latin America as well 
as the rest of the world” (Ruiz, 2006, page 47). The effects on national security relate to the building 
of walls around a territory, whether that is a single state or an entire region. The threat of not only 
citizens from the neighbouring states but also the citizens of other states is of concern to policy makers 
as they represent a form of social or cultural threat. The similar situation in Europe is how North Africa 
serves as a transit region for so many, with migrants coming from Asia, the Middle East and sub-
Saharan Africa (Baldwin-Edwards, 2006). This has been especially highlighted in recent times with the 
Arab Spring causing such unrest in the region. In the summer of 2011, France and Germany suspended 
the Schengen agreement after Italy handed refugees visas that would allow them to travel around 
Europe freely (see Bialesiewicz 2011). The panic that ensued highlighted the negative perception of 
migrants by policymakers at all levels of governance is continuing in Europe that has been historically 
established since the Treaty of Rome (1957). But it is not only the effects or fear of security breaches 
that make a nation, or in the EU case, a region that will close doors to immigration. Issues of welfare 
management, economy and integration are fast becoming the ‘buzz’ words used by politicians and the 
media to explain the building of such symbolically high walls to stop immigration from entering the 
EU territory, in particular the UK. What Ruiz’s paper highlights is the idea of fortifying Europe being 
not always as simple as seeing an outsider as an enemy that needs to be kept out. It demonstrates 
that border building by different actors is often not a physical act of building a wall but is symbolic act 
of defending key social and cultural norms that are historically recognised, then perpetuated 
throughout the field of external migration control.  
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Martin (1999) raised ‘Fortress Europe’ out of being purely a metaphorical discussion to a theoretical 
framework to understand the bordering practice of European states. The theory of Martin’s study is 
based in Immanuel Wallenstein’s World Systems Theory (2004) and it explores and critically assesses 
the changes in the world system after the Cold War, how these changes have greatly affected 
migration policy within the European context and how these changes have seen adverse effects to 
developing states, particularly those that border the EU. Martin examines how the changing politics 
and economics in the early 1990’s onwards has changed the push and pull factors for migrants. He 
suggests: 
“A peripheral state’s proximity to the geographic orbits of these formations, or of economic 
and/or strategic interest to a principal core state may induce or increase massive and illegal 
immigration into the metropoles of the bloc”. 
Martin, 1999, page 824 
The sentiment behind the creation of an ‘island’ or ‘fortress’ that has a negative effect to those that 
live on the periphery of it resonates throughout ‘Fortress Europe’ literature. Martin does touch upon 
how there is an irony that third world immigrants are denied entry into Europe when in fact it was 
often at developing states expense that the EU were capable of building such a lustrous fortress 
(Martin, 1999). Actors at the peripheries of the external migration control field are often manipulated 
by other actors with more capital who seek to use less developed actors, for example the negotiations 
by the EU to expand migration controls into North Africa through the ENP. Martin’s observations fit 
well with the theoretical framework insofar as analysing actors attempting to gain a better position in 
the field by adhering to the doxical norms.  
Ireland (1991) explores the unprecedented changes that reshaped the EU forever, his discussion 
centres on the impact of immigration on creating a more politically ambitious European project. 
“Central to both the economic and social dimensions of the 1992 project has been Western Europe’s 
13 million immigrants… [and] the entry of legal and illegal migrants” (Ireland: 1991: 457). Ireland 
examines how migrants where not only facing a fortress at the external boundaries of the EU but also 
within the receiving societies themselves. They are also not necessarily societal barriers but political 
parties that wish to stem the flow of immigration, be it illegal or not. Ireland also illustrates that 
integration of member states is more difficult when migration looms over any discussions and 
meetings. His discussions supporting the idea of this research that the doxical behaviours of the EU 
are ingrained into all areas of the external migration control field including that of UK domestic 
immigration policy. The case studies may be dated but the core concepts discussed are mirrored 
through current debates about the possibility of accession of states such as Turkey. Ireland’s work 
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mirrors this research insofar as he demonstrates the complexities of multi-level external migration 
governance in the EU and how doxical and habitual behaviours effect the creation and management 
of mechanisms and structures, what his argument lacks is the historical understanding of the 
relationship between actors in the field and the implication this has on the field of external migration 
control.   
Geddes (2000) explores how European integration and policymaking has made migration a central 
issue for the EU. The core argument of the book is how migration is inherently central to its 
integration. “The reshaping of European migration policy and politics by European integration 
emphasises migration’s centrality to European integration” (Geddes, 2000, page 171). This is a key 
theme that pulls the elements of securitization and cooperation together because of the impact of 
historical migrations on the modern integration of EU member states and how the external migration 
field is managed. This research will develop this argument by analysing the different behaviours that 
present themselves as integration in the field; securitization, manipulation and cooperation. Geddes’ 
study shows how conscious the EU and researchers alike are aware of how policy building can also 
affect how the fortress is built or in relation to this research how the field is built and maintained. 
What this thesis develops is how the UK is aware of their behaviour and by using the data, identifying 
what behaviour is learnt norms and what his habitual capital building behaviours. 
Geddes also uses elements of World Systems Theory like Martin (1999) to explain the core/peripheral 
relationships in European migration management. Like Martin, Geddes explains how core European 
states create policy that benefits them and policies towards other regions or states are less favourable. 
What Geddes develops are the links between the creation of migration policy and the widening of the 
gap between core and peripheral areas by using the Maastricht Treaty as a way of illustrating how 
migration policy constructs the wall around the EU. “The post-Maastricht elaboration of immigration 
policy co-operation left little room for the kinds of supranational constitutionalism and 
institutionalism that have been significant for free movement” (Geddes, 2000, page 108). This shows 
a significant change in the attitudes towards immigration from outside the EU, consolidating the doxa 
of securitization further. During the 1980’s the focus was on the opening of internal EU borders and 
the Maastricht treaty was the turn around to a more aggressive policy towards extra-EU migration. It 
was what Geddes coins a ‘reconfiguration’ of policy on a monumental scale (Geddes, 2000). The idea 
of reconfiguration of policy having a direct impact upon attitudes that Geddes alludes to mirrors that 
of this research. Instead of interpreting it simply as a reconfiguration this thesis develops the 
reconfiguration concept and understands the negotiation period of the 1980’s as a time of norm 
building through the reconfiguration of political structures and of the field. 
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Immigration and European Integration; Beyond Fortress Europe? (2nd edition, 2008) fully develops 
the ideas that Geddes put forward in the first edition, particularly in context to the Amsterdam Treaty 
(1997). The first edition was written and published when the Amsterdam Treaty had not been fully 
ratified by all member states. The Amsterdam Treaty became extremely important as it consolidated 
the earlier Maastricht Treaty into law and was the first European treaty that faced a newly 
independent Eastern bloc, which is why it was chosen as a key juncture to analyse. Geddes (2008) 
constructs the idea that it “intensified EU action” towards migration. The treaty opened the discussion 
on external border management, the politics of migration and the integration of foreign nationals 
within the boundaries of the EU. How this research will differ to that of Geddes is that instead of 
putting forward the idea that whilst the Amsterdam Treaty appears to have opened borders, it in fact 
consolidated the doxa of the external migration control field, cementing the need to securitize 
external borders as well as demonstrating how the UK adheres to the rules of the game.  
The concept of ‘Fortress Europe’ and policy is often discussed within the discipline of Law and these 
studies offer interesting opinions about this theme. Papastavridis (2010) offers an analysis of Frontex, 
which as heavily featured in the migration strategy for the external migration control field. The main 
theme throughout is that the EU has an increasing need and want to protect its southern borders by 
any means possible. The most interesting idea which will be elaborated on in much further detail later 
in the thesis, is that Frontex is the closest the EU has got to region wide cooperation but under the 
surface the cooperation between states is never as it seems. “These [Frontex] operations are based 
on a novel concept sometimes called ‘compulsory solidarity’” (Papastavridis, 2010, page 78). The idea 
of ‘compulsory solidarity’ is an interesting concept as it has similarities with the Bourdieusian concept 
of norm building and that doxical behaviour impacts upon the actions of actors in the field. This 
research will expand upon the idea that many EU states will act cooperatively merely on the basis that 
it is expected of them rather than because they want to.  
Castles and Miller (2003) opened the dialogue concerning how migrants affect the economy of their 
receiving states and regions. Instead of being region specific the chapter is an overarching study into 
how migrants affect the economy and vice versa. Castles and Miller also describe the advances in 
researching migration and economy in the USA and Australia but explain how in Europe such studies 
are still in relative infancy. “The economic restructuring since the 1970s has given rise to new 
immigration flows and new patterns of immigrant employment” (Castles and Miller, 2003, page 194). 
Castles and Miller recognise that key points in European political history have a profound impact on 
current structures. This is the main theme that will be present in this thesis and is supported by 
Bourdieu who discusses the importance of history in the norm building practices of actors (Field, 
2003). The turning point for the norm building practices of the EU in context to external migration 
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control did not begin with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. It existed throughout the global economic 
recession of 1973-75 which is why it is imperative to understand where modern practices and 
mechanisms have originated.  
Bialasiewicz (2009, 2011 and 2012) illustrates the EU member states lack of cooperation when it 
comes to immigration cross the EU external border. The article is more of a commentary of recent 
trends in immigration to the EU post Arab Spring, but uncovers the underlying geopolitical importance 
of borders for the EU and highlights the complications that the field has when approaching issues that 
could cause structural changes. Bialasiewicz discusses how although the EU attempts to act as a single 
political bloc and suggests that when the issue of border control arises; national interests still 
outweigh the regional. “’National’ solutions that came to the fore, as a number of Member States 
decided to suspend the Schengen agreement” (Bialasiewicz, 2011, page 299). What Bialasiewicz 
highlights is that states will still act nationalistically if the influx of migrants potentially affects the 
security of their border. This highlights one of the main themes of the thesis, the member states are 
reluctant about whether to produce regional migration policy which in turn will affect how the 
external migration control field is managed. The article highlights the need to analyse actor’s reactions 
and behaviour to external changes to the field as changes can influence controls and mechanism 
beyond just the control of borders.  
Sassen (1999) resonates with a core idea of this research insofar as the politicisation of immigration 
from outside the European bloc began long before the creation of the EU. What Sassen manages to 
achieve is a historical perspective which is so often lacking from ‘Fortress Europe’ literature and 
migration literature alike.  
“It is essential that Europe shed its image and representation as a continent whose migration 
history is confined to the mass emigrations of the past. This is a partial account to the point of 
distortion, and it is hampering the achievement of reasonable policy.” 
Sassen, 1999, page 157 
The author of this thesis agrees that the EU and its member states can no longer create reactionary 
migration policy that is ahistorical. The research that Sassen has undertaken in this book is impactful 
and will be a foundation for this thesis to contribute more knowledge to this area. Sassen achieves 
what many other writers fail to; a critical analysis of migration policy rather than a chronological list 
of historical events. The book encourages the reader to critically assess the knowledge that you may 
currently have about migration in Europe and illustrate to researchers like me that it is possible to 
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take elements of a number of disciplines and make them your own without falling into the trap of 
creating a purely empirical piece of work which this thesis will emulate.   
Security and Migration Literature: Identifying the G aps in a Busy Field 
Security and migration are two themes that are inexplicably linked. When discussing security in 
modern terms you must first define what element of security you are discussing. Within International 
Relations there are many facets of security such as human security, environmental security and 
border/territorial security. Security in context to migration discusses the idea of welfare security and 
the protection of identity as well as border and territory security. In the case of the EU this is a shared 
identity between being a European citizen and a national citizen. For the EU, security is an extremely 
important issue as without it integration between member states would be nearly impossible. Europe 
had been at war within its own borders for hundreds of years and the creation of the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) laid the foundation for regional security. With the creation of the Justice 
and Home Affairs (JHA) policy, in 1992, member states consolidated a small amount of national 
sovereignty to protect the security of the region (Lindstrom, 2005). Following on from the ratification 
of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) the trend between EU member states is to build more regional 
security, especially since the implementation of the Schengen agreement. Although many fear that 
EU security is now being breached by a different sort of enemy, the immigrant. Within the literature 
surrounding this issue the biggest security threat that immigrants face is against European/National 
identity (for some the latter is more important than the former), welfare security and post 9/11 have 
seen migrants be raised to the status of terrorist. Migration is seen as so much of a threat that it on 
the Eurobarometer it is seen as more of a threat to Europe than terrorism (Boer, 2008). When 
researching security and borders you have to acknowledge the difference between security and 
securitization. Security is the physical actions of a state or individual to protect themselves, 
securitization however refers to the policy and diplomatic actions of a state and individual. Both acts 
are evident in the relationship between the UK and the EU in relation to external migration and the 
literature surrounding these concepts will now be explored in greater depth. 
The first academic that opened the security discourse in relation to migration within the context of 
the European Union was Jef Huysmans. In December 2000 the article The European Union and the 
Securitization of Migration (2000) was published and opened the argument for the securitization of 
migration. Huysmans starts his debate with the idea that structural changes within the EU are to blame 
for the growing security culture that now surrounds migration. These changes appear in the 
introduction of the Third Pillar of Justice and Home Affairs, the Schengen Agreements and the Dublin 
Convention (Huysmans, 2000). The article is an in-depth look at how these institutional changes 
26 
 
alongside political changes throughout the EU and its member states, beginning with the initial influx 
of post-World War Two migrants. One admission by Huysmans is that it is difficult to generalise about 
migration policies in the post war period. Each state managed their migration policy differently, but 
one common theme is that the super states of Europe such as France and Germany used guest worker 
policies to gain in economic terms with little thought about migration in terms of security. Huysmans 
outlines an example of this; “Their legal status was not of relevance to domestic needs. If anything, 
their illegality contributed to making them even more flexible and exploitable” (Huysmans, 2000, page 
754). Huysmans then goes on to describe how the securitization of migration began to occur with the 
politicisation of migration in the 1970’s, even more so with the development of the Schengen 
agreements in the mid 1980’s. Huysmans also illustrates the securitization of migration steadily began 
with the integration and expansion of the community and that “security discourses and technologies 
penetrated the Europeanization of migration policy” (Huysmans, 2000, page 756). Like many of the 
contributions to migration literature Huysmans makes the link between the depletion of internal 
borders having a direct link to the strengthening of the EU’s external borders. This is viewed as a 
security issue for a number of member states, especially the UK who already pushes the doxical 
boundaries of the external migration control field.  
The unique element of Huysmans’ research is the illustration of the idea that there are defining 
practices that institutions adopt that have added to the securitization of migration. “In security 
practices the political and social identification of a community and its ways of life develop in response 
to an existential threat” (Huysmans, 2000, page 757). What Huysmans has established is that the EU 
has built more of a community and integrated as a whole because of its fear of the ‘other’, of migrants. 
On a negative point Huysmans argument does lack some ground insofar as it does not tackle the 
discourse that the EU has never integrated its human migration policy.  
Arguments such as Huysmans have been developed further by Adamson (2006). Some academics have 
only engaged with the idea of securitization and migration since 9/11 but Adamson advocates that 
securitization of migration began in the 1990’s (Adamson, 2006). This is a theme that will be addressed 
throughout this thesis. Migration has seen a rise in securitization since 9/11 but the political and 
institutional changes towards securitization began long before 9/11 in the field of external migration 
control. This concept within the literature of will be supported by the argument that securitization 
became a doxical norm from the earliest conceptions of the EU. Adamson’s article is not region 
specific, it looks at both the EU and the USA and draws parallels between the two regions. Like 
Huysmans, Adamson explores the idea that the shift towards the securing of migration began with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the eastward enlargement of the EU. How Adamson differs is the 
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shift from the security issue being a uniquely Eastern European problem to viewing migration from 
the south of the EU’s borders as a higher security risk. As Adamson highlights; 
 “Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, questions relating to migration and security are 
increasingly viewed through the lens of international terrorism. This is true not just in the United 
States but also in Europe.” 
Adamson, 2006, page 195 
Other terrorist attacks in Madrid and London (although the London bombings where a year after the 
publication of this article) emphasised the security risk of migrants. A situation that is different to that 
of the USA who is more at risk of external infiltrators, the EU has been targeted from sleeper cells 
from inside state borders a factor that has been recognised at the EU level. This has effected the 
securitization of migration and in some cases, such as the UK, accelerated domestic policy changes. 
Migration from North Africa has been seen as a higher security risk than Eastern European migrants 
on the basis that migrants from North Africa tend to be Muslim and a growing ‘domestic mobilization 
around radical Islam’ (Adamson, 2006) has seen the construction of a negative policy structure in the 
UK and the EU, causing actors like the UK to deviate from the doxical structures set out by the external 
migration control field. This thesis investigates how these deviations effect the field.  
The body of literature surrounding the securitization of migration is large and there are many who 
support the discussion of 9/11 being a catalyst for the securitization of migration, however, there are 
those that believe that events such as 9/11 have done little to enhance the links between security 
policy and migration policy. Boswell (2007) explores how other political interests and structural 
changes in European institutions and shaped migration policy over the past ten years. Boswell explains 
that policy areas and organisations do not mix as freely as some studies would have you think; “Even 
where there appears to be evidence of one policy area colonizing another, organizations may display 
a surprising degree of robustness in resisting change” (Boswell, 2007, page 607).  Boswell’s main 
concept supports this thesis insofar as actors of the external migration control field will exhibit 
different behaviours and opinions towards migration control structures and mechanisms.  
Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (1993) is written by scholars from the 
Copenhagen School of Security Studies Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre. 
They argue that migration affects the social security of a state and the natural rhythms of migration 
and how migrants will often move from an area of perceived high security to an area of low security 
(Wæver et al, 1993). It is highlighted that the areas of high security do not necessarily have to be 
violent or war torn areas but areas where there is social and economic insecurity.  Wæver et al support 
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this researches argument that migration gradually became an issue throughout the latter part of the 
twentieth century. “[Migration] challenges the ability of states to control their borders, traditionally 
regarded as a fundamental attribute of sovereignty” (Wæver et al, 1993, page 149). They highlight the 
important fact that states are under full control of their borders and can close them if they so wish, 
but more importantly the securitization of migration occurs because of more political issues of 
economics, social and moral issues surrounding the admittance of migrants.   
Wæver et al (1993) focus on state level interactions, however their work points towards how the 
growing economic integration in the early nineties would lead to rising international migration as 
capitalist, developed states became beacons for migrants. As Wæver et al argue; “International 
migration is thus a collective phenomenon which arises as part of the social relations between the less 
developed and more developed parts of the global economy” (Wæver et al, 1993, page 150). The 
developments that have occurred after the publication of this text support this argument for example 
the Maastricht Treaty and the creation of the Third Pillar. From a securitization perspective the 
authors maintain that large scale migration that was occurring during this time effected major changes 
in the social security of states across the developed world. When you take into account 9/11 and 
similar terrorist attacks at the beginning of the twenty first century migration transcended from a 
social security problem to a regional, and in the case of Europe, a national security problem. What 
makes this research unique is taking the relationship between the multiple actors of the external 
migration control field and understanding how the securitization of migration can be analysed 
alongside other behaviours and how those behaviours can challenge the field. Wæver et al (1993) are 
a solid foundation to build an argument upon as this research will take the importance of state 
territory and transcend it to the regional level. It will argue that regional territory is now as important 
as the territory of a single state and regional institutions due to the norm building practices of the EU 
and the continued relations between actors in the field. 
An article which modernises Wæver and the Copenhagen School’s theories is P. E. O’Neill in his study 
The European Union and Migration: Security versus Identity (2006). In the first paragraph O’Neill uses 
Rothschild (1995) to summarise that the post-Cold War global security agenda has changed in these 
four ways; 
 “Downwards, from state level to groups and individuals; upwards, from state level to trans- 
and supra- national systems; horizontally, from military to other forms of security; and outwards, 
where responsibility for invigilating these ‘concepts of security’ is dispersed from states to 
international institutions such as the European Union (EU), local government, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and even public opinion and the press.” 
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Rothschild, 1995, page 55 
O’Neill uses these four changes to assess how migration has shifted the EU security agenda and how 
this can be seen through the creation and implementation of both the ENP and the common visa and 
asylum system (Schengen). He offers a streamlined definition of security that is often missing from 
securitization literature: “Security is principally concerned with freedom from threat, thus, whatever 
constitutes a threat is, de facto, a security issue” (O’Neill, 2006, page 324). Therefore, human 
migration is perceived as a threat politically, economically and socially for the EU as a whole and its 
member states. It goes some way to explaining the gradual securitization of migration throughout the 
region because migration was only deemed a threat when larger security threats had diminished. As 
O’Neill argues since the end of World War Two, Europe has had other security threats such as post-
war instability and the threat of the Soviet Union up until the early nineties. This supports the 
argument that migration has always been seen as a threat but only in the past twenty years as the 
level of threat been unprecedented. It authenticates the aim of this research to prove that the 
behaviour of securitization of migration in the field began prior to the Maastricht Treaty or 9/11.  
O’Neill has a unique element to his research which is the study of the ENP and how it is used to control 
and securitise the Southern borders of Europe. It is highlighted the Mediterranean Basin has the 
steepest demographic gradient in the world and this has greatly affected how the EU has viewed its 
North African neighbours as a growing security concern (Koikkalainen, 2011). O’Neill outlines how the 
ENP is used to gain a level of control over peripheral neighbours. “The ENP seeks to overcome the 
shortcomings of traditional migration control policies by requiring migration-sending and transit 
countries to embrace the EU’s norms and values” (O’Neill, 2006, page 333). By creating a ‘buffer’ zone 
using the peripheries of Europe the EU is attempting to create a secure zone around its external 
territory. A criticism of O’Neill is that he does not investigate fully the extent to which the EU has a 
Janus faced identity, one of national interests of member states like the UK and one of regional 
interest. This is where this research will contribute to the literature because it will explore the 
juxtaposed national security interest versus the regional security interest and how this has caused the 
migration policies of the EU to stagnate and halt development of a region wide human migration 
policy. It will use the work of Bourdieu to assess how the manipulative or cooperative behaviours have 
affect the different levels of governance in relation to external migration control.  
Another academic that has evolved the Copenhagen School to analyse the securitization of migration 
is Sarah Léonard. Léonard (2010) explores the theme of securitization of migration through the 
practices of the EU and its institutions rather than looking at the theme theoretically as previous 
academics have. By analysing Frontex, Léonard explores that securitization is happening not so much 
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through policy but through practices and the use of such buzz words as integrated border 
management (IBM) (Léonard, 2010). There are many ways that Frontex can be seen as a way in which 
the EU is securitizing its practices. Léonard illustrates that Frontex is the closest that the EU has even 
been to fully coordinating external border management, and it is this part Frontex that has received 
most attention by the media as well as academics (Léonard, 2010). One of the most interesting facets 
of Frontex that Léonard explores is the way in which it aids member states to organise the return of 
migrants to their country of origin and how it is one of the most important securitizing factors of the 
EU. “Nowhere else in the world, and never before, has there been such a high level of sophistication 
in the coordination of operations aiming to expel certain groups of migrants” (Léonard, 2010, page 
246).  Léonard’s use of word certain implies that particular groups of migrants are perceived as more 
of a threat than others. All across migration literature unwanted EU migrants are mostly deduced as 
illegal migrants and from under developed states whose control requires a number of different 
domestic and regional mechanisms. This thesis is unique as it examines not only one migration control 
mechanism but other policies and structures to understand the complexities of the behaviours that 
the field produces. The literature needs to move away from examining singular facets of migration 
control like Frontex and look at the broader behaviours of actors, like the UK and the influences they 
have on all levels of external migration governance.  
More recently there has been a change in the securitization narrative with more academics evolving 
our understanding of the original concepts put forward by the Copenhagen school. Balzacq et al (2016) 
look at the development of securitization as a tool of analysis for analysing governance. Their 
discussion looks beyond securitization as merely a speech act, which sets it apart from other pieces of 
work. They critically examine how securitization can cause an analysis of an issue to become blinded 
by the security rhetoric as more research fills the space around the topic of securitization. “The precise 
point is not that such issues are not or should not be linked, but rather that such issue linkages are 
never neutral. They deserve analysis, as they can often obscure alternative understandings and causal 
chains” (Balzacq et al, 2016, page 505).  It opens the space to discuss how securitization can open the 
doors to other ways of understanding the issues that would normally be shut off if one analysed 
something like the external migration control field within a rigid understanding of securitization. A 
broader securitization space allows for the boundaries of understanding politics and security to be 
more malleable. It also challenges the traditional literature insofar as it begins to review the structure 
and agency of the field by attempting to deconstruct linkages and how actors fit within those linkages.  
An argument developed further by Kaunert et al (2017) who explores securitization as a “strategic or 
pragmatic practice” (page 30). They critique former uses of securitization by proponents of the 
Copenhagen School, in particular how the audience is often ignored in the framework but also an 
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absence of a debate centring on the relationship between the agent and the structure.  In an earlier 
article with Léonard (Kaunert and Léonard, 2012) they suggest a reformulation of the approach to 
securitization as a more flexible tool for analysis. Kaunert et al (2017), develops this further by 
suggesting that the EU itself could act as a securitizing actor. A more fluid definition of who can be a 
securitizing actor and a more flexible approach to securitization demonstrates that research which 
pushes beyond the boundaries of the Copenhagen School approach can be just as legitimate. The 
application of theorists such as Bourdieu can only seek to better the understanding of the external 
migration control field and the UK as an actor of that field. Not only does this reimagine security 
studies, but IR more widely. Something which Léonard and Kaunert advocate further in their book 
Refugees, Security and the European Union (2019). Whilst they specifically focus on refugees, the 
theoretical framework they use develops from their previous work, creating an original analytical tool. 
They discuss that whilst speech acts occur as valid forms of securitization, they also utilise Huysmans 
(2004 and 2006) to discuss viewing securitizing practices as another avenue of understanding (Léonard 
and Kaunert, 2019). They believe that by approaching EU asylum and migration policy from a practice 
based point of view you can develop a more thorough understanding of securitizing practices as much 
of the public rhetoric is one of humanitarianism or when there is no securitizing discourse. This wider 
framework of understanding also allows for other behaviours in the field to be discovered. However, 
it still leaves a gap in understanding the relationship between the structure and agency of actors in 
the external migration control field. 
The changes in approach to securitization can be recognised in more empirical research that has been 
undertaken in the past few years (Hintjens, 2019, Bourbeau, 2015, Ghezelbash, 2018 and Lemaire, 
2018). Bourbeau (2015) discusses the connection between resilience and EU security practices 
drawing on Bigo (2002) to support his argument, the more open framework of understanding 
securitization allows for more than just a discussion of speech acts, it reveals the possibility of 
understanding how actors demonstrate more than just securitizing behaviours through the 
implementation of policy and practice. This is particularly important when assessing the external 
migration control field as some behaviours can be attributed to securitizing practices whilst others 
behaviours could have been overlooked if using a more traditional securitization framework. Hintjens 
(2019) explores failed acts of securitization during the 2015 migration ‘crisis’. She discusses how 
securitizing practices cannot be understood in a linear way, understanding how these practices 
transpire in relation to wider behaviours and the context to which practices are occurring must be 
understood in order to full appreciate the field in question.  
Fill ing the Gaps – What is the Contribution?  
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This section will discussion the original contribution of this thesis, exploring the key areas of 
knowledge that it will add to the literature. It will firstly discuss how the approach used will expand 
the theoretical frameworks of IR. Secondly it will explore how the securitization framework applied in 
this research challenges and expands the current understanding of securitization in relation to 
external migration control.  
At present IR has done little to develop the narrative of migration and is stagnating around discussions 
of borders and security (Weiner, 1985, Mitchell, 1989 and Hollifield, 1992. This research will expand 
upon Weiner’s acknowledgement that EU member states recognise the importance of migration as a 
tool to reorder the national boundaries. This thesis will develop and modernise IR migration literature 
by exposing more complex relationships that structure the external migration control field. This is why 
the UK was chosen as the key unit of analysis as its unique position within the field offers a thought-
provoking insight into how the field functions. The literature needs to be expanded away from a 
discussion of internal politics and develop more into a conversation of how linkages and doxical norms 
within the field effect policy as well as contributing factors from outside the field and this is what this 
thesis has achieved. It will also expand the critical literature of external migration controls by 
understanding relations beyond that of positive and negative relations through the seeking of 
cooperative and manipulative behaviour evidenced in the data analysed. 
This research reflects how differing policies are a lens in which to see the relationship the UK has with 
the EU, that policies and engagement with mechanism of the field such as Frontex. This thesis expands 
beyond the space of security and understands how other behaviours are present and what this does 
to the structure of the field, whether the behaviour could be considered manipulative or cooperative. 
Unlike the majority of existing literature this research understands that the securitization and 
subsequent changes to the structures of the field pre date the creation and implementation of the 
Schengen Accord (Martin, 1999, Ireland 1991 and Geddes 1997 & 2000) This gives rise for this thesis 
to explore and present a unique element of ‘Fortress Europe’ literature that acknowledges all the 
factors both political and economic that give rise to Europe managing its external borders. 
One of the unique identifiers of this research is the analysis of manipulative behaviour by the UK in 
the external migration control field.  Manipulative behaviour by actors in any field of area of research 
in IR has had little attention however, this thesis opens the discussion into a modern understanding 
of what manipulation might mean for actors in the external migration control field and how as a 
behaviours it has the potential to change an actors position in the field as well as effecting structures 
and mechanisms. It is of particular interest to those that study the EU more broadly as it could be used 
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as a concept to understand a number of different relationship between national and regional actors, 
both within the EU and outside of it.  
There is a distinct gap in the literature around how the continual securitization of external migration 
effects the structures of the field. The current literature approaches using a securitization framework 
to only study reactive policies and approaches to issues, rather than looking at securitization as a 
continuum (Huysmans 1995, 2000 & 2006, Adamson, 2006, Boswell, 2007, Wæver et al, 1993 and 
O’Neill, 2006). This has been addressed by exploring how the UK and the EU has always kept migration 
and security policy relatively close together but it will highlight that to integrate its security and 
migration policies the EU is a long way from completing this consolidation because of manipulative 
behaviour from the UK in the field of external migration control. This thesis has also developed this 
idea by critically assessing the UK and EU attempts toward developing relationships with its peripheral 
neighbours through strategies such as the ENP and how through schemes such as the ENP there are 
elements of control and security rather than development and friendship. It complements the core 
concept of cooperation between the actors.  
As discussed earlier in the chapter there is a large gap in the securitization literature where there is 
little discussion around the structure and agency dichotomy when dismantling the external migration 
control field. This thesis will directly look at how the UK engages with the structures that have been 
historically established in the field and how this engagement effects its position within the field but 
also how that engagement could have an impact on the structures of the field. Unlike other 
securitization literature which shies away tackling the agency/structure narrative this research uses a 
unique theoretical framework to understand how the UK manages its position in the external 
migration control field. 
Conclusions 
This research around the subject of UK and EU external migration control will position itself within all 
of these themes and create a piece of literature that will explore the policy structures and apply the 
theories of Bourdieu to understand the behaviours of actors in the EU external migration control field. 
The IR literature on the subject of human migration in too broad to ever get an in depth understanding 
of an actor’s behaviour. This thesis provides the specificity that the literature needs alongside 
expanding the theoretical boundaries of the subject. Much of the substantial literature on migration 
and IR is older and does not take into account recent migration trends and political structures. The 
policy literature has informed this research by illustrating how the EU control structures compare to 
other states and regions. However, the literature concentrates on the impact of the policies, what this 
research will create is analysis of how these policies where created and how their conception and 
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creation impacted upon actor’s relationships in the field. The next chapter will outline the theoretical 
framework that will analyse the data chosen to answer the research question. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
The Theoretical Framework:  
Constructivism and Bourdieu 
External human migration (human migration that originates from outside the EU) has been a growing 
concern to individuals, communities, governments and regions of the European Union (EU) and its 
member states. The migration boom of the past 50 years has been unprecedented, especially in 
Europe, effecting the development of the modern world, politically, economically and culturally. This 
chapter will introduce the theoretical framework which will assess these dramatic changes to the 
external migration control landscape. The discussion will begin with how Constructivism has informed 
the foundations of the framework, in particular the work of Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan. From the 
concepts of securitization and Speech Acts the discussion will move on to the work of Pierre Bourdieu, 
whose theoretical framework dominates the theoretical approach of this research. As well as a 
Bourdieu other scholars who have adapted his work will be discussed as they have informed the use 
of Field Theory, alongside his other theoretical concepts such as doxa and habitus. Special attention 
will be given to how theories outside of the discipline of IR not only compliment the core concepts of 
securitization, manipulation and cooperation but how they can be threaded with IR theories to create 
a strong theoretical framework which will support the research questions and methodology of this 
thesis.  
Constructivism 
Constructivism is the analysis of the agents and structures of international relations whose actions are 
explained through a sociological and historical understanding. A constructivist would argue that a 
state or institution is constructed through social and historical influences. Nicholas Onuf (1989) was 
the first IR scholar to coin the term constructivism in relation to IR (Jackson and Sørensen, 2010). A 
current example of this is the possible accession of Turkey into the EU. One of the concerns is the 
social integration of a state that whose population is predominantly Muslim. Although there are 
concerns about the stability of the state, especially the civil unrest between the Turkish and the 
Kurdish populations many of the decisions and negotiations surrounding the possible accession have 
been influenced more by the idea of societal differences (europa.eu, 2004). A constructivist would 
argue that the unlikely accession of Turkey to the Union would not necessarily only be based upon 
member states national security being threatened it is the threat of a different culture permeating the 
EU making it less “European” alongside previous colonial tensions between the Ottoman empire and 
European states.  
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Alexander Wendt is one of the leading and influential IR constructivist thinkers and his work discussing 
the relationship between agents and structure have become classic pieces of constructivist literature. 
Wendt critically deconstructs the dominant theories of that time; neorealism and world systems 
theory. He identifies how these theories lack a way in which to conceptualize “entities [individuals, 
states and institutions] and their relationship” (Wendt, 1987, page 338). What Wendt is 
demonstrating is the way in which to explain why an agent is the way it is, which is what neorealism 
and world system theory do not achieve. Wendt argues that a positivist approach does not take into 
account previous interaction between actors. He suggests “external relations are important for 
explaining what happens to entities in the course of their interaction, but they do not explain the 
essential characteristics of those entities themselves” (Wendt, 1987, page 346). This statement 
highlights the very framework of constructivist analysis which is; recognising the empirical interaction 
between states is important but it is the question of why they act the way they do, for example will 
states cooperate or become conflicted. Relations within the external migration control field cannot be 
analysed in isolation of the wider relations that exist, for example analysis of the UK’s external 
migration control policies cannot be done in isolation of the EU. The essential characteristics of EU 
member states when they negotiate and use migration control mechanisms are key to understanding 
the policy decisions that have been made. Using Wendt’s framework of understanding, an actor’s 
behaviour must not be taken at face value but understood in context to historical and wider relation. 
In a later piece of work Wendt applies his concepts in context to security.  
Wendt (1992) evolved his argument and looks specifically at the way in which states act when they 
are faced with a security dilemma. He argues that the structure of a state “is an ongoing [sic] 
accomplishment of practice, not a once-and-for-all creation of norms that somehow exist apart from 
practice” (Wendt, 1992, page 413). The ‘practice’ of security is something which is an ever changing 
challenge for states and now is a challenge for large regional institutions like the EU and for its member 
states, such as the UK. A security threat will change over time and a state’s reaction to a perceived 
threat will also change. Wendt recognises the way in which territories and boundaries are perceived 
is not as simple as a line on the map; “In the modern world we are used to thinking of territorial 
boundaries as vanishing thin lines on a map, so that the states spatial extension is precisely delimited” 
(Wendt, 1998, page 211). The EU, for example, has adopted this very structure by decreasing the 
importance of internal borders and delimiting the power the EU has over its member states. As the 
sovereignty and boundaries of a member state change as does the way in which it will securitize 
against perceived threats. This malleable approach to how states use their territories has influenced 
how we could understand the UK as a manipulator in the external migration control field. The overall 
approach to the data has been with Wendt’s idea that spatial delimitation is greatly influenced by 
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what it perceives as a threat, therefore the research question reflects the idea that the UKs 
participation in external migration controls and mechanisms can be a flexible approach. A flaw within 
in Wendt’s work is how he does not analyse the detailed relationships that exist in a region like the 
EU. The complex web of member state relations versus the external relations of the EU and also 
bilateral relations between single member states and external neighbours is a detailed security nexus.  
Around the same time as Wendt was discussing security and state structure the Copenhagen School 
was founded. The school focused on the ideas of constructivism and two of their biggest contributors 
are Barry Buzan and Ole Wӕver. Unlike Wendt, Buzan and Wæver examined states and regional actors 
in greater detail allowing a better understanding of their complex relationship with security. Firstly, 
the main concepts of their work will be discussed and then there will be more a more detailed 
demonstration of the use of Speech Act Theory in informing the theoretical framework of this 
research, which both academics have been highly influential in developing.  
The changing landscape of security studies in IR was highly influenced by Buzan and Wӕver who took 
the core concepts of constructivism and began applying them to modern day security concerns. Their 
work reflects not only the change in the subject but also the changing political landscape at the end 
of the Cold War. Wæver and Buzan (1993) reflected of the fear societies had of mass migration across 
Western Europe just after the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992. It recognises the beginnings of 
what they perceive to be the securitization of migration across the world. Migratory routes are 
problematic for the societies of member states as well as the EU as a symbiotic “society” in which 
member states attempt to culturally and politically come together as one actor. However, not all 
member states engage with the EU project in the same way. The UK in particular still suffers from the 
“fear” of migration changing its societal make up even from migrants that are from the inside of the 
EU (Somerville, 2007), which in turn effect its international relations with member states and external 
neighbours of the EU such as North Africa. This complex web of security interests is looked at in more 
detail by Buzan in his work People, States and Fear (2nd Edition, 1991). Buzan recognises that security 
is not simply influenced by the actions of one state to another. The relationship exists at all levels of 
the state, regional and world.  
 “Security complexes offer a systemic approach to security analysis which requires attention 
to the macro level of great power impact on the system, the middle level of local state relations, and 
the micro level of domestic affairs. In forcing attention to all three levels, security complexes 
emphasize the mutuality of impact among them, with external influences tending to amplify local 
problems, and local problems shaping and constraining external entanglements and influences”. 
Buzan, 1991, page 222 
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Migration in the EU is shaped by these very ideas of different levels of the structure having direct 
impact on one another. The suspension of the Schengen area during the Arab Spring in 2011 is one 
such example which will be explored further later in the text. Like Wendt however the detail of the 
regional complexities is not explained in enough detail to better understand the externalisation of 
migration by the EU and member states and how these practices effect the structure of the field.  
In a later text, developing the concept of ‘new’ security threats, Security: A New Framework for 
Analysis (Buzan, Wӕver and Wilde, 1998) demonstrates creating a constructivist framework for 
analysing the growing securitization of ‘new’ security issues such as societal and environmental 
security concerns. What the text illustrates is the need for constructivists to not throw away the 
traditional realist frameworks of analysis as they can help extend the subject further. “It is not just 
about tacking the word security onto economic, environmental and societal. Pursuing the wider 
security agenda requires giving careful consideration to what is meant by security and applying that 
understanding to a range of dynamics” (Buzan et al, 1998, page 195).  As the framework for 
understanding the growing number of security concerns has developed, so has the framework in 
which to understand what a security threat is. The widening of the consideration of what is perceived 
and then acted upon as a security threat has influenced the way in which the data in this project has 
been approached. Rather than seeking data that is explicitly centred on the securitization of external 
migration, the practice of accepting a wider understanding of security rather than compartmentalising 
the concept allowed the search for data to be wider and include a variety of documents, a further 
discussion of this will be in the next chapter. 
The use of a broader understanding of what constitutes a security threat was then developed further 
by the Copenhagen School. The Speech Act Theory is a method of analysing the way in which a ‘threat’ 
is securitized. In order for securitization to take place there needs to be a structure in place in which 
agents act their part. Firstly, there needs to be a threat for example migration and these threats can 
be real, perceived or a diversion. Secondly there needs to exist an object which is likely to be negatively 
affected by this threat for example a town and thirdly an audience who reacts positively to the speech 
act in order to justify the securitizing actions of the agent who has perceived this threat. Wӕver 
summarises the key points of the Speech Act Theory: “by uttering “security” a state representative 
moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever 
mean are necessary to block it” (Wӕver, 1995, page 55). What Wӕver achieves through theorising 
the use of speech acts is a developed way of understanding how states justify the securitization 
processes against threats. If the speech act is used to develop policy for two separate issues such as 
security and migration, the act itself binds the two together therefore giving a state or institution more 
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right to act against both areas of policy. However, as Michael C. Williams argues that it is not as simple 
as a state claiming that action needs to be taken against a particular threat.     
Williams (2003) offers a thorough analysis of the speech act theory as well as bringing it up to date to 
include security issues post-9/11. He addresses one of the biggest criticisms and misinterpretations of 
speech act theory (see McDonald, 2008 and Glover, 2011). “Security is not just any kind of speech 
act… It is a specific kind of act: what makes a particular speech act… is its casting of the issues one of 
an “existential threat” which calls for extraordinary measures beyond the routines and norms of 
everyday life” (Williams, 2003, page 514). The speech act is not an everyday occurrence of political 
life; it is a process. The securitization of migration in Europe began with the Treaty of Rome (1957) 
when migration of guest workers was seen as a potential threat so the speech act occurred. Title 3 of 
the treaty is titled Free Movement of People, Services and Capital which defines what a migrant in 
Europe can and cannot do. From that point in 1957 migration in the EU began its securitizing process. 
As Mitchell (2006) explored European states, such as Germany, saw migrants as workers first and later 
a threat to unemployment and welfare. The speech act then develops as the threat develops. This has 
greatly influenced the analysis of data for this research. It has focused the coding process to highlight 
speech acts made by actors, such as the UK, of the external migration control field.  
Didier Bigo specifically looks at this is his article Security and Migration (2002). He develops the speech 
act by understanding that there are now more and more actors taking part. He supports Wӕver’s 
framework but also strengthens it by highlighting the way in which migration has been developed 
through politics and even claims that “the relation between security and migration is fully and 
immediately political” (Bigo, 2002, page 2002). He illustrates that this has been possible through the 
way in which migration policy has evolved and how society’s perception of migration has greatly 
changed especially since the Maastricht Treaty (1992). One of the main reasons for this has been the 
“Europeanization” of migration as a security threat. Not only are internal EU migrants perceived as 
threat (particularly to those not within the Schengen area), external migrants from North Africa (and 
other areas) are also a threat to the whole of the EU. The sharing of power and sovereignty to control 
migration is itself a speech act. Frontex is a key development that was ultimately created out of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and a distinct marker which illustrates the evolution of the securitization 
of migration in Europe and of the external migration control field. The treaty was the speech act which 
empowered the EU to fund a new border control project that receives €143 million in funding per 
annum from the European Commission and associated states. 
Media discourse, within the theory, is not represented as something that greatly impacts upon the 
speech acts of the political world. The media, especially online media outlets and social networking, 
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are of growing importance in representing the views of politicians as well as the general public. 
However, Williams (2003) did go some way to quashing this idea by highlighting that media outlets 
are facilitators of the speech act not the speech act itself. Speech act theory helps to understand the 
way in which states securitize but it does not explain why certain threats are securitized, why some 
are given higher priorities than others. Constructivism and the Copenhagen School are a solid IR 
framework for the research but the addition of other academics outside the field can strengthen the 
theoretical framework even further. Constructivism identifies what could be considered an act of 
securitization by using speech act theory but it offers little in relation to a field of analysis.  The 
literature focusses too much on securitization, what is needed is a better interpretation of different 
behaviours in relation to the norms of the field. For example, speech acts can be used to identify 
cooperative and manipulative behaviour, therefore widening the scope in which it can be used. What 
will now be illustrated is by using other thinkers such as Pierre Bourdieu and how the threads of 
constructivism discussed can be pulled together to build an effective frame work to deconstruct the 
behaviours of the external migration control field. 
Bourdieu: Field Theory, Capital Habitus and Doxa  
Unlike Constructivism, Bourdieu allows for a greater number of actors to be considered and cross 
referenced by using the term field: “The government is not the field of power, but is one of the sites 
in which power operates” (Webb et al, 2002, page 86). Fields are areas in which individuals, states and 
international institutions can operate. There are two main types of field, cultural and political, 
Bourdieu (2010) insists that although they are linked they can be analysed separately. For the 
purposes of deconstructing the securitization of migration by the UK as an actor in the external 
migration control field, the political fields of power are most applicable. When referring to a field of 
power it will be a political field, unless otherwise stated. Bourdieu believes that a political field of 
power reduces the status of citizens to consumer as they have control of the ‘products’ they 
‘consume’, it is in turn a “field of ideological production” (Bourdieu, 1991, page 177). The external 
migration control field is the field in which this thesis explores the relationships and mechanism that 
actors use and how relationships have developed and shaped the field.  
Migration is an issue that posits many fields of power, security, economic, geographies demographics 
and political (Assem and Drent, 2012). This is where one can see the ability of field theory to transcend 
the binary border debates that are discussed by academics such as Geddes (2000 and 2008). Bourdieu 
is a starting point for the analysis of securitization however there are other academics that have taken 
his work further. Bigo (others such as Berling 2012, Cohen 2011 and Leander 2006, 2011 also use 
Bourdieu and will be discussed further later in this chapter) is an advocate of the way in which 
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Bourdieu deconstructs the traditional structures power and security and how they have wider 
application beyond sociology. Bigo discusses the gap between the traditional internal/external 
narrative and policing/military arguments and how these theoretical gaps could be pulled together 
(see Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002). However instead of concluding that the EU and its member states 
are securitizing migration beyond their own borders, Bigo is using Bourdieu’s theories to take the 
argument further and suggests that: “security has come to depend on security networks, agreements 
between countries and security agencies, and even on private insurance systems and companies” 
(Bigo, 2001, page 105). Security is no longer something that a state has the sole franchise of, it is 
passed on to agencies, such as Frontex, further within the borders of a state and beyond the borders 
of a state.  
Bigo explains how deeper securitization is partially down to the end of the Cold War. He believes that 
the loss of the Soviet Union had a similar effect on security policy within states such as the USA, as the 
loss of the gold exchange standard had on the international monetary system (Bigo, 2001). It left 
security issues, whether they be environment, human or military, in a vacuum with more powerful 
states making sure that the security issues they found most important were placed in their own field 
of power. “They [fields] are nearly always the product of relations and the circulation of power inside 
and between fields, as well as an imposition of problems coming from the dominant field” (Bigo, 2011, 
page 231). However, Bigo highlights the importance of context when looking at domination and the 
creation of fields by more powerful states is to realise that it is situated in time, space and subject 
area. Examined in this research the external migration control field starts at the Treaty of Rome in 
1957 up until the end of 2014. The value of Bourdieu is that the actors, and the roles they have within 
the field, can be fluid and change according to circumstances, whether they be political or cultural.  
Bigo furthers his deconstruction of Bourdieu’s field theory by offering the idea that fields create 
borders, however the boundaries that fields create are more flexible. “The boundaries of the field are 
then almost always in a process of changing flux. Indeed, fields can merge or differentiate through 
time” (Bigo, 2011, page 240). This is an amalgamation of the two ideas that have been discussed, on 
the one hand there still are borders to protect however they may not necessarily be geographical, and 
they could be based on political ideology for example. On the other hand, the field theory allows 
scholars to analyse structures that do not exist in terms of institutions or states. It allows, for example, 
the way in which migration is securitized in the EU outside of the conventional arguments to be 
identified. Rather than viewing it as something which is securitized it can be viewed as a manipulative 
or cooperative act. In relation to this project the analysis of the data will be able to identify 
manipulative and cooperate behaviours of the actors within the external migration control field.  
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Berling (2012) has constructed a basic analysis of Bourdieu and his use in International Relations and 
the subject of security. What she argues is that the way in which the EU is now structured with its 
multiple actors who transcend the national and/or the regional the more traditional analysis is 
insufficient, especially in terms of security. Security is no longer state centred and controlled solely by 
the military it is progressively becoming dominated by ‘insecurity’ professionals (Berling, 2012). 
“[insecurity professionals are] establishing a high degree of hegemony over European security 
knowledge especially in relation to immigration” (Berling, 2012). A member state, the EU or other 
actors, dependent on the field, may no longer be viewed as the hegemonic power of the securitization 
of migration. It is now the responsibility of actors such as Frontex or the ENP who have created a new 
field of power (Bigo, 2000). One in which they can influence policy by writing reports on the issue and 
publishing papers in the press that create the perceived threat of migration, which in time has caused 
the securitization of migration. In relation to this research, field theory can aid the exploration of the 
complex and multifaceted approach to migration control that the EU and its member states have 
created. However, Berling perceives this to be a reaction since the creation of the JHA pillar in 1992 
however this research will analyse data which shows the behaviours of the external migration control 
field predate 1992, going back as far as 1957. 
In IR there has been a growing interest of non-military security arguments since the mid 1980’s with 
the Copenhagen School of Security Studies leading the way. The shift in literature outside of IR, in 
areas such as Sociology and Cultural Studies, place the paradigmatic shift of analysis in the early 2000’s 
around the time of 9/11 (for example Berling 2012 and Huysmans 2006). This research will prove that 
the politics of insecurity began earlier in the century. The Nottingham and Notting Hill race riots in 
1958 and Enoch Powell’s Rivers of Blood (1968) speech were early evidence of growing insecurity in 
the UK alone, as stricter entry rules were enforced after each cultural and political event. Sassen 
(1999) even predates the existence of securitization to the late 19th century the creation of the 
European Economic Community (EEC) and its evolution into the EU was a reaction to economic 
insecurity, which migration was part of, were all the beginnings of the securitization of migration. As 
Leander (2011) explains, Bourdieu can ‘stage’ international relations, because it deconstructs the 
paradigms of traditional structures of analysis. The securitization of migration can be broken down 
into smaller fields of analysis as well as be able to make more connections surrounding the 
relationships of these fields. When analysing the data sets for this research the field can be used at its 
largest or to investigate more intricate relationships between particular actors.  
 An example of which can be found in the work of Huysmans. Huysmans’ book titled The Politics of 
Insecurity (2006) goes deeper into the analysis of the changing structures of migration security in the 
EU and of its member states. In an earlier article The European Union and the Securitization of 
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Migration (2000) Huysmans examines how migration as a security issue had effected and was 
continuing to affect the integration process of the EU. At this point in history it also appeared that the 
EU would attempt to create a common migration policy which is reflected in the positive outlook of 
the article. He argues that migration was rendered a security issue more than a political or a societal 
issue. This is a theme which he continues through to The Politics of Insecurity (2006). However, in this 
text he realises that the securitization is occurring at multiple levels, both regionally and nationally, 
rather than just at EU policy making levels. Huysmans uses Bigo to illustrate that the network of 
securitization is moving beyond the ‘normal’ limits of bureaucracy. This is where Bourdieu allows a 
researcher to use his tools of analysis to understand that you can construct fields to enable you to 
analyse what the normal agency versus structures argument cannot.  
Bourdieu was a sociologist, anthropologist, philosopher and political commentator that spent much 
of his career at Science Po in Paris researching the concept of power. He concerned himself with how 
power was transferred between different actors in society and how structures of power were passed 
through generations, especially through the education system. He created a unique means of 
understanding these systems: Field Theory. Bourdieu’s texts Language and Symbolic Power (1991) and 
Distinction (translated by Bennett 2010, originally published in 1979) both discuss field theory, 
however Bourdieu wrote Language and Symbolic Power (1991) much later in his career. For Bourdieu 
fields are malleable units of analysis that can be formed by researchers to group together actors who 
are interconnected either through power that they share or power they wish to gain; Bourdieu refers 
to this as capital. “Capital is the sum of resources actual or virtual” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, 
page 119). The capital forms part of the network in which the actors of the field relate to one another. 
It becomes an asset to an actor and has the ability to maintain or improve their position within the 
field. Greater discussion of capital in relation to this research will be later in this chapter.  
Bourdieu explains field theory as a methodological instrument, a means of understanding why actors 
pursue particular capital gains at particular junctures (Bourdieu, 1991). In context to this research 
particular political and/or historical markers have been used assess an actor’s behaviour. These 
markers are the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) and the UK Immigration Bill 
(2014) as they illustrate key moments in the history between the two actors where large amounts of 
capital have been gained or lost. This complex web of exchanges is made even more complex when 
actors play ‘the double game’ whereby they gain power whilst maintain social relationships and social 
structures (Bourdieu, 1991). “The political discourses produced by professionals are always doubly 
determined, and affected by a duplicity which is not in the least intentional since it results from the 
duality of fields of reference and the necessity of serving at one and the same time the esoteric aims 
of internal struggles and the exoteric aims of external struggles” (Bourdieu, 1991, page 183). An actor 
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in a field will always look to manipulate their position in order to gain more capital, which will be 
explored in much greater detail later in the thesis.  
Bourdieu has written extensively on the formation and reproduction of the state. In an article headed 
Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field (1994) Bourdieu explores how 
the power of the state comes from its ability to produce and impose power to all things within the 
social world. The state is a “set of people recognising the same universal principles” (Bourdieu, 2014, 
page 12). He pulls on Max Weber’s ideas that a state is an undetermined entity which lays claim to the 
use of physical and symbolic violence over a specific territory and the population that lives within it. 
This power is housed and utilised through “specific organisational structure and mechanisms” 
(Bourdieu, 1994, page 4). The organisational structures and mechanisms in the field of external 
migration control are managed by the EU. This research extends the understanding of the state in 
Bourdieusian terms to include a regional actor as the most dominant in the field as the EU. The EU has 
the dominant role of ensuring the doxa is maintained within the external migration control field. The 
EU can then extend its power through state actors, in the case of this research, the UK alongside other 
key actors such as Frontex.  
The field that will be created as a unit of analysis for this research is the external migration control 
field and the capital will be the level of control over external migration. The power that is exercised 
by actors in the field is not necessarily a literal power it can be symbolic: “symbolic power is that 
invisible power which can be exercised only with the complicity of those who do not want to know 
that they are subject to it or even that themselves exercise it” (Bourdieu, 1991, page 163). This concept 
follows a neo-Kantian tradition of seeing different symbolic universes as structures of knowing and 
forming the world around us. Symbolic power allows there to be a consensus because it facilitates the 
social world we live in (Bourdieu, 1991). The use of symbols by certain groups give them a distinctive 
positon in the field. The most dominant actor in the field will set their own position as their ideology 
is doubly determined not only do they produce the symbols they also maintain them. Bourdieu 
expresses that symbolic power is not illocutionary, it is through the relationship between those who 
exercise it and those who submit to it, for example a teacher and a student. 
Symbolic power is the way in which the dominant actor ensures that the doxa of the field are adhered 
to, it is a “power that is exercised in such an invisible way that people are unaware of its existence, 
and those subject to it are the first among these, since the very exercise of this power depends in this 
lack of awareness” (Bourdieu, 2014, page 163). Symbolic power is built over time and is woven into 
the fabric of the field, adhered to and if not an actor will be held to account and possibly have its 
position in the field altered to a less desirable positon. Autonomy within a field exists because of 
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accumulated capital, for example, UK participation in particular structures like Frontex allows it 
greater autonomy. 
Bourdieu expands upon his discussion of the state by claiming that; “The state is the culmination of a 
process of concentration of different species of capital” (1994, page 4). The different capitals could be 
associated with physical force such as an army, economic capital, informational capital, cultural capital 
and symbolic capital. The state for Bourdieu encapsulates all of these differing forms of capital and 
becomes a “meta-capital granting power over other species of capital and their holders” (1994, page 
4). This then enables the state to exercise power over a number of different fields, allowing fields to 
gain capital but also reserves the power to revoke capital from fields too. The type of capital created 
is dependent on the field. Capital then indirectly effects the structures of the field, this actions is 
dependent on who controls the field (Bourdieu, 2005). Whilst the processes for gaining each individual 
type of capital can be separate from one another, Bourdieu argues that the processes are 
interdependent, therefore should not be seen in complete isolation. In relation to the EU being the 
most dominant actor in the external migration control field, one can see how the EU fits in easily into 
the traditional role of the state, being part of multiple fields with the ability to grant capital and take 
it away if needed. The UK, as the key focus of this research, sits as a key actor within the field and is 
susceptible to the dominance of the EU as head of the field. It means the UK is not in a position to 
change the doxa of the field but can use habitual behaviours and gain capital to change its position in 
the field by using the structures and mechanisms put in place by the EU, or those that have been 
jointly created.  
In his discussion of information capital Bourdieu claims that the state enforces common values and 
ways of thinking through state structures which constructs the identity of the state. In other words, 
the way that we view the state is in fact a product of the state and the state is simply a structure where 
a “set of people [are] recognising the same universal principles” (Bourdieu, 2014, page 12). Symbolic 
capital on the other hand is more malleable as a concept, Bourdieu views it as: “any property… when 
it is perceived by social agents endowed with categories of perception which cause them to know it 
and to recognise it, to give it value” (Bourdieu, 1994, page 8). Whilst symbolic capital does not 
necessarily have a physical value or form, it is often one of the more powerful forms of capital as it 
embodies the values and cultural of the structures it forms and the power that whomever controls 
symbolic capital has. In relation how the state bestows capital Bourdieu argues that, “there is a shift 
from a diffuse symbolic capital, resting solely on collective recognition, to an objectified symbolic 
capital, codified, delegated and guaranteed by the state, in a word bureaucratised” (Bourdieu, 1994, 
page 11). Delegated capital is key in allowing an actor to exist and participate within the field, 
particularly if the actors wishes to gain a better position within that field, like the UK in the external 
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migration control field in order to have more sway on how it is managed. By gaining capital the UK 
solidifies or even has the possibility of bettering its position in the field.  
Other sociologists such as Richard Jenkins and IR academic Rebecca Adler-Nissen (2008) illuminate the 
possibilities of what can be done with Bourdieu’s concept of capital. Jenkins breaks down Bourdieu’s 
understanding of capital further claiming that there are 4 categories; economic, social, cultural and 
symbolic (Jenkins, 2002). All these differing forms of capital form the field as well as facilitating 
interactions within it. However, the forms of capital addressed by Bourdieu can be reinterpreted as 
Adler-Nissen also claims that political actors will also compete for diplomatic capital (2008). This is 
because an actor’s primary concern is the improvement of its position within the field, whether that 
be to preserve it or to improve it (Field, 2003). This is what will be used to examine the UK’s behaviour 
in relation to external migration control to assess how they maintain their relationships with other 
actors.  
Bourdieu then furthers the discussion of symbolic capital by exploring the behaviours of submission 
and obedience whereby it “creates the conditions for a kind of immediate orchestration of habituses 
which is itself the foundation of a consensus over this set of shared evidences constitutive of common 
sense” (Bourdieu, 1994, page 13). Submission and obedience are key when analysing the external 
migration control field, as key doxic norms like freedom of movement must be abided by, however, 
the orchestration of habituses as Bourdieu mentions are what are created out of the submission of 
actors within the field, areas in which actors can stray from the doxic submission so readily wielded 
by the most dominant actor, in this case the EU. However, the most dominant actor does not always 
use its position of power in such an explicit way, as Bourdieu explains; “The dominant is the one that 
occupies a position in the structure such that the structure acts on its behalf” by defining what is 
regular and what are the rules (Bourdieu, 2005, page 195). This thesis uses the parliamentary 
transcripts, policy documents and reports to understand how the UK fits within this structure to 
demonstrate how their submission to the doxa of the field is readily evidenced through policy creation, 
implementation and interactions with other actors in the field or as Bourdieu writes “doxic submission 
to the established order” (Bourdieu, 1994, page 15).  
The definition between doxa and habitus can often be blurred, the lines crossing between the two 
and one becoming the other. However, there is a distinct need to ensure that the two concepts are 
clearly defined as they serve very different purposes within any given field, in the case of this research, 
the external migration control field. Firstly there will be a discussion of doxa, how it relates to this 
research and how it influences actors in the field. Secondly there will be a discussion of the habituses 
of the field, how they are created and maintained alongside how they affect an actor’s position in the 
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field. Thirdly there will be a conversation of how the habitus and doxa intersect in the field of external 
migration control.  
Before doxa can be established the field needs to be created. Actors create the field deforming the 
space and inserting their own structures. The field of analysis for this research is the area of external 
migration control. This field was identified as it holds a unique collection of actors and norms. Other 
actors in the field are made of member states, organisations such as Frontex, and neighbouring states 
to the EU. The most important actor however, and the subject of this research is the UK. The UK has 
been chosen as previous theoretical insights into its relationship with the EU in relation to external 
migration control are limited, with most discussions centring on the concept of securitization. Whilst 
this thesis does explore securitization it is done within a space that allows for discussion to move away 
from the standard UK/EU rhetoric.  
From the space during the establishment of the field comes the insertion of doxa, as Bourdieu 
describes it doxa is a “particular point of view, the point of  view of the dominant, when it presents 
and imposes itself as a universal point of view” (Bourdieu, 1994, page 15). The universal view is then 
adopted by all those within the field. In the case of the external migration control field the doxa was 
founded around the time of the Treaty of Rome (1957) with the then EEC deforming the migration 
control space and re-establishing a new cross regional order. “It is the immediate and tacit agreement, 
in every respect opposed to an explicit contract, that founds the relation of doxic submission which 
attaches us to the established order with all the ties of the unconscious” (Bourdieu, 1994, page 14). 
The difference between doxa and norms, discussed by Constructivists such as Wendt and Weaver 
(1992 and 1995), is that doxa is a submission, it is completely unconscious, and its implicit nature 
forgoes the norm building that actors undertake by a Constructivists standard. Bourdieu challenges 
the Marxist understanding of consciousness; “It is the doxic submission of the dominated to the 
structures of a social order of which their mental structures are the product that Marxism cannot 
understand insofar as it remains trapped in the intellectualist tradition of the philosophies of 
consciousness” (Bourdieu, 1994, page 14). Bourdieu speaks of doxa as existing across structures of the 
field, it is accepted by actors in the field as self-evident and is an adherence to relations of order. The 
structures it creates posit the real world, as Bourdieu describes, and the thought world, inextricably 
linking them so that adherence to it becomes unconscious (Bourdieu, 1984). Doxa as the universe of 
the undiscussed and undisputed (Bourdieu, 1977). This is not to say that once the doxa is established 
that it cannot be challenged. Bourdieu discusses the idea that crisis can bring doxa into question but 
is not sufficient enough to change it. For example the suspension of the Schengen Agreement during 
the Arab Spring in 2011 and the reinstate of a number of internal EU borders during the so called 
refugee “crisis” in 2015 can be viewed as watershed moments which could have altered the doxa. 
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However, these moments in recent external migration control history did little to change the doxa, 
this is because the dominant actor seeks to defend the doxa. If the doxa changes so do the structures 
that it has built and maintained, therefore damaging, or at worst, dismantling the power held by the 
most dominant actor.  
Habitus is another concept that forms part of Bourdieu’s complex framework of understanding. One 
of the many definitions he has given habitus is:  
“[Habitus] is necessity internalised and converted into a disposition that generates meaningful 
practices and meaning giving perceptions; it is a general, transposable disposition which carries out a 
systematic, universal application – beyond the limits of what has been directly learnt – of the necessity 
inherent in the learning conditions”.  
Bourdieu, 1984, page 170 
It is one of the more challenging concepts as it is a concept that has evolved throughout Bourdieu’s 
work. Habitus is an estimation of chances based on past transformations, however, they are firstly 
defined without calculation. Habitus is often a reactive behaviour with little thought, however, past 
experiences of actors in the field play a part in its conception and delivery. For example, the UK 
producing law that would relate to the external migration control field means it will keep the doxa 
intact, however, to gain capital in the field or to change position within the field, habitual behaviours 
are calculated from previous interactions and implemented to attain the aim it wished. As such, 
habitus is a product of history, it has infinite capacity as it is not just a reproduction of the original 
condition, and it takes into account habituses that have gone before it. Habitus is “objectively 
‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without being in any way the product of obedience to the rules, they can be 
collectively orchestrated without being the product of the organising action of a conductor” 
(Bourdieu, 1992, page 53). The conductor of the external migration control field is the EU and habitus 
can be formed by the UK without having to necessarily conform to the dominant structures and 
behaviours, such as the UK not being part of the Schengen area but still taking part in Frontex (a more 
in-depth discussion of this dichotomy is in the analytical chapters of this thesis). Habitus will manage 
its own constancy by defending itself against new information that goes against its accumulated 
information. Habitus will then protect itself from crisis and will find a way to reinforce its disposition, 
they are temporal structures that adjust to a probable future. This is the key difference between 
habitus and doxa is the temporary nature of it. However, habitus is not always viewed as a deviant act 
and is produced within regulations and is “objectively adjusted to the logic characteristic of a particular 
field” (Bourdieu, 1992, page 56). As it can be produced within the standard regulations of a field, the 
most dominant actor (the EU) can trust actors within the field to remain within the doxa and structures 
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it produces. It allows the UK to deviate from the field, to ensure its own objectives are met whilst 
appearing to conform to the doxa of the external migration control field.  
Habitus operates in the external migration control field by allowing the UK a flexibility that is unique 
to its position within the field. Whilst the UK can be viewed as an actor that continually pushes against 
the doxic structures and norms implemented by the EU, especially when viewed through theoretical 
lenses such as Constructivism, Bourdieu’s concept of habitus opens the possibility that whilst the UK 
can be a deviant actor, underneath the public rhetoric lies an actor who is continually addressing and 
readdressing its position within the field. Habitus particularly affords the external migration field the 
ability to act in self-interest, such as the creation of bilateral agreements. This is where the intersection 
between doxa and habitus in the external migration control field lies. Doxa acts as the check and 
balance that the UK needs to ensure that its habitual behaviours are within the established structures 
of the field. Whilst the unconscious submission to these doxic structures do not appear explicitly in 
the relationship the UK has with the EU this thesis will discuss the continual submission of the UK to 
the doxa of the external migration control field, which is the securitization of external migration  
controls and mechanisms.  
Rebecca Adler-Nissen (2008, 2011, 2012 and 2014), Didier Bigo (2011), Matthew Eagleton-Pierce 
(2014), Stefano Guzzini (2006) and Mikael Rask Madsen (2016), are the handful of academics who 
have explicitly used elements of Bourdieu’s work. However, the frameworks they use do not employ 
Bourdieu’s frameworks to analyse fields, rather they discuss the possible positive or negative impacts 
that he could have on the subject, one exception is Adler-Nissen whose article The diplomacy of opting 
out: A Bourdieusian approach to national integration strategies (2008) uses Bourdieu’s idea of gaining 
capital in relation to European integration (Alder-Nissen and her work that uses Bourdieu will be 
examined in greater depth later in the thesis). Other than this one exception the articles only use 
particular elements of Bourdieu’s work to understand international relations, for example Eagleton-
Pierce uses symbolic power and Madsen uses fields and power. The articles do little in moving forward 
and applying Bourdieu’s work in a practical sense.  
The main components of the theoretical frameworks are the core concept of speech acts from 
Constructivism and marries them with Bourdieu’s concepts of fields, capital, doxa and habitus. The 
theory of speech acts identifies the key moments in the external migration control field and Bourdieu’s 
key concepts are then used to deconstruct these speech acts further as speech acts alone cannot 
reveal the complexities of the field. These have been brought together as Constructivism lacks the 
nuanced approach that would allow a researcher to discover other behaviours present in the field. 
Whilst Bourdieu rarely discusses how changes to the field can affect the established norms and how 
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these changes impact how actors, like the UK, the approach of this thesis is to discuss how changes to 
the structures and mechanisms of external migration control can have the potential to alter the field. 
Whilst theorists such as Bigo (2000, 2002, 2011 and 2014) and Berling (2012) have moved the 
discussion of Bourdieu into the field of security, I believe the Bourdieu can offer more when combined 
with Constructivism to see how the behaviours of manipulation and cooperation work alongside 
securitization in the field.  
The complexities of the framework are mitigated by the unique insight gained, an insight whereby 
securitization is not the sole focus which reveals a truer picture of the UK’s relationship with the EU. 
It has allowed data to be interpreted beyond the language of securitization to produce an 
understanding of how the UK works within the external migration control field. If this research had 
been undertaken with a purely Constructivist framework the behaviours of manipulation and 
cooperation may not have been considered, and would have produced another piece of research 
regarding securitization and migration in the EU. This framework also extends the theoretical 
boundaries of IR. As discussed in earlier there has been use of Bourdieu within IR but this is unique in 
the practical application of his concepts to the topic of migration control. The unique nature of the 
theoretical framework adds to the originality of this thesis. This research takes Bourdieu and IR away 
from just discussing how his work could be used and applies it to a unique case study. This thesis also 
addresses the gap in the theoretical frameworks of securitization by engaging with the 
agency/structure dichotomy. It directly tackles the position of the UK in the structure of the field, 
investigating how decisions made by the actor effect the doxa, if at all and how the habitual behaviours 
of the UK challenge or reinforce its relationship with the most dominant actor of the field, the EU. As 
discussed in the Literature Review, very little IR or securitization literature tackles the agent/structure 
when investigating migration controls, perhaps because of the theoretical complexities of attempting 
to achieve it. However, this thesis directly engages with the historically built structures of the external 
migration control field and deconstructs how engagement or disengagement by the UK effect those 
structures.  The adoption of this framework has also informed how the core themes, which also form 
the themes of the chapters, this will now be discussed in more detail.  
The core themes of securitization, cooperation and manipulation are distinct from one another, 
however, they also share a relationship that has been informed by the theoretical framework. The 
interrelated nature is based upon the theme of securitization. Securitization is distinct as it is the doxa 
of the field, it is the default position in which all other interactions are based, therefore, cooperation 
and manipulation whilst at times are distinct, they also form part of a wider understanding of the 
security nexus of the external migration control field. The most distinct is the theme of manipulation 
as it is linked the most directly to habitus. As discussed, habitus are behaviours which are often 
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reactive however they are based upon experiences of the actors but are not a product of an obedience 
to the rules, manipulative behaviour falls into this category (Bourdieu, 1992). As they are not an 
obedience to the doxa, they have the potential to be deviations from it therefore could manipulate 
the structures of the field. This instances of habitual behaviour are also linked to an attempt to gain 
capital by the UK. Capital is deployed by the EU and “given” to the UK as habitus becomes an illusion 
of submitting to the most dominant in the field. The UK consciously using habitual behaviours 
demonstrates a conscious act of building capital, whether to gain a better position in the field, 
preserve it the position or potentially change the structures of the field all together (Adler-Nissen, 
2008). Manipulation has the smallest chance of being linked to the doxa as manipulative behaviour is 
more likely to challenge the doxa than any other behaviours, especially if the EU becomes aware of 
the deviance which could alter the structure of the field. However, manipulative behaviour can also 
be attributed to securitization, it becomes manipulative when the behaviours does not exactly 
conform to the exact rules of the external migration control field and instead begins to form its own 
space causing the most dominant actor to act appropriately against the deviant actor. Cooperation, 
like manipulation is habitual behaviour, however unlike manipulation it is guaranteed to ensure capital 
gained as it supports the dominant structure of the field and adheres to the doxa. The EU, as the most 
dominant actor can then attribute capital to actors who act cooperatively, like the UK, who it feels 
have supported the structures and doxic norms of the field. However, cooperation is also linked to 
doxa as it is an adherence to the relations of order (Bourdieu, 1984). The discourse of the field, by 
analysing a large cross section of documents produced by actors of the field, will be examined to 
illustrate how one, or two, behaviours be they doxical or habitual can be present at any one time. 
Conclusions 
In conclusion the theoretical frameworks that have been illustrated in this chapter highlight the 
growing need to analyse how external migration control effects the management and creation of 
mechanisms as well as the relationships between actors beyond the confines of IR theory, instead an 
interdisciplinary approach adapting theories to complement existing theoretical frameworks extends 
our understanding of international relations and the subject area of IR. Speech act theory especially 
lacks the subtlety of using a theoretical framework like field theory. If this research had just used a 
standard Constructivist approach the outcomes would have been an acknowledgment that 
securitization is present, but conclusions that are not unique. Using with field theory allows for a 
number of behaviours to be identified within complex relationships. Manipulation and cooperation 
are not easily identifiable just using Constructivist frameworks. To analyse the complexity of 
international relations and that of the external migration control field, Bourdieu offers the theoretical 
understanding to uniquely approach the behaviours of actors in the external migration control field.  
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In the next chapter the methodological approach will be discussed in relation to the aims and 
questions of this research.   
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The Methodological Framework:  
The Creation of the Field of Analysis 
This chapter will outline the research design of this thesis detailing the strategy of engagement with 
the data and how the data has been collected and analysed. The chapter will be made up of three 
sections; Methodological Approach, Data Collection and Data Analysis. The first section will introduce 
the broader methodological framework of the research as well as detailing how it corresponds to the 
theory and concepts of the research. The second section is a detailed illustration of how the data was 
captured. Finally, the third section will be a comprehensive discussion of the data analysis.  
From Theory to Research 
This section will specify the broad approach of this research, outlining the research questions and the 
influence of the theory on the methodological framework.  The key objective of this research is to 
understand whether the UK uses EU external migration control mechanisms to its own advantage or 
is simply adhering to these mechanisms as part of wider community norms. The research question is: 
How does the UK engage with EU external migration control structures and how does this impact on 
its relationship with the EU?  
This research question was chosen, firstly, as it allows for the exploration of multilevel external 
migration control governance and mechanisms. To fully explore how the UK engages with the field of 
external migration control it is important to see how it does this bilaterally as well as multilaterally, 
directly through policy or through mechanisms such as Frontex. A wider exploration such as this allows 
for a more detailed analysis of a number of documents to identify to what extent securitization, 
manipulation and cooperation occur. This has supported and developed the theoretical framework as 
the question creates the field that is to be analysed, that of the external migration control field. The 
establishment of the field is crucial as it secures what the rules of the game are and the possible 
challenges that actors could face within the field if they do not adhere to these rules. Secondly, this 
research questions identifies the core actors that will be analysed within this research, which are the 
UK and the EU. Their relationship is important as the multifaceted nature of external migration control 
means that the relationship must be stable enough to ensure the rules of the field are followed. Their 
relationship is also dependent on the quality of the governance alongside the impact of any 
mechanisms, across national and regional structures.  
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Research regarding external migration control in the EU over the past few decades has focused on 
securitization. Purely concentrating on the securitization of external migration controls and 
mechanism can lead to the perpetuation of that narrative. By creating a research question that allows 
for the investigation of all areas of engagement in controls and mechanism, it opens up the 
possibilities of differing behaviours beyond that of just securitization. Small pilot tests of the Frontex 
quarterly and annual reports demonstrated that an investigation beyond securitization was needed. 
For example the UK’s participation in Joint Operations could simply be viewed as a securitizing 
behaviour, however, when viewed in a wider understanding of external migration control norms, it 
could also be understood as direct cooperation which juxtaposes the standard narrative that the UK 
distances itself from EU practices. Which is why a broad research question was identified that had the 
scope to reveal more than just one behaviour.   
The weakness in just examining the securitization processes of external migration control is that you 
miss the complexities of the relationships that play out within the field. The historical importance of 
building norms and how these impact upon modern day policy making is so often missed in 
contemporary research when examining the external migration control practices of the UK and how 
this impacts upon its relationship with the most dominant actors, especially the EU as the most 
dominant actor in the field. By examining policies and practices that make up the external migration 
control field with a lens that is wider than just securitization you can begin to piece together a more 
realistic picture of how the UK engages with the field and the actors within it.  
The field of analysis for this research is the area of external migration control. This field was identified 
as it holds a unique collection of actors and norms. The most dominant actor in this field is the EU, 
from the Treaty of Rome onwards the EU (and as its previous incarnation as the EEC) have sought to 
control and dictate how migration from outside the EU is controlled. This has been reiterated 
throughout the policies changes that have been made, in particular after the introduction of the third 
pillar in the Maastricht Treaty. Other actors in the field are made of member states, organisations such 
as Frontex, and neighbouring states to the EU. These actors, including the EU become the units of 
analysis. The rest of this section will now break down each element of how the theory has built the 
methodological framework.  
A field is primarily “a social arena within which struggles or manoeuvres take place over specific 
resources or stakes and access to them” (Jenkins, 2002, page 84). Field theory allows a researcher to 
specify a particular area of social interaction taking into account historical and current relationships 
to understand and in the case of this research it allow the analysis to view how the UK engages with 
external migration control. Actors create the field deforming the space and inserting their own 
55 
 
structures then the actions taken effect the relationships of actors within the field (Bourdieu, 2005). 
Behaviours are widely controlled by the most dominant actor in the field, in context to this research 
is the EU. I have achieved this by identifying what makes the external migration control field unique 
in terms of its content, structure and logic. The field is a “structured system of social positions” 
(Jenkins, 2002, page 85) and to understand these positions one must identify the system of forces 
which exist between points.  
This research has identified policy documentation as a system of forces that create and reinforce 
positions for actors within the field of external migration control and how political policies maintain a 
system of force. Policy documentation is key in illustrating the doxa and the habitus of a field. Bourdieu 
explains habitus as an “acquired system of generative schemes objectively adjusted to the particular 
conditions in which it is constituted” (Bourdieu, 1977, page 95). Policy documentation is a “generative 
scheme” in which the external migration control field is maintained. Political policy is something that 
needs mutual agreement and cooperation in a field. The key element of habitus is that it disposes 
actors to take certain actions which are informed by past experiences and are calculated on the 
possible gain. In relation to this research habitus explains why UK policy documentation does or does 
not adhere to EU norms in context to migration control. This thesis explores if habitual practices 
through the external migration control field do in fact dispose the UK to adopt particular measures in 
context to Mediterranean migration control. This research also explores what happens to the 
structure of the field if the historical constructed norms of the field are compromised by actors. This 
will be explored further in the Data Analysis section of this chapter.   
Actors are constantly concerned with their position within a field whether that be preserving it or 
improving it. Bourdieu (1977) explains that the concept of capital is key in analysing what is at stake 
for actors within a field.  “The state is the culmination of a process of concentration of different species 
of capital” Bourdieu, 1998, page 41). Capital can come in a variety of forms Bourdieu identifies 
economic, social, cultural and symbolic as the most prominent. However, Adler-Nissen identifies that 
if you analyse fields at an interstate level, actors can exchange “normal” sources of capital for 
diplomatic capital that is maintained by historically constructed legitimacy which makes any behaviour 
by that actor within the field look “natural” (Alder-Nissen, 2011). Historically legitimated diplomatic 
capital is a useful marker in which to analyse the relationship between actors in a field. In particular, 
an actor such as the UK, as it no longer as economically powerful as it was say 50 years ago however 
it is extremely dominant in terms of its diplomatic power because of its previous position as a colonial 
power. This research is analysing how the capital the UK holds effects its relationships within the 
external migration control field. Its powerful historically constructed position has the ability for it to 
manipulate the field and potentially adjust the habitual behaviours of the actors within the field even 
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if it challenges the most dominant actor, the EU. This behaviour has been assessed using the coding 
framework that will be demonstrated in greater detail later in the chapter.  
The ability to adjust the field is evidence of manipulation of the UK’s position within the field. This is 
identified by analysing the policy documentation and illustrating the linguistic markers which show 
that the UK has greater political say in the direction of external migration control policy. However, the 
concept of doxa has also informed the research question which highlight the proposition that the UK 
adheres to external migration control field norms more than has previously been considered.  
The concepts of habitus and capital are central to Bourdieu’s Field Theory, however there is another 
concept which gives further insight into the practices of actors within a field and how these practices 
maintain and/or adjust the structures. Doxa is used by Bourdieu to understand “pre-reflexive” 
behaviours (Deer, 2008). What Deer means by “pre-reflexive” is that doxical behaviour is completely 
unconscious or what Bourdieu explains as “what is taken for granted” (Bourdieu, 1977). This concept 
has informed the research questions of this project that explore the notion that the UK does support 
external migration control policies. This thesis argues that the support the UK shows is not necessarily 
explicit but has been constructed from many years of negotiation which has informed the research in 
two ways. Firstly, it has developed the timeframe in which the documentation has been taken from. 
The conception of an external migration control field is founded in the Treaty of Rome (1958) 
therefore investigations and analysis begin at this point. The Treaty of Rome established a benchmark 
of how European migration should be managed therefore every policy thereafter has significance 
because it alters the norms of the field. Secondly, it has advised the type of documentation that has 
been chosen to analyse. Policy documentation highlights whether the UK follows EU migration control 
field norms from the conception of a policy or if the EU is a later consideration for UK policy makers.  
Bourdieu informs the research in relation to structures and relationships however his theories do not 
suffice when analysing policy documentation. Discourse analysis is far more suited to understanding 
the language of the policy documentation and complements the structural understanding that 
Bourdieu offers. As has previously been discussed Speech Acts are important in the production of 
securitization language. This theory analyses the reaction of states and institutions in relation to a 
particular event and the intersubjective relationship between the threat, the agent and the audience 
(Wæver et al, 1993). However, what the theory fails to give a researcher is the tools to analyse 
documents. This is why the application of discourse analysis has been so important in this research. 
Larsen (2004) discusses the use of discourse analysis to gain insight into EU foreign policy. “Across EU 
documents a discourse can be identified according to which the Union is constructed as a unit which 
defends its own interests and has an obligation to take on responsibilities in the light of international 
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challenges” (Larsen, 2004). The unique language of the EU allows this research to better understand 
that when the discourse changes it must be in relation to a common perceived threat. This 
complements using Bourdieusian analysis as shifts in established language potentially could adjust the 
habitus of the field. Adjustment in the habitus effects all the actors within it and potentially its 
behaviour towards external threats such as migration. 
Discourse analysis also reinforces the way in which the field is examined. Common discourse is one 
key element in establishing a field and its external relations. “The ways in which other regions around 
Europe can be seen as contributing to constituting EU identity in EU discourse through ‘othering’ is 
manifested in EU policies towards these regions” (Larsen, 2004). One of the key features of a field is 
when it ceases to have any impact and it fails to be recognised as a field (Jenkins, 2002). Policy 
documentation illustrates firstly EU identity and also how far reaching the field is in terms of its foreign 
policy reach.  
As McCourt (2011) has argued in his article Rethinking Britain’s Role in the World discourse is key in 
maintaining external relationships. He discusses how discourse has shaped the UKs position in world 
politics and where in the international field the UK is. McCourt argues that the UK encourages its 
position as an EU protagonist as it leverages more power as a diplomatic “floater” between the US 
and the EU (McCourt, 2011). He uses press releases to illustrate how the UK likes to be viewed as a 
diplomatic powerhouse in the field of political power. However, press releases are often written by 
PR representatives or are highly orchestrated by politicians. It is not sufficient enough evidence to 
show how international relations is maintained. Policy documentation illustrates how political and 
historical structures influence policy conception and creation. 
Methodological Approach: Qualitative versus Quantitative  
In order to apply the above theory this research uses a mixture of both methods, however, the 
predominant approach will be qualitative. “Qualitative research simply requires a broader and less 
restrictive concept of ‘design’” (Maxwell, 2008, page 215). Unlike quantitative research which is a 
strict set of predetermined structures qualitative research offers a “looser” set of structures in which 
to undertake research. This research is predominantly qualitative because of the nature of the 
research questions. The questions centre on relationships between international actors.  Moses and 
Knutsen (2012) argue that an actor’s behaviour can be influenced by interactions which are deemed 
meaningful by that actor.  
Anselm Strauss (1987) advocates the use of a diverse range of material in order to improve analysis 
and gain a deeper understanding of a subject. With this in mind this project combines a qualitative 
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analysis with an element of quantitative data analysis which has allowed for the research questions 
to be answered in greater detail. Coffey and Atkinson (1996) and Denzin and Lincoln (2005) agree that 
a qualitative research design is inherently multi method.  “QUAL + quan, a qualitatively driven project, 
with a qualitative core and quantitative simultaneous components” (Richards, 2013, page 93). This 
approach means that both components are not equally weighted, one provides the analytical core 
and the other provides insight and contextual explanation alongside the findings from the qualitative 
analysis. Policies and documents from actors such as Frontex (quarterly and annual reports) and the 
ENP contain quantitative data alongside qualitative material therefore a researcher needs to adopt a 
method in which to combine the two approaches. A multi method approach allows the data to be 
triangulated. Denzin (2006) illustrated methodological triangulation allows for different methods to 
be utilised as way of verifying findings within the data. Comparing the securitization language of the 
qualitative data to the number of migrants crossing the Mediterranean means any findings within the 
qualitative material can be verified. For example, if rising securitization is present in the language of a 
document that rise could be simply because of a rise in the number of migrants entering the EU.   
Huberman and Miles (1984) discuss distinct processes of qualitative analysis, one being data 
reduction. If this thesis was to include every bit of data concerning migration in the European region 
over the past 60 years, it would be a large undertaking that would take many years. Data reduction 
can be achieved through conceptual frameworks and refining research questions. This then reduces 
the amount of data to analyse as the specificity of the research questions make only a small number 
of documents valid for analysis, it is able to summarise a large amount of data (Huberman and Miles, 
1994 and Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). EU migration data is extremely wide and varied, without 
reducing the data to more specific categories vast amounts of it would be irrelevant.  
Huberman and Miles (1984) second process of data analysis is data display. Unlike quantitative 
analysis being able to visualise what you discover within documents is extremely difficult. Something 
that can be solved through the third process of qualitative data analysis which is conclusion drawing 
and verification. This is where a researcher can interpret the data and draw meaning from it. The data 
can also be analysed for comparisons and contrasting cases where a researcher can explain and note 
significant themes and patterns. In terms of this research conclusion drawing and verification will 
come after the coding of the data which will be discussed further later in the chapter. Here is where 
you can draw up visual diagrams of your data through charts signifying the differences or similarities 
throughout the data. From this point the data can then be explored either deductively or inductively.  
This research is using a deductive approach; “deductive explanation moves in the opposite direction 
[to that of induction], in that a particular situation is explained by deduction from a general statement 
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about the circumstances” (Flick, 2007, page 4-5). A deductive approach begins with having an 
established theory and conceptual framework. This conceptual framework informs the research 
questions which then drives the data collection and analysis.  
The theoretical framework which has influenced the methodological approach is centrally 
constructivist. Ontological diversity and complexity means that constructivists draw on more 
resources and evidence than a positivist researcher (Moses and Knutsen, 2012). As we have already 
discussed employing qualitative and quantitative methods ensures deeper analysis. Constructivism 
however not only attempts to understand the subject but also the researcher. Constructivists (such as 
Guba and Lincoln (1989) who will be discussed below) highlight that “no knowledge is completely 
value-free… there is a difference between pure partisan politics and intellectual understanding and 
scientific knowledge” (Jackson et al, 2003, page 250).  The research design reflects these 
considerations when choosing the data and in what ways that data has been analysed.  
Intersubjectivity is important for any researcher to consider. We all view things differently and that is 
determined by social/contextual backgrounds and or presuppositions. No researcher just experiences 
the world objectively. This research is being undertaken by a natural born British citizen therefore it 
had the potential to be bias to the political position of the UK. In order to overcome intersubjectivity 
as a researcher you must be aware of its potential negative influences. This can be achieved by using 
a broader set of epistemological tools such as empathy or authority (Moses and Knutsen, 2012).    
Data Collection 
In this thesis the collection of the data has been based upon a list of keywords derived from the 
literature and the research questions. Miles and Huberman (1984) explain that the conceptual 
framework has a profound effect on the data collection. They argue that as a researcher you have 
gathered a knowledge of the phenomena you are studying therefore you have an intuition about 
where to find relevant data. This is the way in which data collection was managed in the case of this 
project. An initial set of keywords were created in order to guide the beginning of the data collection. 
They were used to search through government and institutional databases and archives. Keywords 
such as; borders, (im)migration and external were used to search for data within the timeframes of 
the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) and the UK Immigration Act (2014). These 
timeframes were identified as key junctures where the key actors of this research, the UK and the EU, 
gained or lost capital in the field of external migration controls. These keywords and the timeframes 
which they searched within were informed by the literature review and initial exploration in to the 
data that would be used for the research. The expansive results that came from such searches signified 
a need to define the search terms by either using phrases or combinations of words to refine the 
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results such as “immigration security” or “external migration control”, for example. Although these 
phrases (among others) still offered a large amount of data, what the results did offer was a sign 
posting to the databases and sources that could be used, as well as the current social debates 
surrounding migration in Europe and the UK, such as the current Immigration Bill (2014) in the UK. 
The research questions reflect a specificity in what data is relevant to the research. When used to 
search the databases they produced a reduced number of ‘hits’, however the data that they did return 
was more valuable in terms of content. In order to provide a detailed account of all the data that was 
collated from these searches as well as more specific searches for institutional or state specific 
databases the remainder of this section will be split between the UK, the EU and other sources of data.  
The UK 
There are three online data sources the first being www.legislation.gov.uk. This catalogue holds all of 
the statutory laws and general acts passed by UK government and also the amendments attached to 
these laws from the original Immigration Act of 1971 to amendments made on the Borders, Citizenship 
and Immigration Act (2009). The advanced search allows you refine your search by year or by UK public 
general acts or UK statutory instruments. A simple search of immigration however gives you instant 
access to the 200 legislative documents that the database holds. The majority of records are available 
on downloadable pdf files or can be viewed on the website. Examples of which are; Borders, 
Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, Immigration and 
Asylum Act 1999, Immigration Act 1988 and the Immigration Act 1971 
The examples illustrate a number of differing pieces of legislation that are within the database. When 
accessing through the website you can navigate to each subsection of the act which makes analysis 
quicker. Coding of acts is relatively simple because of their structure and language. This is especially 
true of UK immigration acts as they tend to be a progression of the previous act. However, this can 
also be a pitfall of coding documents that are linked. Acts will reference previous version in order to 
illustrate that there has been no change in that section of the legislation, however it can cause a 
researcher to code a document twice. In order to overcome this, a research journal will keep track on 
the documents that have been already coded and one can simply refer back to the journal to check. 
Documents such as these will be coded alongside the EU legislative acts to investigate what national 
level mechanisms the UK uses to construct control over migration in the Mediterranean. 
The second catalogue is www.official-documents.gov.uk which holds the records and publications 
from virtually every executive agency in the UK including the UKBA, Foreign and Home Office. This 
catalogue holds both detailed quantitative and qualitative data about migrants in the UK. Statistics 
from the National Statistics Office are one of the most reliable sources of quantitative data. Access to 
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the data is completely free of charge and available through the website. Documents are downloadable 
through the website in Word, Excel, PowerPoint or pdf or available to view through the website. Like 
other online databases searches are either achieved through a simple search or an advanced search 
in which you can refine searches by year, topic, department or official document status. Examples of 
the data after using the search term (EU migration) are; Statement of changes to the Immigration 
Rules: HC1138 (2014), UK/Belgium: Agreement concerning immigration controls on the Channel 
Tunnel (2013), Office of the Immigration Services Commissioner annual report and accounts 2012 to 
2013 (2013), Draft Immigration Bill (2009) and the Control of immigration: statistics United Kingdom 
(2003). 
These examples illustrate the breadth of data that is available on this database. Unlike its counterpart 
of www.legisalation.gov.uk the intrinsic detail of the preparatory papers compliments the final pieces 
of legislative documentation. This list also shows the differing types of data on offer for a researcher 
for example the Office of the Immigration Services Commissioner annual report and accounts 2012 to 
2013 (2013) and the Control of immigration: statistics United Kingdom (2003) are quantitative data 
which will give contextual understanding the research. A large number of qualitative documents in 
this database are statements of change. Analysing these using my code reactive policy making by the 
UK will help to pin point if these changes are reactions to increases in the number of migrants or 
political event. (Detailed information regarding the structure of the codes of this research will be 
discussed at length in the following section Data Analysis.) 
The third catalogue is UK Treaties Online (https://www.gov.uk/uk-treaties or 
http://treaties.fco.gov.uk/treaties/treaty.htm;jsessionid=AA1E3702496B37F54046A3CCADA836F5) 
which is run by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. This catalogue holds the multiple treaties that 
the UK holds with Commonwealth states and the EU as well as many other unilateral and bilateral 
agreements. The records within this catalogue are dated from 1934 to 2013 and are available in pdf 
format to download or view online. It stores the EU documentation in a particular series called the 
European Union Series within it are multilateral agreements between member states of the EU, or 
between third parties and member states of the EU that are not yet in force for the UK. Previous to 1st 
April 2011 the series was called the European Communities series. There are two main ways to search 
the database. The first is a simple search of keywords the other is an advanced search where you can 
search via treaty type, year of adoption, signatories and entry into force. The catalogue gives great 
insight into the exact details of UK treaties with the EU, member states and treaties with third parties 
which may not be so evident when performing a direct comparison of the legislation. However, this 
database only holds “European Union Series” data from 2013 onwards and currently has no data on 
human migration, after a substantial search of the database it was found it had no relevant data.  If 
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this research was to be repeated or developed, then this catalogue would be a worthwhile database 
to explore.   
One of the other sources used for data from the UK is Portcullis. Portcullis is the Parliamentary Archive 
Catalogue and holds many differing types of data source to analyse. Access to Portcullis is firstly 
achieved by using the online archive to search through the documents. The search engine within the 
website offers a simplistic mode of data reduction in which you can then view the titles of the 
documents. Many different documents are held including committee’s decisions, private letters 
between MP’s, letters between the UK and other states concerning immigration, immigration case 
files, to name but a few. These records are snap shots of the discussions within parliament at the time 
when crucial legislation was passing through. One positive of Portcullis is the relative ease of gaining 
access. Once you have identified the documents you email the archive with the documents you wish 
to have access to. Access can be granted within two working days and with access to twelve records 
at a time.  Within the catalogue there are two types of archive; open and closed. Open archives are 
free to view by request; closed archives are only obtainable through a Freedom of Information request 
and legally have to be processed within 20 days.  
These are two of examples of the data available: “HL/PO/CO/EU/F/11/24 - SCR: Report from the 
Commission on a Dialogue for migration, mobility and security with the southern Mediterranean 
countries (Document No 10784/11). Letter of 16 June 2011 from Damian Green MP, Minister for 
Immigration, to Lord Roper, on the effects of migration in relation to the current situation in Libya” 
(2011) is an example of how the data from Portcullis allows me to understand the decision making 
processes rather than simply analysing the piece of legislation in isolation. A letter between politicians 
is more revealing than an isolated policy as it reveals the narrative and contextualises decisions that 
have been made.  Another example of the data illustrating more than just legislation is 
HL/PO/CO/EU/F/7/26 - Who will patrol Europe's border? Why can't Europe's promised border controls 
come to Malta's help in coping with the great exodus from Africa? Malta suffers setback in bid for 
burden-sharing on immigration (2006). This document demonstrates the position of the UK with the 
EU structure in a number of ways. It demonstrates the relationships between the UK and other 
member states, which is not always explicit in legislation. The content is centred on the international 
relations between the UK (and the EU respectively) and African states. Considerations such as these 
would not be taken into account if the project focused solely on legislative data. Using an archive 
catalogue could also lead to uncovering data that may not have been uncovered or had not been 
considered as important through early data collection.  
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There are some limitations of Portcullis as a source of data. Firstly, the ‘closed’ records can only be 
opened through a Freedom of Information request. Legally the requests have to be processed within 
20 days however the requests can be denied. During the data collection process of this project no 
requests were rejected and all documentation was accessed with ease. The second limitation is the 
age of many of the records. The majority of the records (over three quarters of them) are older than 
ten years which does not discount them completely but they are less useful. Newer documentation 
can be found elsewhere on the websites www.legislation.gov.uk and www.official-documents.gov.uk. 
Overall the use of Portcullis as a source of data is a positive as it will expand the knowledge base 
beyond what data is readily available on websites.  
The EU 
The EU has a number of databases that store legislative data to statistical data alongside data from 
each EU institution agency or body. In this section each three major databases will be discussed (Eur-
Lex, Eurostat and the European Union Open Data Portal) as well as examples of the documentation 
within them and how they relate to the research questions. Each database is accessed differently so 
it will be outlined how they were accessed, how they are navigated and some of the negative 
experiences of using them.  
The Eur-Lex database (eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) is a comprehensive catalogue of all legislative 
items published by the EU. The data that is available is the complete catalogue of EU law as well as 
the preparatory acts, case law and international agreements. As well as the legislative data it also gives 
the user access to the Official Journal of the European Union. Access to the databases requires simple 
registration through the website which gives you a username and password each time you wish to 
access it.  The obtainability of the data is relatively simple. An example of a search could be TE (Text) 
IMMGRATION AND UK. This search produces 1111 search results which can then be refined by specific 
queries such as year, subdomains (legislature, preparatory acts, and consolidated law etcetera), 
author or the type of act. The search TI (Title) IMMIGRATION AND UK produces only 11 results, which 
reflects that those pieces of data are more specific than those which only have these keywords in the 
title.  
Different syntaxes can be used to create different data sets which can then be saved for future 
reference. The simple search was used to understand the amount of data that was held, searching the 
work immigration produced 9448 results which indicated that it would hold a large amount of data to 
analyse. Once a single document has been chosen to view the databases assigns it specific 
‘classifications’ which can include, migration control, return migration, EC fund and area of freedom 
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and security. By clicking on these links the database then gives you everything that is stored under 
that classification.  
Having access to opinions, resolutions, proposals and decisions to the varying projects and legislative 
decisions made by the EU will increase the scope of my knowledge not only of the existing EU 
legislation but also of the decision making processes. Unlike the data sources for the UK, Eur-Lex 
provides the data in one place unlike UK data which is spread across four different catalogues this has 
made accessing the data more time efficient. The data also has a wide time frame making it suitable 
for a comparative analysis. A small limitation of the Eur-Lex is that some of the records are not in 
English, however, these are few and any that cannot be read are available elsewhere within the EU in 
an English translation or at request to the Eur-Lex helpdesk (eurlex-
helpdesk@publications.europa.eu).  
Eurostat is another database in which statistical information can be obtained. Unlike Eur-Lex and the 
European Union Open Data Portal the data is purely quantitative. Their remit covers a large number 
of the key areas of EU policy. Agriculture, Population, Trade and Industry are just some of the key 
areas in which they hold data. More importantly they have large data sets in relation to immigration 
in the region. Datasets include basic data on the number of migrants in the region as a whole as well 
as per member state. Other more complex datasets include change of immigration status permits by 
reason and citizenship, immigration by sex, age group and country of previous residence and 
Immigration by sex, age group and country of birth. The data is also in tabular form however the data 
base also has the ability to create graphs based on the data you wish to use or it allows you to create 
your own.  
The use of Eurostat in the overall design has been to add contextual understanding and give 
quantitative support to the rest of the data. The European Union Open Data Portal is another database 
which as offered peripheral information on the everyday workings of the institutions, bodies and 
agencies that make up the EU. It is in its early stages of development and is an attempt to bring 
together a number of member state as well as regional level databases, including Eur-Lex and Eurostat. 
At the moment data from the portal is exactly the same as that in the Eurostat database, however if 
this research was to be repeated or revised in the future it may be an invaluable source of more 
qualitative and quantitative data.  
The data available from Frontex is both qualitative and quantitative. The specific documents that have 
been analysed are the FRAN Quarterly Updates (Frontex Risk Analysis Network) and the Frontex 
Annual Risk Analysis. There are fourteen documents to date that detail the exact number of migrants 
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that have crossed the EU’s southern border. The data is broken down into different categories. These 
categories include; 
• Detections of Illegal Border Crossings which is subcategorised in to routes and the country of 
origin of the migrants. 
• Detections of Facilitators - subcategorised by nationality. 
• Detections of Illegal Stay - subcategorised by nationality. 
• Refusals of Entry - subcategorised by nationality.  
• Reasons for Refusal of Entry  
• Third-Country nationals effectively returned to third countries - subcategorised by type of 
return for example forced or voluntary. 
The quarterly reports and the annual reports were produced from 2009 onwards allowing for a direct 
comparison between not only on an annual basis but on a quarterly basis. The reports are not simply 
statistical records of the movement of people into the EU from the south. The document also has 
many other sources of information that can be analysed. One of these are illustrations (for example 
maps) of the movement of migrants, what states need visas to enter the UK and illustrations on the 
changing number of third country nationals trying to enter the EU. The qualitative information the 
annual and quarterly reports hold data on the language that is used when EU agencies discuss 
migration words such as threat, risk, clandestine, tactics and surveillance to name just a few. Frontex 
informs the research of the UK taking part in policing operations in the Mediterranean. Evidence such 
as this illustrate the UK using EU mechanism to control migration in the region. Information on Frontex 
operations are also of great value because many of these operations are completed alongside 
particular member states that have a history of securitizing against migration and using stricter 
controls such as Greece and Italy (frontex.europa.eu). The frequency and the cost of the operations 
can be analysed to gain a detailed idea of how legislation and reports are translated into controlling 
actions. The limitations of this data are that official documentation of the operations are classified. 
Information about the operations on the Frontex website are limited to the basic actions of the 
operation, who took part and how much it cost. All other information surrounding the operations is 
limited to media or charity reports whose validity are questionable and not as easy to analyses. Use 
of these reports has only been for contextual information surrounding the Frontex operations. 
The data for the ENP will be gathered through the same database as the EU legislation; Eur-Lex. 
However, the ENP website (ec.europa.eu) does contain detailed documents that outline the exact 
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bilateral agreements that the EU has with states that have signed up to the ENP. It also has access to 
short and long term reports in terms of the EU’s relationship with Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. 
Current agreements alongside documentation outlining EU initiatives in these states such as New EU 
support to Libya for economic integration and human rights (21st November, 2013) are key to 
understanding the EU’s relationship with the North African states that are part of the ENP. It also 
unveils a large number of documents to analyse. Documentation from other departments of the 
European Commission such as EuropeAid and the delegation department are linked with these 
projects which opens the analysis wider than simply the obvious migration documents. By analysing a 
wide range of documentation from relative areas of the EU a deeper explanation can be given to the 
extent of how much migration controls (re)structure the sovereignty of the region. In terms of the 
UK’s (re)structuring documentation of laws and policies, including consultation papers and 
amendments to the act, these documents can be found at gov.uk through a simple search engine using 
words like ‘immigration’, ‘security’ and ‘citizenship’.  
The sources that have been discussed are not without fault. The largest issue to overcome is that there 
was not a wide enough range of data to confirm whether or not (re) structuring is occurring through 
migration control in the Euro-Med region. To overcome this the codes needed to be specific enough 
in order to thoroughly understand the (re)structuring processes as well as discovering them in the first 
place. A more practical issue with this data is the proportion of it which is in French only, in particular 
documents that outline current activities that the EU is taking part in with the region and specific 
North African states. This was overcome by applying to the EU to have the documents translated into 
English. The EU Council, Commission and Parliament are obligated to provide documents under the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (Article 42) and in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(Article 15(3)). The length of time it takes for the EU to respond to such requests was not available 
however the number of documents that needed to be translated were relatively small so this was not 
too damaging to the research. 
Data Analysis  
The concept of coding and the rationale of adopting it as the method of analysis was discussed under 
the section Methodological Approach. However, what has not been discussed is the codes that will be 
specifically used for this project. This section will be a detailed insight to the coding framework. 
However, the first section is a broader discussion of how coding was chosen as the method of analysis. 
“Analysis is a process of resolving data into its constituent components to reveal their characteristic 
themes and patterns” (Dey, 1993, page 8). Dey identifies three processes as key for analysing 
qualitative data are describing, classifying and collecting. The language is very similar to that of 
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quantitative data analysis. Like Huberman and Miles (1984), Dey defines analysis of qualitative data 
as a clear, identifiable and distinct set of sub processes which are therefore systematic and 
developmental. The analysis of qualitative data is important to structure in this way because it gives 
the research a clear set of objectives.  
Wolcotts (1994) takes a more extreme approach when analysing qualitative data. He takes his analysis 
a step further by demonstrating that qualitative data can be ‘transformed’. He advocates that instead 
of finding descriptions in the data that the data should speak for itself and that if a researcher aims to 
‘pull’ descriptions out of the data that it may not be accurate as you cannot have a ‘pure’ description 
of data. He also claims that interpretations are unbounded and finding key factors and relationships 
is the most important factor in qualitative data analysis. Wolcotts also identifies that the processes of 
data analysis are not always mutually exclusive and can be done in a variety of different ways in which 
different conclusions can be drawn. “The identification of analytical themes and the fragmentation of 
the data in accordance with an emergent conceptual scheme are widespread among the researchers 
and the relevant literature” (Coffey and Atkins, 1996, page 23). Fielding and Fielding (1986) remark 
there is often more than one way to skin a cat and these processes can be applied to a number of 
different qualitative data analysis techniques. 
Qualitative coding put simply is about linking concepts and data whilst assigning labels and tags to 
data based on concepts and theories (Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000). The two academics that have 
been given accolade of mainstreaming qualitative coding give the definition of coding as: “The 
discovery of theory from data – systematically obtained and analysed in social research” (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967, page 1). The process of applying labels and tags is in fact not the analysis the analysis 
comes from the investigation and dissection of what the codes produce. “Attaching codes to data and 
generating concepts have important functions in enabling us rigorously to review what our data is 
saying” (Coffey and Atkins, 1996, page 27). Coding can link the different segments or instances in the 
data which are then pulled together to create categories of data that we think have a common 
property or element which may or may not relate or are about a particular theme or topic. What is 
most important is how we use these codes to analyse the data. Coding can help to generate ideas that 
are precisely linked to the data.  
Coding is not a way of developing conceptual frameworks as they should already be in place in order 
to accurately code the data. Rather coding can be thought of as a range of approaches that aid the 
organization, retrieval and interpretation of data” (Coffey and Atkins, 1996, page 27). Coding is often 
the easiest way of simplifying or reducing the amount of data that you analyse. As you retrieve and 
coding the data it goes into an index which can be organised by specific codes, themes or theories. 
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Throughout the coding process it enables a researcher to go back over very particular segments of 
that data without having to go through the whole document again. Coffey and Atkins (1996) also argue 
that coding can be a form of data complication. Not in a negative sense but insofar as the coding 
process can expand and transform the data which in turn opens up more analytical roots than first 
predicted. However realistically coding data is often a mixture of data simplification and data 
complication.  
The three main processes involved in coding are firstly, noticing relevant phenomenon. Before the 
coding process begins the research questions created during the research design process will give an 
idea of the phenomena that is to be looked for within the data. However occasionally when coding 
the data, it can reveal other phenomena that the researcher may not have foreseen. This is remedied 
simply by creating a new code that includes new phenomena ensuring that it is relevant to the coding 
framework already in place.  Secondly the researcher must then collect examples of them identifying 
passages and ensuring that they are thematically linked together and indexed.  Thirdly analyse the 
indexed passages to find patterns, differences and structures within the data. It is not just a case of 
the number of times these phenomena occur and counting them but viewing them as part of a 
mechanism in a much wider process. In the case of this project one would code the data, index and 
identify the associations between data from the UK and data from the EU.   Coding opens up the data 
in order to interrogate the data further. One could say it goes beyond the data and allows a researcher 
to think creatively with the data by asking of it questions.  Using coding is heuristic and provides unique 
way in which a researcher can interact and think about the data. Gibbs et al (2007) understands this 
process as analysing narratives that are within the data. “The analysis of narratives… adds a new 
dimension to qualitative research” (Gibbs et al, 2007, page 71). Applying this idea to this research, the 
data has within it a historical narrative. Understanding the historical narrative of migration in Europe 
is also connected to the constructive understanding of the object of the research.    
The creation of codes can occur before the coding process as well as during. This project uses concept 
driven codes. These are codes that are created from the research literature, previous studies as well 
personal hunches that a researcher may have (Gibbs et all, 2007). Codes that are concept driven are 
called In vivo codes that are “codes that derive from the terms and language used by the social actors 
in the field” (Coffey and Atkins, 1996, page 30). It is described as a bottom up approach that derives 
the categories from the context of the data (Coffey and Atkins, 1996). Transforming coded data into 
meaningful data that can be analysed is perhaps the most important part of the coding process. “The 
establishment of ordered relationships between codes and concepts is a significant starting point for 
reflection” (Coffey and Atkins, 1996, page 48). In order to accurately transform coded data there must 
be a distinct framework in which you analyse the data.   
69 
 
Hutchinson et al (2010) discussed the evolution of the design must come from the development of 
the codes and of the theoretical framework the basis of which must come from an understanding of 
the contextual background of the research subject. Strauss discusses that codes are not simply 
categories but must be created to give the researcher a wide picture, in what Strauss calls the coding 
paradigm;  
“While coding involves the discovery and naming of categories, it must also tell the researcher 
much more than that… Whether explicit or implicit, it functions as a reminder to code data for 
relevance to whatever phenomena are reference by a given category, for the following:  
Conditions 
Interactions among the actors 
Strategies and tactics 
Consequences” 
Strauss, Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists, 1987, page 27-28 
Strauss in detail outlines how to look out for each part of the category in the language used. Such as, 
when looking for conditions words such as “because,” “since,” and “as” (Strauss, 1987) are key 
identifiers in what could be categorised as conditions. Although Strauss applies these details to the 
analysis of interviews the premises of the paradigm are the same if you apply it to other areas of 
research. The categories that Strauss has outlined above give a structure to the process. In short a 
coding paradigm contextualisation of the data that identifies relationships between the context and 
the process (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, page 89).  
Bernstein discusses codes as “regulators of the relationships between contexts, and through those 
relationships, regulators of relationships within contexts” (1990, page 101). As Harker (1993) argues 
the link Bernstein’s idea of codes and Bourdieu’s concept of habitus allows for a solid foundation of 
analysis. Habitus is a form of social subjectivity (Bourdieu, 1977) and codes allow for an analysis of 
how that subjectivity has been created as well as analysing how that subjectivity effects relationships 
within the social constructs in which that subjectivity was created.   
Like the work of Stevens et al in the article Priming time for Blair? Media Priming, Iraq, and leadership 
evaluations in Britain (2011) the conceptual definitions have had a direct impact on the codes that 
have been used. Their research is an excellent example of creating codes based upon the theoretical 
and conceptual ideas of a research project. They seek to understand the effect of media priming of 
the Iraq war in the 2005 election and use the coverage of a number of British media outlets to see if 
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the coverage could possibly have had an effect on the results of the election. It is a unique combination 
of content analysis alongside a tracking of the public opinion through the YouGov questionnaire 
results and opinion polls. The analysis is relatively basic, the codes were bad news, good news and 
mixed news in which the authors ascribed value to each code and crossed referenced it with the 
“respondents self-reported readerships of the newspapers” (Stevens et al, 2011, page 549). By their 
own admission the research is extremely limited in so far as it only covers one election (Stevens et al, 
2011) however what is does offer is a comprehensive approach to basing codes in the theoretical and 
conceptual frameworks of their work.  
Starr and Most (1976) also illustrates the use of a conceptual framework to generate codes. They 
created a set of codes from International Relations literature regarding different bordering practices 
of states. They used codes such as contiguous land borders and 200-mile limit water borders in order 
to identify the different types of borders that exist within the literature. This has informed this project 
by illustrating that coding can be used to identify specific concepts through the analysis and that 
coding can be used to build existing theories. For example, a code may illustrate how the UK adjusts 
its habitual practices to gain a more dominant position in the field of EU migration control. However, 
they limit their data to International Relations literature. Abbott and Snidal (2000) have influence this 
project by using legislation and institutional literature unlike the projects that have been discussed. 
They approached their data the same way as this project by seeking examples of where states and 
institutions stray from constructed norms. This has been identified by using historical documentation 
and constructing what the EU and UK norms are in context to migration. They do not use a coding 
framework and this is a weakness within their research. Coding offers a distinct and through analysis 
by allowing a researcher to ask questions of data rather than take it at face value.  
Coding the large number of documents that make up the data of this research means a strict method 
of analysis is needed. Richards (2005) offers a number of differing techniques in which to efficiently 
code large amounts of data. One such technique is “mechanical coding” (page 156) which is simply 
uses text searches to lead you to the more meaningful parts of the data. This works as a technique as 
long as the researcher is aware of slight differences to words and phrases or they could be missed 
from the analysis. It also is useful when a phenomenon that did not seem significant during the 
creation of the codes becomes apparent then it allows the researcher access text in relation to that 
phenomenon as quickly as possible. “Drag net coding” allows a researcher to test a simple text search 
to be tested by seeing if a word or phrase occurs in certain parts of the data or across a whole set of 
data. Drag net coding alongside data reduction techniques is how this research has. Text searches can 
help to test theories and it pulls different materials together from a range of data sets. Gibbs (2007) 
describes it as a way of thematically retrieving related parts of texts. Neither mechanical coding nor 
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drag net coding are interpretive they are simply techniques of instant retrieval. This research has used 
both these techniques to search documents. Microsoft Word and PDF readers have search functions 
it has allowed for efficient initial coding of the documents. Microsoft Word also has a function in which 
you can compare documents. This function is useful in context to this project as comparisons can be 
made between different policy documents especially UK legislation which is often has two versions; 
an original as enacted and a revised version. Basic text searches need suitable codes in order to make 
them useful. Keywords and phrases have already been discussed in terms of data collection therefore 
the rest of this section concentrates on the exact codes that are used. The end of the section will then 
be dedicated to the analysis of the data post-coding.                  
The first code is policy acceleration. Policy acceleration was identified by looking for key phrases in 
data such as management, implementation and increasing. This code has created an understanding 
of whether or not the number of migration control policies towards North Africa have been increasing. 
The code has been used in a number of differing ways. Firstly, it has been used to analyse UK data and 
then EU data, alongside breaking down the structures of these two actors further by examining 
specific agencies such as the UKVI or Frontex. It has allowed the researcher to identify the rate at 
which each actor is creating migration control policies and compare if the UK is accelerating policy 
creation beyond the EU rate of creation thus proving that the UK is creating national level mechanisms 
to construct control over the EU’s southern border. Acceleration is also evidence of the (re)structuring 
of sovereignty by the UK and the EU. 
The second code is policy deceleration. Policy deceleration was identified by looking for key words 
such as completion, reducing and decreasing. Much like the policy acceleration code it will examine 
all the same institutions and agencies but identifies policies that illustrate if the UK is decelerating 
policy creation and using EU mechanism to control migration in the Euro-Med region rather than using 
resources to create its own. Evidence of deceleration also illustrates that the UK and the EU are 
uninterested in (re)structuring sovereignty in the region.  
The third code is UK engagement with EU migration policy making for the Euro-Med area. Evidence of 
this can be seen in the use of language such as “The UK believes…”, “The UK will develop…” or the 
“The UK has…”. This code was developed to understand how involved the UK is in the making of 
migration policy. This is evidence of the potential influence of migration control in the (re)structuring 
of sovereignty by the UK and the EU if they UK is actively engaging in the policy making then it has an 
interest in the effects of that policy on the structuring of sovereignty in the EU. It also gives evidence 
to answer the core research questions of How does the UK manipulate the EU’s southern border and 
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North African Territory to control and securitize migration? as it measures the level of influence has 
over the creation of migration policy in the Euro-Med region. 
The fourth code is EU engagement with UK migration policy making. This code was specifically 
developed for deconstructing the preparatory papers held in the UK concerning the development of 
migration policy. As discussed within the Data Collection chapter examination of the preparatory 
documentation of policies are often as revealing as the finalised piece of documentation. The 
influence of the EU is illustrated through their engagement with the creation on the policies through 
parliamentary committees alongside green and white papers. If the final policy reflects the influence 
that the EU applied during the process, then it is evidence that the UK does not extend its own 
sovereign control over North Africa and is aligned with the EU structure.  
The fifth code is reactive policy making by the UK while the sixth code is reactive policy making by the 
EU. The fifth and sixth codes are linked as the evidence from each will be used to compare who is 
more likely to react to increases in numbers of migrants from North Africa or after a significant political 
event. An example of a linguistic marker that is evidence of reactive policy making would be “In 
reaction to…”, “The recent situation…” or “Recent events…”. Accurate data on the number of migrants 
from North Africa are taken from the FRONTEX quarterly and annual reports as they are the most up 
to date. To determine what a “large” spike was, an average number of migrants was calculated and 
when the average number increased by 1000 this was understood as a “spike”. A significant political 
event was defined by the reaction of the UK or the EU. If an official statement was released by either 
actor, then this was deemed a significant political event such as 9/11 or the Arab Spring. Policies would 
also only be taken into consideration if they were within 6-9months of the increase in numbers or the 
political event.  
Analysis is a constant throughout the coding process as you categorise your data by a codes frequency 
and/or its association with other data. Richards (2009) call this “coding on” a process in which you 
refine codes and categories. Sub categories are also an important part of the coding process as very 
often it is difficult to disseminate one code that has no relation to any of the others. It allows similar 
codes to be duplicated so when coding a document, it is thoroughly deconstructed. To make sense of 
the codes and their sub categories you can create coding maps in order to make sense of different 
overlapping codes, how they relate to one another, it often reveals that more specific codes are 
embedded in the more general codes. Without such an index it would be difficult to understand how 
the codes relate to one another. Codes are links between particular parts of data that one would not 
normally be able to relate, the codes are the tool in which to conceptualize and understand the gaps 
and connections in the data. However, when going through the coding process one has to be mindful 
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of the contextual narrative of the data. To overcome this, a simple coding journal would accurately 
navigate the codes and data that have been used over a period of which the research is being done 
(Richards, 2009 and Gibbs, 2007). A coding journal acts as a place in which all your notes are stored. 
It can also have a far more analytical role. It can be a vehicle for finding new phenomena as well as 
creating new codes. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has given a detailed overview of the research design for this project. The first section 
gave detailed insight into the how the theory and methodology literature have framed the design for 
this research. By understanding what Bourdieu, and academics that use his structures like Adler-
Nissen, mean by power one can then create an analytical structure in which to find behaviours of 
actors within the data. The second section described the data collection process, detailing how data 
was collected and managed. The third section illustrates previous research, their influence on this 
project and how a detailed insight into how the specific coding framework of this research was 
constructed and utilised. The rest of this thesis will now demonstrate how the design was applied and 
what has been found from the analysis of the data.  
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From Welcome Workers to Security 
Threat 
To understand the way in which migration is currently being controlled by the United Kingdom (UK) 
and the European Union (EU) we must first understand the historical journey of both actors in context 
to migration. Understanding the history of the policies and the historical context in which they were 
enacted compliments the research as it introduces and explains some of the key decisions that have 
led to more complex structures in current migration control. It also introduces the early indicators of 
the relationship between the UK and the EU that will be analysed later in the thesis. This chapter 
explores the establishment of the external migration control field throughout the latter half of the 
20th century. A detailed understanding of these structures is needed to inform the use of Bourdieu 
and field theory and this will be explored in more detail throughout the chapter. It will also be a critical 
overview of how the UK and the EU has engaged with migration over the past 60 years since the end 
of World War 2 (WW2). There is some discussion of pre WW2 policies however as they illustrate the 
earliest state migration policies therefore reflecting the attitudes of actors as the external migration 
control field as it became established. In particular, this chapter will discuss the change in attitudes 
towards external migration into the region and how this change was reflected in policy development 
from active immigrant recruitment post war too controlled and often restricted migration from the 
mid-1970s onwards. This chapter will establish the historical connections between the actors of the 
external migration control field. In understanding the historical interactions between the actors the 
analysis that proceeds this chapter is contextualised. Bourdieu highlighted that a field is not a static 
structure, it is instead a process that is historically and culturally constructed so to understand the 
modern external migration control field you first need to look at its earliest conceptions (Adler-Nissen, 
2013). 
The first part of the chapter will be a discussion of post-WW2 migration in the European region with 
an examination of the policies of the France, Germany and the UK. The use of France and Germany is 
to illustrate the migration policies of the states in continental Europe as no regional structures or 
policies existed until 1957. Discussion of France and Germany post 1957 will be to allow a detailed 
comparison of the viewpoints of those contributing to the development of regional policies during the 
pre-Maastricht Treaty negotiations and the first established norms of the field. These two countries 
were chosen because of the influential role they played both in the conception of the EU and the 
power they then exercise within the EU now as the two of the largest economies in the region with 
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some of the highest population of migrants. The use of France and Germany is solely for the purpose 
of this chapter to add context to illustrate the similarities and differences as these states came 
together to negotiate regional migration policies.  
The second part of the chapter will be an analysis of the key junctures in migration policy history 
including the policies (domestic and regional) and their historical context from 1957 onwards and how 
these events caused migration policy in the UK and Europe to develop from active recruitment to 
controlled migration. The key events in history that have been chosen because of their political 
significance either directly or indirectly on UK and Europe migration policy development. For example, 
one of the historical events that will be discussed is Enoch Powell’s Rivers of Blood speech. This event 
has been chosen not just because of the ramifications of the speech on UK migration policy but also 
as an exemplification of the changing attitudes across Europe. Another event will be the Maastricht 
Treaty (1992) as this was the consolidation of many years of integration in the European region and 
migration was one of the key areas of negotiation. Another key event is the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) 
which enacts the Schengen Agreement and was the framework in which many current policies have 
been based upon such as the development of the migration control mechanism Frontex. The 3 
examples of events that will be discussed are key to this research because they illustrate the 
relationship between the UK and the EU, how their histories have similarities and differences and how 
this has effected and informed current migration policy. These events will not be analysed in isolation 
but in a wider context of political and social dynamics in the region, which is why France and Germany 
have been chosen as examples, in order to gain an insight of the changing aspects of migration control 
throughout the 20th century. It will introduce and explore the conceptual dynamics of this thesis such 
as migration control mechanisms such as Frontex which are used by the actors in the region.  
The Early Beginnings of Migration Control  
Pre-WW2 historical trends in immigration policy across Europe vary from state to state. The early 
migration policies of Europe reflect the distinct differences in state formation (Sassen, 1999). The UK 
for example had a structured central government much earlier than its European counterparts such 
as France and Germany. That structured central government allows the production of national level 
policies which can then be implemented faster because the legislative structures are well established. 
An example of which is the first national level immigration act the UK enacted which was the Aliens 
Act 1905 and 1914. The Aliens Act was designed specifically to curb Jewish immigration from Eastern 
Europe and it is the first example of national level immigration control in the UK. Jewish immigration 
had created much hostility within the British public they often occupied less desirable areas of London 
and other major cities (Winder, 2005). “British governments since the 1905 Aliens Act… had two basic 
76 
 
motivating factors which have determined the level of migration which has occurred in the form of 
the needs of the British economy and the hostility of public opinion” (Panayi, page 308, 2010). The UK 
was one of the first states in the world to introduce national level migration controls as complex as 
the Aliens Act. This is for three reasons, firstly, the UK always experienced high levels of immigration 
in comparison to other states as its position as a dominant colonial power meant that people would 
readily travel to the UK from its overseas territories. Secondly it was the centre of industrialisation in 
Europe which encouraged migrants, particularly from Ireland, to fill jobs in the burgeoning industries. 
Thirdly it was a state of transition for many migrants who were looking to travel from the UK’s major 
ports in order to travel to the Americas. All the contribution factors indicate that migration control 
was an inevitability for the UK.   
During this period of history mainland European states were still operating regionally with little or no 
central control meaning that migration control could be very different even if it was in the same state. 
Many of the differences related to the central industry of the region (Sassen, 1999). For example, the 
north eastern region of Germany had a very large agricultural sector thus required a large number of 
seasonal migrants to work within that industry. Although the migration control structures were 
disjointed all over Europe because of a lack of national level controls the number of migrants settled 
in one geographical area for very long was actually small in comparison to the UK as they preferred to 
move around Europe picking up short term seasonal occupations, which benefited the local 
populations as well as the migrants (Sassen, 1995). This early period indicates that early regional 
control on migration was almost non-existent with controls existing to serve an ad hoc purpose (which 
suited the migratory patterns at the time). The UK Aliens Act 1905 and 1914 where unusual by 
comparison. The UK in contrast to its European counterparts were very quick to control migration. 
Such an early configuration of migration control is attributed to the fact that the UK was receiving 
migrants that were seemingly less desirable than experiencing the cyclical and seasonal migratory 
patterns that France and Germany were experiencing that were profitable for industries. It identifies 
an early beginning for the UK as a key actor in the newly forming external migration control field.  
In the late 19th and early 20th century European migration controls centred on the notion of jus 
sanguinis and jus solis. Jus sanguinis is the principle that citizenship should be granted to those who 
share a common “blood” with nationally being centred on the principle that it is a biological 
inheritance rather than a cultural acquisition (Sassen, 1999). Jus solis is the granting of citizenship 
through the principle of birth and residence. Each principle has its positives and negatives. Jus 
sanguinis for example is very difficult to control as how far do you allow a bloodline to go back in order 
to grant citizenship. Germany was an advocate of applying jus sanguinis whereas France and the UK 
were more inclined to implement the principle of jus solis. The differences between the applications 
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of the two principles differed on the nation building and sovereignty building practices of each of these 
states (Sassen, 1999). The reason for each state implementing these principles differently is down to 
the colonial territories each state occupied. Those subjects born outside of the UK and France still had 
to be considered as British or French subjects especially those born into upper class families who were 
living abroad as ambassadors or who had business prospects within the colonies (Czaika and de Haas, 
2014). Germany on the other hand did not have the vast colonial territories of the UK and France 
therefore the application of the jus sanguinis principle was easier and allowed for those born in the 
borderlands of Germany to claim citizenship after the breakup of the Prussian empire.   
As WW2 came to an end European governments were faced with the task of rebuilding their states 
and with a depleted population, immigration by many states was seen as the most convenient way to 
access a cheap labour supply (Henry, 1985). However, states also realised that allowing mass migration 
onto the labour markets would need structuring to ensure the system was not taken advantage of and 
it had a sufficient bureaucracy to control the inflow and outflow of migrants from across the European 
region and the world. However, each state took a different route in which to structure the migration 
control. “The legal frameworks through which the post war migration occurred were varied” (Hansen, 
2003, page 25). There are two distinct ways in which migration control was formed at this time. The 
first was colonial (or neo/quasi colonial) linkages and the second is organised recruitment (Sassen, 
1999 and Hansen, 2003). As with the principles of jus sanguinis and just solis, the uptake of which 
structure was dependent on the size of the empire that you were able to attain migrants from. The 
two distinct apparatuses reflect that labour migration at this time was highly modulated and 
happened within systematic settings and through a number of mechanisms. The structures of 
migration control that we see in modern policies were at this time beginning to take shape, 
consolidating the habitual behaviours. The norms of controlling external migration through highly 
structured mechanisms is still reflected in the actions of actors in the field.  
The system of using colonial linkages for an immigrant workforce was undertaken by a number of 
European states including the UK. Colonies, in terms of utilising them for labour, had only been 
previously used for the slave trade (Czaika and de Haas, 2014). After the abolition of the slave trade, 
colonialism encouraged more emigration with British nationals exploring the possibility of greater 
prosperity in the colonies that at home, immigration in fact was relatively small (Holmes, 1988). The 
idea of exploiting this resource was very attractive to post-war European states. Initially the UK 
government were apprehensive to open the doors to the empire however they did eventually concede 
to allowing organised and active recruitment of workers for low skilled manufacturing and agricultural 
jobs. In the first few months following WW2, The UK adopted similar schemes to that of Germany and 
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actively recruited from across Europe however this gave way to the UK using its colonial territories to 
recruit workers. Both these mechanisms will now be discussed in more detail.  
Germany’s gastarbeiter (guest worker) schemes were a highly centralised set of systems and a number 
of bilateral agreements were signed with European and North African states (Hansen, 2003 and 
Heckmann et al, 2009). The states included in the agreement were: Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, 
Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia and Yugoslavia. The German system was the most comprehensive and 
organised recruitment. Guest worker schemes encouraged temporary migration of workers and upon 
seeing the successes of other European states the UK’s Royal Commission on Population Report in 
1949 reported that immigration should be welcomed “without reserve” as long as the immigrants 
would be able to assimilate to “the host population” (Holmes, 1988 and Rees, 1993). An ageing 
population, many women returning to domestic roles after the war and the rise of the school leaving 
age removed a large section of the working population (Hansen, 2003). The UK recruited from prisoner 
of war camps and from groups of displaced persons whose homes had been destroyed or were not 
able to go home. “The so called displaced persons constituted an obvious pool of human resource” 
(Holmes, 1988) and the UK recruited around 80,000 workers from this section of society (Holmes, 
1988). This recruitment was not on the same scale as Germany, whose guest worker numbers were in 
the millions. The number of workers was so high it now means that 10% of the current German 
population have an immigrant background as a direct result of the guest worker schemes 
(www.loc.gov).  The UK however did subscribe to a number of schemes such as the European 
Voluntary Worker scheme (EVW) actively recruited workers to go into unskilled manual labour. The 
majority of these workers came from Poland and other areas of Eastern Europe and the UK wanted to 
be seen as a state in which migrants could seek a better life. However, “it might be flattering to the 
national ego to assume… Britain was engaged in a great humanitarian venture… The fundamental 
influence over official policy was the economic policy in which the government had to operate.” 
(Holmes, 1988, page 212). However, the small streams of labour from Eastern Europe that the UK had 
benefited from soon became difficult to access as the Iron Curtain descended across the eastern 
frontiers of Europe and the UK was also not economically recovering as quickly as its European 
counterparts which effected its popularity with migrants from Europe looking for a prosperous 
country of destination (Hansen, 2003). It caused the UK to readdress the issue of gaps in labour market 
and look to other alternatives. 
Once the UK made the decision to no longer pursue recruitment from Europe, it copied the colonial 
mechanisms that France had begun to utilise through its own colonies, an early example of following 
other behaviours in the field. Migrants from colonial territories became more desirable as they were 
able to assimilate to the population in the UK quicker. This was because they knew English and were 
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aware of the cultural customs. The UK government realised that although it lacked the strong economy 
and the cultural linkages with southern Europe it had over 600 million subjects in the colonies of the 
Empire (Hansen, 2003). In 1948 the British government enacted the British Nationality Act (1948). The 
Act stated that:  
“Every person who under this Act is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies or who under 
any enactment for the time being in force in any country mentioned in subsection (3) of this section 
is a citizen of that country shall be by virtue of that citizenship have the status of a British subject”  
The British Nationality Act, 1948, page 1  
The British Nationality Act had a clearly defined policy of what constituted UK national status for 
members of the public. The act was ratified at the same time as the Commonwealth of Nations 
(formally the British Commonwealth) was being established and formed part of the restructuring of 
sovereignty by the UK. The British Nationality Act and the Commonwealth being formed almost in the 
same period meant that the UK needed to establish who had the right to abode to avoid false claims 
being made. Once the act became law there was large scale migration of a number of colonial subjects 
from China, the West Indies, Africa and the Indian sub-continent. The initial migration that the British 
Nationalities Act attracted concentrated on immigrants from the colonies of the West Indies. 
However, the act itself was not the only contributing factor to this migration. “It was related in part to 
the underdevelopment of British territories which had been starved of investment. Such prevailing 
conditions had resulted in a continual process of emigration by surplus power” (Holmes, 1988) and 
the immigration occurred from the islands that had the lowest per capita national income. Other 
conditions also had a contributing factor such as the United States of America imposing the McCarran-
Walter Act in 1952 which placed heavy sanctions on the admittance of West Indians to the US. Another 
factor was the business behind immigration from the West Indies which included direct recruitment 
from employers such as the London Transport Executive and the British Hotels and Restaurants 
Association who entered joint business ventures with private steamship companies and airlines in 
order to transport new recruits across the Atlantic (Winder, 2005). The “business” of migration was 
also a trend seen in France whose industries sought to recruit directly from the country of origin and 
would later seek visa documentation from the National Office of Immigration (Hansen, 2003). Less 
than 10% of the immigrants from the new commonwealth were directly recruited by the UK 
government (Coleman, 1994). Other immigrants to the UK from the colonies travelled by their own 
means or were relatives of those who were directly recruited by the UK government. Politically and 
economically the large scale recruitment of workers from the old empire was a success however, the 
societal impact was negative. The race riots in Notting Hill and Nottingham in 1958 were evidence of 
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a changing social environment. The race riots could be viewed in two respects. Firstly, they could be 
seen as a culmination of many years of tension between national and migrant communities (Winder, 
2005). Secondly they could be viewed as a catalyst for the tensions and changes that happened socially 
and politically following the riots. In hindsight they were an element of both historical tensions and 
newly developed animosity. It led to changes in the way in which migration control was created by 
governments, creating some of the first signs of securitization.  
The years previous to these riots the European economic and political landscape was changing. The 
Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) had been signed on the 18th April 
1951 and continental Europe looked forward to creating “common definitions” (Article 69, Paragraph 
2) of the goals that the region wanted to establish. The main idea behind creating this regional actor 
was to nurture economic growth across Europe as well as creating a bond between states which would 
hopefully prevent future wars. The establishing states believed this could be achieved by opening the 
internal border to allow for freer movement of goods and services. The establishing dates were: The 
Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg and The Netherlands. 
In order for this to be able to take place the establishing states understood the importance of creating 
easier movement of European citizens to facilitate the expansion. Under Article 76 of the treaty the 
members declared that there should be particular shared privileges and immunities for member 
states. These privileges included the introduction of a European Laissez-Passer for civil servants and 
members of the newly established institutions. These tentative moves towards the eventual ethos of 
freedom of movement indicate the changing attitudes towards internal movement throughout 
continental Europe. These early stages of control are not regional controls of migration. It is the 
earliest point of being able to identify a habitual norm. At this point control of migration remained 
solely in the hands of the member states however this would soon change. However, one can see the 
early steps towards the external migration control field as the creation of an inside and an outside 
cultures becomes normalised.  
The Treaty of Rome (1957) established the European Economic Community (EEC). The establishment 
of the EEC took the premise of the ECSC (which was to begin freeing the ability for goods and services 
to move around the region) and elevated it to a more complex web of interdependencies. The Treaty 
of Rome (1957) laid the early foundations of what we now know as the EU. The EEC was the first 
economic community of its kind and it had very strong principles in relation to the movement of 
people, a philosophy carried from the establishing values of the ECSC. The formation of the EEC was 
also the formation of the field of external migration control. It believed that “the abolition, as between 
Member States, of obstacles to freedom of movement for persons, services and capital” (Treaty of 
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Rome, 1957) was the key to a successful regional economy that would benefit all its members. It 
declared that member states were “resolved to ensure the economic and social progress of their 
countries by common action to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe” (page 2, 1957). In relation 
to migration around the region the treaty established the right to freedom of movement for all EEC 
citizens under Title III Free Movement of Persons, Services and Capital.  The Treaty of Rome was a 
regional policy on a scale never witnessed before however there were still elements of control of 
migrants. Movement of citizens could only occur if they had an offer of employment or you 
prospectively wished to set up a firm or company within the member state that you were travelling 
to, the freedom of movement did not extend if you simply wanted to change the member state that 
you lived in. The treaty also outlined the rights of establishment for workers that travelled across the 
region. The rights secured not only secured abolition of any discrimination against employment in 
another member state but it also secured the rights of the families and dependents of the workers 
that travelled.  
“Article 51  
 The council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, adopt such 
measures in the field of social security as are necessary to provide freedom of movement for workers; 
to this end, it shall make arrangements to secure for migrant workers and their dependents: 
(a) aggregation, for the purposes of acquiring and retaining the right to benefit and of calculating 
the amount of benefit, of all periods taken into account under the laws of the several countries; 
(b) payment of benefits to person’s resident in the territories of Member States.” 
The Treaty of Rome, 1957, page 22 
The establishing member states are demonstrating that European migration is of great importance to 
the prosperity of the region not only for its workers but also for the families and dependents of those 
moving around. It was also signalling the beginning of the end of a dependency of third country 
national migration through the guest worker schemes. The establishing member states recognised 
that internal migration would be easier to control and the migrants would settle quicker as they are 
European rather than being from outside the region where they may not assimilate to the local 
population as quickly. The Treaty of Rome is a historical turning point for continental Europe however 
the UK was not part of establishing the EEC and continued along the path of using immigrants from 
previous colonial territories. The Treaty of Rome however did afford the UK another status. Part 4 of 
the treaty outlined the how and which external territories to the newly established region would 
associate with overseas countries and external territories. The EEC wanted to create “special 
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relations” with the UK and concluded that “the purpose of association shall be to promote the 
economic and social development of the countries and territories and to establish close economic 
relations between them and the Community as a whole” (Treaty of Rome, 1957, page 46). The ‘special 
relationship’ did not extend as far as allowing freedom of movement to the UK however from a 
historical perspective it demonstrates the early relationship that continental Europe and the UK were 
to create. What it did afford to the UK was some of the economic benefits of being next to a growing 
global economic power. The UK had managed to become a part of the EU external migration control 
field, from this point on a more established position could be negotiated, however it would be another 
15 years until it would become a substantial actor within the field.  
The UK began to feel the strain of commonwealth migration and the changes to the political territories 
and the social reaction to immigration from the new commonwealth led to the onset of a number of 
migration controls. The UK government felt compelled to change the law and the next policy (which 
was an adaption of the Nationality Act) was the Commonwealth Immigrants Act which was passed on 
the 1st July 1962. This was different from the Nationality Act because it did not automatically grant 
citizenship to any colonial subject. The Immigrants Act was to begin with uncapped (although 
sanctions were quickly added) and perspective migrants would have to apply for “vouchers” in order 
to travel, it was seen as a precautionary measure to ensure there was some control to who was 
allowed to travel. Unlike the rest of Europe immigrants to the UK were not from mainland Europe 
(who could culturally integrate quicker) or the poorer fringes of the region but from Ireland and the 
new commonwealth which is attributed to the unique relationships and arrangements that the UK 
had with its previous colonies (Coleman, 1994). “This immigration began much earlier than on the 
continent and was controlled much earlier” (Coleman, 1994) and because immigration has started so 
much earlier the pressure on housing and employment social tension arose much earlier than it did 
on the continent.  
From the Commonwealth Immigration Act 1962 policy development towards the control of 
immigration began to slow. However, the public opinion of immigration grew ever more hostile. The 
hostility from the public (the Notting Hill and Nottingham race riots as discussed earlier) soon began 
to seep into the rhetoric of the politics of immigration. Enoch Powell’s Rivers of Blood speech in 1968 
is a perfect depiction of the public opinion towards migration but it also illustrated the shifting political 
narrative of the time towards migration. The preceding decade before this speech there has been a 
number of changes to the political environment such as tighter immigration controls from 1962 
onwards, the emergences of the National Front in 1967, the tightening of the Commonwealth 
Immigration Act in 1968 and Powellism whose societal impact has been illustrated above. 
“Immigration controls are still opposed by the Left but not by the Labour party, even though particular 
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aspects of the laws are denounced as racially discriminatory” (Coleman, 1994). Although Labour did 
introduce two Race Relations Acts (1965, 1976), which paved the way for the concept of 
multiculturalism, political parties agreed that immigration to the UK needed to be curbed. Before an 
exploration of the political implications context of the speech one must first understand its content. 
Below are two excerpts from the speech: 
“We must be mad, literally mad, as a nation to be permitting the annual inflow of some 50,000 
dependants, who are for the most part the material of the future growth of the immigrant-descended 
population. It is like watching a nation busily engaged in heaping up its own funeral pyre.” 
 Powell, 1968 
Other quotes relay the “damage” that the Race Relations Bill would have on migrant integration; 
 “For these dangerous and divisive elements the legislation proposed in the Race Relations Bill 
is the very pabulum they need to flourish. Here is the means of showing that the immigrant 
communities can organise to consolidate their members, to agitate and campaign against their fellow 
citizens, and to overawe and dominate the rest with the legal weapons which the ignorant and the ill-
informed have provided. As I look ahead, I am filled with foreboding; like the Roman, I seem to see 
"the River Tiber foaming with much blood." 
Powell, 1968 
The metaphor he uses depicts violence and rioting if migration was to be left at the same rate. The 
speech got him removed from his position as shadow Defence Secretary it did not dull the public 
support of the speech. A poll taken after the speech suggested that 70% of the UK population agreed 
with the sentiments of the speech (Hansen, 2003). For the UK this was a cross road in migration 
control. No longer was migration an element of population control but a potential threat that would 
not only damage the social fabric of UK society but also the economic and political stability of the 
state. The UK was not the only European state to witness a change to a restrictive approach towards 
external migration. The norms of the external migration control field were slowly establishing.  
At this point states across Europe were opting for internal migration over external migration and these 
changes in political narrative became reflected in the policy. In France changes to the institutional 
framework that controlled migration showed a changing attitude to immigration particularly from 
states such as Algeria. A Directorate of Population and Migration was created in 1966 which sought to 
halt illegal immigration from North Africa and the southern states of Europe (Wihtol de Wenden, 
1994). Germany at this time however was still was recruiting but at a far slower rate than before and 
there were changes being made to the politics of immigration in Germany. In 1971 (the same year the 
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UK Immigration Act was created) migrant workers who had been in Germany for longer than five years 
were given permission to apply for permits which extended their stay by another five years. “These 
steps considerably diminished the regulatory power of the guest-worker concept and may be 
interpreted as a political compromise to take into account the gradual adaption of the foreign 
workers” (Rudolph, 1994, page 121). Although the two streams of migration were different (France 
and the UK having a colonial stream of immigrants and Germany having a guest worker scheme) the 
overall political aim was to slow immigration down or as the Conservative party manifesto describes 
“to reduce and keep new migration to a small inescapable minimum” (Coleman, 1994, page 58). This 
narrative would become migration control policy in the conception and enactment of the Immigration 
Act 1971. 
The Act was the first comprehensive migration control policy in the UK. Previous to this act migration 
control had not had the same legislative functions and structures as this act created. The act outlined 
provisions for regulation and control, the administration for control, provisions for deportation and 
criminalized illegal immigration. One of the defining features of the Act was the recognition of 
different kinds of migration to the UK. It outlined that a definition should be made between temporary 
migration, student migration and permanent migration. By making a distinct definition between the 
different types of migration the UK government was able to make its controls bespoke to the differing 
kinds of migration the UK was receiving at the time of the enactment of the policy. The Act also uses 
the term partial the definition of which is any person who has the right to abode and is subject to 
immigration control. In 1971 this covered all citizens with the right to abode. Under Section Three of 
the Act, General Provisions for Regulation and Control, it declared that any person who is not patrial 
does not have the right to abode to unless they have been given special leave to remain. A special 
leave to remain would be refugee status or you patrial status is agreed once an immigrant has reached 
the UK after an appeal for example. Any non –patrial immigrant who is found to be living in the UK are 
considered criminals alongside those that have helped to remain in the UK. It gave the Home Office 
and the Police the right to arrest suspected illegal entry migrants and those that have overstayed 
without warrant or investigation as long as they have ‘reasonable cause’ to suspect an immigrant. 
These mechanisms and language were relatively unprecedented in the UK and reflected the political 
and social changes in the UK. It also demonstrates the European pattern of the increasing 
securitization of migration across the region.  
Shortly after the enactment of the Immigration Act 1971 the UK began to aggressively bid for accession 
to the EEC. The Official Journal of the European Communities Special Edition (27th March 1972) 
recognised that previous accession applications made by the UK had been unfavourable. The UK was 
at first apprehensive about joining the community, claiming that it would erode sovereignty. However, 
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in the early 1960’s the UK began to warm to the idea and initial attempts were made by the UK in 
1963 and 1967 to start accession. These were halted by the French President Charles de Gaulle, who 
believed that the UK was not politically willing to join whole heartedly into the community (his 
apprehension was perhaps justified given the relationship the UK has with the EU). In fact, one of the 
most prominent factors were the UK’s hesitation over the freedom of movement of people. In 1973 
the UK (under the Labour government of Edward Heath) joined the EEC. Bourdieu argues that an act 
is never solitary, everything an actor does places it within a field (Bourdieu, 2010). The UK joining the 
EEC was a clear message that it wished to appropriate diplomatic capital within the external migration 
control, therefore manipulating a privileged position. Accession widened the area of the EEC and as 
more countries joined member states realised that the bigger the area of free movement the more 
people are likely to move as the opportunities for employment are widened. It also increases the 
external border and means the edge of the region was now in the Mediterranean. Granting of 
citizenship in one-member state meant that migrants were free to move all across the Community, 
this was a consideration for existing member states needed to address. The accession of Greece, Spain 
and Portugal saw that automatic freedom of movement was not granted to new member states. The 
fear of mass movement from the economically weaker states to the more prosperous north of the 
region caused the core members states of France and Germany to rethink if new states should have 
such freedoms. These limitations are the first signs of reluctance by European states to truly open 
their borders to free movement of people throughout the region, and the early establishment of the 
field. 
Establishing the Habitus 
Over the past few decades there have been significant paradigmatic shifts in the norms of the external 
migration control field and demonstration of doxical behaviours from key actors such as the UK. The 
first negotiations of the EEC member states to create a larger more comprehensive regional institution 
in the mid-1980s were the beginnings of what we know as migration control in the EU now. In 
comparison to previous legislation from individual member states the idea of free movement was a 
right rather than a privilege bestowed on those that had colonial or guest worker ties with a member 
state. “The Single European Act, 1986 which allowed freedom of movement within the EU from 1993, 
led to a series of Europe-wide policy measures aimed at curbing migration from outside the EU” 
(Bloch, 2002, page 54).  Before this point migration control was an element of politics that had been 
mostly left to national governments, protecting your own territory came higher on the political agenda 
then protecting the borders of a state that was the other side of the region. The Maastricht Treaty 
(1992) was the introduction of the third pillar of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) which shifted the EEC 
being a predominantly economic institution to a political institution that also handled the political 
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affairs of Europe and its member states. This is not to suggest that member states lost all control over 
their own political affairs it simply added another level of relations between member states and the 
newly established European Union.  
The Treaty of Rome (1957) had laid the foundations for free movement of people however the free 
movement was often stunted by member states immigration policies (Blade, 2003). What the EEC 
wanted to achieve, through the Maastricht Treaty, was an absolute abolition of internal borders and 
expansion of the power of the EU to jointly control borders. The idea received mixed reaction from 
member states on the basis of the security of the external border. “Much more problematic than 
regulating transnational migration within the EC/EU was the question of access to this region from the 
outside.” (Blade, 2003, page 289). The UK saw it as an infringement on the sovereign territory and the 
loss of too much political control. Underlining these main concerns was the loss of security. If 
migration control was even partially given to an external actor it would mean member state 
governments would not have full control over the measures taken to ensure clandestine migration 
was controlled appropriately. Another consideration for member states was the extension of the EU 
into the eastern region of Europe. At this point in history, migration and refugee displacement was 
high because the dismantling of the Soviet Union took its toll on internal Eastern European politics 
(Blade, 2003). However, the Maastricht Treaty was unanimously adopted. 
In the Treaty a very specific article was inserted under the heading of Common Rules and Competition, 
Taxation and Approximation of Laws. Unlike previous treaties, Maastricht was building an institution 
and the introduction of the third pillar of Justice and Home Affairs was the consolidation of the dream 
of making the EU a political as well as an economic bloc. It also constructed a complex web of policy 
makers. Instead of the EEC existing as one institution the EU became a trio of institutions namely the 
Council, Commission and the Parliament as well as the Court of Justice of the European Union. The 
roles of all the branches of the EU are different. The council is the helm of the EU it points the EU and 
its member states to general political directions and dispel any issues that cannot be dealt with at level 
intergovernmental level. The parliament is the institution in which laws are debated and passed it also 
creates and agrees the EU’s annual budget. The parliament also performs checks and balances on the 
Commission and the Parliament. The Commission is made up of 28 commissioners (and their staff) 
that deal with varying areas of the EU’s remit.  It is the institutions which upholds and implements the 
policies that have been over seen by the Council and the Parliament, it also controls the allocation of 
the budget and enforces European law as well as being the international “face” of the EU (europ.eu). 
All these varying facets of the EU have a direct impact upon the way that they create, implement and 
maintain policies directives. Especially in areas of high importance such as migration. Article K.1 of 
Title VI of the Maastricht Treaty recognises the external migration control as an area “of common 
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interest” (1992).  In one particular article (Article 100) in the Maastricht Treaty changed the way in 
which migration was viewed and handled by the EU and individual member states (Blade, 2003 and 
europa.eu). “Regulations relating to migration issues were consequently dealt with by the first 
[included within this pillar are the supranational mechanisms that encompassed the ECSC and 
EURATOM], and third pillars, which is why, for example, the list of countries for which a visa is 
compulsory could be issued as an EU decree” (Blade, 2003, page 290).  
Article 100 c (1992) is one of the most important articles in relation to the control of migration in the 
region. Paragraph one, two, three and five of the article outline very specific laws for member states 
to adhere to: 
“1. The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting 
the European Parliament, shall determine the third countries whose nationals must be in possession 
of a visa when crossing the external borders of the Member States.  
2. However, in the event of an emergency situation in a third country posing a threat of a sudden 
inflow of nationals from that country into the Community, the Council, acting by a qualified majority 
on a recommendation from the Commission, may introduce, for a period not exceeding six months, a 
visa requirement for nationals from the country in question. The visa requirement established under 
this paragraph may be extended in accordance with the procedure referred to in paragraph 1. 
3. From 1 January l996, the Council shall adopt the decisions referred to in paragraph 1 by a qualified 
majority. The Council shall, before that date, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, adopt measures relating to a uniform 
format for visas. 
5. This Article shall be without prejudice to the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon the 
Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal 
security.” 
The Maastricht Treaty, 1992  
These four paragraphs are evidence of a shift in the way in which the EU and particular member states 
deal with migration. In one sense it draws together member states and is the first attempt of unifying 
migration control and on the other it signifies a distinct lack of unification, these scenarios will now be 
broken down to understand how this new article changed migration control and how it simultaneously 
did not effect it.  
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In previous decades’ migration control had been distinctly a member state issue evidence of which 
can be seen in the varying different programmes that were maintained throughout Europe. “The 
Treaty of Maastricht opened up the possibility of ‘communitizing’ areas of national policy, that is, 
transferring them to EU law” (Blade, 2003, page 290). However, the changes that were being made 
were having a residual effect on the outer edges of the region. Many states on the periphery knew 
that the dismantling of the internal border would be good for economic growth however it would 
mean a strengthening of the external borders. Which is evident in state level political acts such as The 
Asylum and Immigration Appeal Act 1993.  
In 1993 the Asylum and Immigrations Appeal Act consolidated the “new” form of migration as 
something that needed to be controlled. It was the first act in British history that consolidated rules 
and regulations over the admittance and settlement of asylum seekers in the UK. “The act 
demonstrates a trademark of British migration policy, namely that the liberalisation of some measures 
is often countered with restrictiveness towards other aspects in one and the same act” (Cerna and 
Wietholtz, 2011, page 199). After the act was enforced the government’s preference over the type of 
migration that they were interested in which was further compounded by the Maastricht Treaty. In 
France the focus was not of European internal movement but of the importance of domestic politics. 
“Integration has little to do with the new migratory waves, with asylum seekers and illegals, or with 
the all-European debates. In the French model, the object is mostly a population that is or will become 
French” (Wihtol de Wenden, 1994, page 79). Across the border in Germany domestic issues also 
dominated the politics of migration with tensions between the populations from the GDR (German 
Democratic Republic) and the FRG (Federal Republic of Germany) (Rudolph, 1994). During this period 
the UK and the EU transitioned into a new period of negotiation and the political landscape changed. 
From the outside the migratory politics of the EU had converged and become unified in an ideological 
sense however the domestic politics of the member states that have been discussed illustrate a much 
different pattern of divergence at the time of the Maastricht Treaty (1992).  
The years following the Maastricht Treaty saw many changes to the controls that managed migration 
across the region. “Between 1985 and 2000, the European continent experienced a steep increase of 
resident immigrants, from an estimated 23 million in 1985 to more than 56 million or 7.7% of the total 
European population in 2000” (Zincone et al, 2011, page 7). Although the change in population was 
significant the change in the geography of migration was also greatly different. States that had 
previously seen more emigration than immigration, in particular Spain and Italy, saw a rise in the 
number of immigrants reaching their shores during this time period. As already discussed the origins 
of migration prior to 1985 had been colonial, labour or refugee migrations (Bloch 2002, Coleman 1994, 
Hansen 2003 and Holmes 1988), whereas current migration patterns are more blurred. Alongside 
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these changes there has been a shift in the way the EU, states and governments are making efforts to 
influence migration and settlement patterns. Pre-nation state, the regulation of admission was down 
to local authorities and cities, the building of nation states greatly influences the way migration is 
controlled, however it was the introduction of the welfare state systems that changed the way states 
controlled migration. It led to questions of who should be allowed access to welfare and how can 
“outsiders” slot into the nation based developed patterns of welfare. “Within Europe, the making of 
migration policies developed unevenly in terms of both time and place. Depending on national 
trajectories and experiences, such policies have also been articulated in various ways and at different 
points along the way” (Zincone et al, 2011, page 11). States such as the UK, the Netherlands and France 
had to redefine colonial relations and migrants coming from colonial states. They also had to create 
very specific instruments to control these flows.  
The Maastricht took at small step to the ‘communitizing’ of migration policies (Blade, 2003) whereas 
the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) expanded the concept. “It transferred to EC/EU law the subjects of the 
Schengen agreements that had previously been treated outside the EC/EU, and the entire area of 
visas, asylum and immigration issues was transferred from intergovernmental cooperation (third 
pillar) to the jurisdiction of the EC (first pillar)” (Blade, 2003). The key word that Blade uses is 
cooperation, before Amsterdam the ideological position of migration control across Europe was that 
of cooperation not political obligation to adhere to EU law however the treaty changed this position. 
The deeper integration of a semi common immigration and asylum policy did not gain public of 
political support in the UK, they instead adopted their own initiatives. After Labour’s landslide election 
in 1997 the actively sought to revitalise the job market with highly skilled migrants. Between 1997-
2008 highly skilled migration alongside student migration accounted for 52% of migration during this 
period (Cerna and Wietholtz, 2011). “Over the last decades, the UK has undergone a profound shift 
from a ‘zero immigration country’ to one that adheres to the paradigm of ‘managed migration’ (Cerna 
and Wietholtz, 2011, page 199). The “management” really boils down to an extremely restrictive 
policy towards asylum seekers and illegal immigrants however relatively open to highly skilled 
migration and student migration. The level of openness to this kind of migration can be greatly argued, 
however it is dependent on the politician and how the media perceives any new migration policy. 
The UK may not have agreed to the Schengen however they did converge their policy with the external 
migration. Although each state is still responsible for the protection of its sovereign borders some 
control has now been assigned to other institutions under the Amsterdam Treaty. Quasi autonomous 
institutions that have been given the power to securitize migration such as Frontex (whose official 
name is European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of 
the Member States of the European Union) who purpose was to create an intelligence driven 
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institution to combat clandestine migration from the East and South of the EU (Neal, 2009). It created 
an intergovernmental instrument to frame policies around a regional directive of migration control 
and securitization. The European Council on Justice and Home Affairs have taken dramatic steps in the 
past 15 years to reinforce region wide cooperation on internal and external migration, asylum and 
security. Frontex was the culmination of a number of strategies such as the External Border 
Practitioners Common Unit which was a group that was constituted of the members of Strategic 
Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA) and the executive officers of national border 
control services. Firstly, the Council created a number of pilot projects across the EU which it called 
ad-hoc centres. They created six centres:  
• Risk Analysis Centre (Helsinki, Finland) 
• Centre for Land Borders (Berlin, Germany) 
• Air Borders Centre (Rome, Italy) 
• Western Sea Borders Centre (Madrid, Spain) 
• Ad-hoc Training Centre for Training (Traiskirchen, Austria) 
• Centre of Excellence (Dover, United Kingdom) 
• Eastern Sea Borders Centre (Piraeus, Greece) 
Information taken from: http://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/origin 
From the establishment of these centres the council decided upon a wider reaching institution which 
eventually became Frontex by the Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004. “Frontex promotes, coordinates 
and develops European border management in line with the EU fundamental rights charter applying 
the concept of Integrated Border Management.” (Frontex, accessed 13th January 2014). Integrated 
Border Management (IBM) is a structure in which member states are urged to coordinate and 
cooperate border management through institutions such as Frontex. IBM promotes larger (more 
financially stable) states to support less developed states with funding and personal to develop their 
border protection (europa.eu). IBM is especially important in the Mediterranean as many of the states 
that process the largest proportion of the migratory volume from North Africa are lesser developed 
than their Northern European counterparts. Such funding is illustrated in the budget of Frontex. The 
2013 budget is €93, 950 000 million, €8 million more than was first estimated for last year. 
Contributions from Schengen associated countries was €5, 730 000 million and from the UK a total of 
€1 million (frontex.europa.eu). More practically Frontex controls the joint effort of EU states to protect 
the EU’s southern border, by land, sea and air. Although Frontex is not a policy maker its existence 
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and its actions are evidence of the EU’s trend of securitization of migration. This is illustrated through 
their publication of quarterly and yearly reports on their missions and current projects through the 
Euro-Med region.  
There are other institutions which act out the orders of policy making institutions. Frontex is an 
example of a regional migration control institution whereas the UKVI is the nation state level migration 
control institution in the UK. The UKVI controls the UK borders, consulates and visa processing centres 
as well as internal visa processing and clandestine detention. The UKVI is far more about the 
prevention on illegal immigration, the coordination of labour migration and the protection of 
refugees. It has largely been criticised for the way in which it runs its detention centres with groups 
such as Amnesty International and the UNHCR claiming that they are more like prisons than places of 
shelter for refugees. All of these actors play a role in the external migration control field as they 
correspond with the norms of the field. Their interaction away from the central actors of the field 
(member states) are what strengthens the field. They ‘sign read’, which means their actions confirms 
one habitus’ affinity with another. In simpler terms if their behaviour deviates from other fields norms 
they are protected by the behaviours of those around them. Mirroring the habitual behaviour of those 
with greater power within the field means lesser actors can gain capital.  
Conclusions 
This chapter has demonstrated the complexities of modern day migration control the UK and the EU. 
These complexities have arisen from the historical roles that each state has had in the recruitment 
and movement of labour across the region. The two types of early migratory streams (recruitment 
and colonial) have eventually led to the same conclusion of region wide control and although this 
control happened at a different pace it has eventually led to a regional consensus that external 
migration is contentious therefore is subject to strict control. The evidence from this chapter 
illustrates that although policy convergence is a historical trend it is often by coincidence rather than 
an immediate want to secure a region wide policy. One historical trend and a trend that is still evident 
within current migration politics is the growing control and the use of many types of policies and 
institutions used to gain that control. A trend that has been accelerated by the dismantling of the EU’s 
internal borders (Bade and Brown, 2003). The UK is a key factor in the politics of migration control in 
the region as it chooses to adhere to particular controls for example Frontex but not others, for 
example Schengen. From this chapter onwards will be the analysis of policy documentations that have 
to the control of migration. Documentation such as the ones that have been mentioned here will be 
analysed in relation to how and why the UK uses particular EU migration control mechanisms but not 
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others. The establishment of the field of external migration control was necessary in order to 
understand the behaviours and actions of the actors in the field.  
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Securitization:  
The Habitus of the External Migration 
Control Field 
The concept of securitization has developed in International Relations over the past 30 years. It is a 
means of trying to understand the processes states and institutions take in which to protect their 
sovereignty. Securitization can manifest itself in many ways through dialogue between the media and 
populations to diplomacy and through government and institutional policy. This chapter will be 
analysing the latter. The growth of securitization in government policy has been expediential over the 
past 15 years. There have been a number of catalysts which have caused such an rise in securitization 
by governments and the subsequent influence on regional actors and institutions. Events such as the 
9/11 bombings of the Twin Towers in New York and further terrorist acts in Europe over the last 10 
years have all had an effect on the securitizing practices of states and intergovernmental institutions. 
The threats posed by terrorism, the changing face of conflict as well as an increase in the number of 
non-state actors facilitating illegal movement of migrants, are just some of the reasons for the growth 
in securitization. Human migration has had a profound effect on the securitizing practices of states 
and regional/international institutions. This is nowhere more truly felt than the European Union (EU) 
and its member states. External migration into the EU has seen unprecedented growth since the late 
1980’s. The type of migration has also changed. As well as economic migrants seeking better 
employment within the EU there has also been a rise in trafficking and smuggling of human beings as 
well as seeing large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers as neighbouring states are politically 
unstable (Costello and Hancox, 2014).   
These challenges at the borders of the EU as well as the global trend of anti-Islamic feeling by 
populations living in western states has caused a dramatic shift in the structures in which external 
migration to the EU is now managed, especially by member states such as the UK. As discussed in the 
previous chapter securitization is an action that has been evident in the policies created by the UK and 
the EU since the earliest conceptions of freedom of movement for European citizens and gained 
momentum as economic migrants travelled from previously colonial territories, culminating in the 
discussions by academics such as Ole Weaver (1993) in the securitizing practices of states and 
institutions in relation to the rise of global migration. What will be discussed in this chapter is the 
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processes of securitization since the Maastricht Treaty up until the most recent changes in UK policy, 
the 2014 Immigration Act. This will be done in context to the theoretical framework of this research. 
It will be argued that securitization has developed as a doxical behaviour of the UK through following 
the norms of the field that are set by the EU as the head of the external migration control field. There 
are a number of distinct periods of securitization since the Maastricht Treaty. The first is the 
Maastricht Treaty itself, the Amsterdam Treaty and the two major changes in British policy, the 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and the Immigration Act 2014. These policies are 
markers which signify changes not only in the securitizing practice in the institution or state in which 
they were enacted by also major changes within the external migration control field. As well as these 
significant policy changes the securitizing practices of externalising EU borders and an analysis of the 
quasi military/policing institution, Frontex will be addressed. There will also be a section in which the 
doxical behaviour of securitization will be analysed in terms of the UK’s position within the external 
migration control field and how the securitization processes can lead changes in the relationships 
between the actors in the field.  
The Growth of Securitization 
Huysmans (1995) discussed the cultural changes in western society in the early 1990s and its effect on 
the securitizing behaviours of states. Huysmans argued that a feeling of insecurity within society that 
is fed by images of ‘dangerous’ and ‘violent’ cities placed next to images of migrants and refugees 
raised the threat from being a threat to the individual to a threat to society and the collective identity 
(1995). Around this period the rising fear from society was mirrored by a rise in the discussions had by 
politicians around the subject of migration. The rhetoric spanned across all levels of governance. NATO 
gave lectures on international (in)security in which migration was a regular topic. It was also at this 
time that the EU were structuring the Schengen agreement and Dublin Convention.  
The Dublin Convention is of particular interest when assessing the growth of securitization norms 
within the field of external migration control (Drewry et al, 2004). The narrative of the convention 
placed ‘issues’ of refugees and asylum seekers in the same category of drugs and terrorism. 
Agreements such as the Dublin Convention reveal the norm building practices of actors within the 
field. Article 3 Paragraph 5 outlines the rights of states to process request third country processing: 
“Any Member State shall retain the right, pursuant to its national laws, to send an applicant for asylum 
to a third State, in compliance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention, as amended by the New 
York Protocol” (Dublin Convention, 1997, page 3). The coding structure used to analyse the data 
recognised this as a cooperative securitizing practice firstly because it is a document issued by the 
head of the field but secondly it allows member states to externalise their controls to third countries. 
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It is why Frontex as an immigration control structure also has the remit of attempting to control the 
smuggling of drugs and weapons into the EU alongside the human movement over external borders 
as they use third countries to alleviate the pressures on member states a fact that was supported by 
Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003. The perpetuation of external migration to the EU as a security 
issues in the early 1990s was reinforced by academics studying it. Huysmans (2000)m places Weaver 
and Buzan (1993) as some of the key academics that placed migration on the security agenda. He 
argues that academics from strategic and security studies viewing migration as a security issues and 
discussing it within the literature legitimises it as a security issue. 
Buzan (1991) in his key text People, States and Fear argues “In the case of security, this discussion is 
about the pursuit of freedom from threat. When this discussion is in the context of the international 
system, security is about the abilities of states and societies to maintain their independent identity 
and their functional integrity.” (pages 18-19). External migration into the EU has perceived negative 
impacts on the ability for states to achieve what Buzan is arguing. Independent identity and functional 
integrity brings into question concepts of sovereignty and territory, two things in which a state actor 
is most interested in securing. Both concepts have an impact upon an individual and collective 
identities. If these are threatened it is enough of a catalyst for people to interpret threats as security 
problems. From this point Buzan claims that the security ‘story’ is made up of three parts: 
1. The threat. 
2. The object which is threatened. 
3. The maintenance of this objects identity. 
It follows an almost structural understanding of the security issue; at the centre is a threatened 
identity and at the peripheral exists the threat. The security story follows the Hobbesian model; the 
creation of an object for abstract fear then locating it in other agents. The two agents are then 
interlocked which gives them the drive to securitize against the perceived threat. For this reason, it is 
best to keep the migrant, whether they be an economic migrant, refugee or trafficking victim under a 
single collective identity. Like the Dublin Convention, by placing them all in one identity rather than 
assessing individual traits such as gender, age, religion or wealth it is easier to securitize against the 
threat. By maintaining the threat as a singular agent it is therefore easier to create policy to attempt 
to eradicate the threat. Article 1 Paragraph 1 is testament to this: “‘Alien' means: any person other 
than a national of a Member State” (1997, page 3). Instead of differentiating between Asylum Seekers 
and Refugees the EU simply use the term ‘alien’. From a Constructivist perspective: “Security is 
interpreted as a social construct, which means that it is something produced by social practices in a 
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particular spatial and temporal context” (Huysmans, 1995, page 66). For Europe in the early 1990s 
there was a distinct feeling of change which was acknowledged by state and regional actors. The 
changes to the international migration control field would and have had a distinct impact upon the 
external migration control field.  
Huysmans (2000), Weaver and Buzan (1993) have approached the securitization of migration into 
Europe from a position where there is no overarching control over decisions made in terms of policies 
in attempts to control external migration into the EU. This control is not categorised by a literal power 
or governance by an external actor. This power comes from head of the field which is a predetermined 
role. In terms of the external migration field the head of the field is the EU. As discussed in previous 
chapters a field is “a social arena within which struggles or manoeuvres take place over specific 
resources or stakes” (Jenkins, 2002, page 84). The stakes that are at threat are the stability of an 
influential political and economic bloc. The different forms of capital such as economic, social, cultural 
and symbolic (Jenkins, 2005). By analysing the securitization of external migration into the EU using 
field theory as a tool it can explain some of the differences and similarities in the way migration into 
the EU has been managed since 1992. Regional differences within social groups can blur national 
interests, as can social conditions and previous contact with migrant groups (Leitner, 1997). 
“Dominant racial and national ideologies, defining who belongs and who does not belong to a national 
community, also influence who is admitted” (Leitner, 1997, page 263). Principles of citizenship and 
policy are influenced by national ideologies which can be subverted for economic and political gain. 
The gain which is able to made in the field of external migration control is a more stable regional field 
and a more stable state.  
The Perception of Threat  
Threat perception is an important element in the securitization processes of the UK and the EU. 
“Threat does not operate in a void; it only functions by threatening something” (Huysmans, 1995, 
page 55).  
 “An approach which is central to the process of policy formation is that which distinguishes migrants 
according to the basic cause and intention of movement” (Collinson, 1994, page 2).  
The negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) was central to the securitizing practices of the external 
migration control field. It was a period when members of the field felt doubly threatened. On one side 
they had the potential erosion of their own political/territorial sovereignty and on the other they had 
a growing concern of the rise in migration from third countries. “There is much at stake in the present 
Europe because there is a certain openness to fundamental changes in the organisation of that 
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Europe” (Huysmans, 1995, page 63). The changing landscape for a member state such as the UK was 
doubly difficult to handle because of the refusal to join the agreement. Prior to taking such action the 
UK, and other member states had been able to deal with their own migration flows. Particularly states 
which had created post-colonial migration flows or dedicated structures such as the guest worker 
policy in Germany. “Historically European nation-sates have successfully used their powers to control 
flows of international migrants and deter a great deal of unwanted immigration (Leitner, 1997, page 
260). The early 1990s was categorized by many different kinds of migration. One of the largest groups 
being economic migrants as globalisation opened an even wider international job market but also a 
large number of refugees from civil unrest in Eastern Europe. It was unprecedented and European 
states were feeling the strain more than most because of the high amount of previous colonial 
migration. The negotiation for Maastricht began before 1992 when the Thatcher era in the UK was 
beginning to come to an end. The political baton was picked up by the new Prime Minister John Major. 
Major was generally enthusiastic about the widening of the responsibilities of the new EU: “A 
centralist Europe is most likely to develop if Britain has no influence in the Community, if it is side-
lined, and if we do stand aside and let others run Europe while Britain scowls in frustration on the 
fringes” (Major, 1992). However, his Home Secretary Kenneth Baker was less than enthusiastic: “If 
these matters were to pass into European competence in the way that the Liberal Democrats want, 
there would be an inevitable weakening of our controls and our frontier controls, which I am not 
prepared to accept” (House of Commons Debate, 1991). This changing landscape had a profound 
effect on the relationships within the field of external migration control. Bourdieu argues that a field 
is a “structured system of social positions” and are defined by the stakes that are at stake (Jenkins, 
2002, pages 84-85). This can easily be adjusted to view the field as a structured system of political 
positions. The ease of redefining these political positions is based on how willing members of the field 
are to changing or creating their own habitus within the field. Habitus is defined by Bourdieu as an 
“acquired system of generative schemes objectively adjusted to the particular conditions in which it 
is constituted” (Bourdieu, 1977, page 95). In context to the field of external migration control the 
single most objective scheme is security. The sovereignty of member states is paramount even within 
such a complex political field. Securitization at time was one of the key areas in which all member 
states agreed.  
“In the struggle for the nation state, a highly securitized migration could well be a strategy for 
reaffirming the identity of the nation state” (Huysmans, 1995, page 63). Post 9/11 the integrity of the 
national identity of many western states was under a perceived threat. The War on Terror that 
followed had a direct impact on the policy making of those within the field of external migration 
control in Europe, especially in the UK where immigration and terrorism policy are so often interlinked.  
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Unlike the argument from Huysmans (1995) that claims that securitization starts with a societal 
perception of a threat. In the 2000s the threat was manifested by politicians which started a new era 
of external migration control management.  
The 2014 Immigration Bill represents a more recent struggle for the UK and its relationships within 
the field of external migration control. The bill was introduced to parliament as one of the biggest 
changes to external migration control since the 1971 Immigration Act. Prime Minister David Cameron 
said of the act “Hardworking people expect and deserve an immigration system that puts Britain first. 
Over the past 4 years we have clamped down on abuses, making sure the right people are coming 
here for the right reasons” (gov.co.uk, 2014). Prior to the introduction of the act the then Conservative 
– Liberal Democrat coalition had been trialling a number of schemes in order to curb illegal 
immigration to the UK this was in relation to the regional struggles at this point of refugees arriving 
due to the civil uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa. This rise in numbers had sparked 
societal and political unease and was one of the leading issues during the 2011 election campaign. 
During the House of Commons reading for the 2014 Immigration Bill the expansion of powers for UK 
immigration officers was widely discussed. The majority of MPs were behind the idea that immigration 
officers at ports and processing centres external to the EU, including centres that were in North Africa. 
What makes the 2014 Immigration Bill unique is the securitization of the service industry. Up until this 
point securitization was an action that happened externally, in the EU and outside in third countries. 
During the Ping Pong session in the House of Commons on the 7th May 2014. The then Home Secretary 
Theresa May, was quick to blame the previous Labour leadership however as predictable as her 
thrashing of the previous government was the language which was then used was more akin to a 
terrorism bill than to a policy that was created to control external migration. A Guardian headline 
captured the feeling of the moment: “Immigration bill: Theresa May defends plans to create 'hostile 
environment'” (2013). The hostile environment was supported by the rebranding of the UKVI 
(formerly the UKBA) and the infamous “go home” van initiative instigated at this time. The 2014 
Immigration Bill was exclusively for the control of third country nationals, meaning migrants that do 
not have the right to freedom of movement. On page 6 of the document it was evident the UK 
government was securitizing against potential threats rather than having a determined plan or specific 
threat. Terms used were: 
• “very dangerous” 
• “seek to threaten” 
• “legitimate security issue” 
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• “a real and current threat” 
This language is repetitively used throughout the discussion. When you look at the recent terrorist 
acts passed by the UK government the language is almost interchangeable. An example of which is 
the omission of Section 38 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 by the Counter 
Terrorism Act 2008. Section 38 outlined specific structures in which information could be gained about 
migrant, refugees and asylum seekers by other authorities. The Counter Terrorism Act removed these 
structures allowing for information to be gained without the bureaucracy. The removal of the Section 
38 is a clear securitizing act by the UK government. It demonstrates that the UK believe foreign 
nationals are more likely commit terrorist acts therefore information regarding them should be readily 
available to authorities.  
This is also a key point when you take the rhetoric of securitization and see how the government 
simply discussing the act of securitizing to actually witnessing as a palpable structure which has been 
created and maintained. The public image of the 2014 Immigration Bill was to ensure migrants entered 
the UK fairly however the mandate of the bill between politicians was one of securitization. The 
language as used above does not even attempt to hide the sentiment of the government. This rhetoric 
is continued when you compare the Final Immigration Act to the Immigration Bill (as amended in 
public committee).  
• Page 2 insertion of the word enforcement. 
• Page 5 insertion “Deprivation if conduct seriously prejudicial to vital interests of the UK”. 
• Page 6 insertion of the word detention.  
The argument continues through the Immigration Bill – Factsheet: Article 8 (clause 14) where 
Immigration Minister Mark Harper believes the courts can be over generous with the rulings in regards 
to Article 8 (European Convention of Human Rights; Right to Private and Family Life). “It is for 
parliament to decide what the public interest requires” (2014, page 1). All throughout the progression 
of the Bill to enactment the government repeatedly exposed the fear of external migration. Much of 
the former Home Secretary Theresa May discussions during parliamentary Ping Pong within the House 
of Commons centred on the governments right to revoke citizenship to those suspected of terrorist 
acts. May was extremely eager to allow the revocation of citizenship even if the individual was in a 
third country. Rendering an individual stateless when in a third country goes against the UN Human 
Rights Charter, however, what must be recognised is the rhetoric that surrounds this is of 
securitization. This is supported by the UK Borders Act 2007 in which it is stated that foreign national 
offenders with sentences of 12 months or more are subject to automatic deportation. This allows for 
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the securitization of external migration to not only be an action that happens at the borders of the UK 
or in visa processing centres but an act that could happen within the legal system of the UK. The 
Immigration Report 2014, introduced to parliament in October 2013 outlined that the drive behind 
the policy was that English language and economic wellbeing are the only factors that the UKVI will 
consider when assessing a claim for leave to remain. The 2014 Immigration Act also attempted to 
address the securitization of migration from within the UK. One of the policies main aims were to 
make access to public and private services much more difficult for migrants without correct 
documentation. It outlined that landlords of private rented accommodation would have to “check” 
the immigration status of prospective tenants and banks would also have to ask for documentation 
pertaining to the status of individuals. This faction of securitization by the UK government illustrates 
them not only adhering to the doxa of securitization but evolving it too, expanding the field of 
migration control to cover areas that have previously been unaffected by immigration policy in the 
UK. Expanding previously exclusive social structures and transforming them into political and security 
structures is evidence of the UK going above and beyond the requirements of the field. However, does 
this then effect the UK’s position within the external migration control field?  
This exposure however was not unique to just the UK the whole EU external migration control field 
migration was continually being securitized. Externalisation and promotion of a security driven 
mandate was evidence at all levels of EU governance. This is evidence of the UK cooperating with the 
EU (a concept which is explored in a subsequent chapter) but it is also evidence of the UK following 
the established EU doxa as part of the external migration control field. An example of which is the 
Agreement between the Government of the UK of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of the Kingdom of Belgium, Concerning Immigration Controls on Rail Traffic between 
Belgium and the United Kingdom using the Channel Fixed Link (2014). The act outlines the plans for a 
“secured safety zone” which are clearly designated areas of train stations which are not publicly 
accessibly in which border controls are integrated into commercial ticket control. A “control zone” 
which would be part of the “secured safety zone” and would be an area which UK immigration officers 
can perform checks on Belgian territory.    
Frontex was designed as a quasi-policing/military structure in which Schengen and some non-
Schengen states come together to try and stem the flow of movement by humans, weapons, drugs 
and illegal goods at the outer borders of the EU. “Frontex promotes, coordinates and develops 
European border management in line with the EU fundamental rights charter applying the concept of 
Integrated Border Management” (Frontex, 2016). Frontex specialises in particular actions such as 
CIRAM: “To analyse all the data, Frontex has developed its own risk analysis model, called CIRAM - the 
common integrated risk analysis model. CIRAM provides Frontex with a foundation for coordinating 
101 
 
joint operations at the external borders. Gaining knowledge on cross-border criminality is essential for 
the establishment of an appropriate reaction. Therefore, CIRAM enables assessment of the relative 
risks posed by different threats. It was developed in close consultation with member states, and is 
applicable both at EU and national level” (Frontex, 2016). External migration control structures such 
as CIRAM represent the core norms and values of the field and as such are a manifestation of those 
norms. It takes securitization from a passive, at times an unconscious action and reverts it into an 
active behaviour. It is important that member states are seen to actively participate in these structures 
and mechanisms of external migration control. If they are participating it means that they are adhering 
to the norms set by the head of the field. Not participating would be an indication of a deviation from 
the field. What is most interesting from the analysis of CIRAM is that it states that it is a regional and 
a national structure in which to control migration. For those in the field, especially the UK, who can 
find participation in the field impacting negatively on sovereignty, the EU is buffering the participation 
in the structure offering member states different ways in which to access and show how they are norm 
building alongside member states.  
Frontex: Doxical Enforcement 
The most dominant actor of the external migration control field, the EU, and other members of the 
field coming together under the umbrella of securitization is an action that is not solely undertaken 
by models and structures that have been created by the head of the field. They also come from actors 
within the field that create mechanisms for all members to participate in. Frontex began as 
manifestation of fears over the extension of the EUs border during the accession of the A8 bloc. 
However, Frontex, although heavily reliant upon EU funding, has become an actor in its own right. It 
has become a focus point in which member states can exercise securitizing practices. Active 
participation in the mechanisms that Frontex have created is evidence of member states adhering to 
the doxical norms of the field. UK participation in Joint Operations (JOs) with Frontex is an explicit 
form of securitization. As seen throughout the other sections of this chapter, UK securitization is often 
passive and hidden in the subtext of policy and actions made by the UK Visas and Immigration office 
(UKVI). However, UK action within Frontex represents an overt participation in the norm building 
practices within the field, a want to follow the structures set by the head of the field, the EU. JOs take 
place when there is a recognised common need to prevent or remedy external migration. The UK has 
participated in 66 JOs and has also led a number of operations. One of the most recent operations was 
a JRO (Joint Return Operation) which the UK led. JRO to Nigeria was actioned on the 28.01.2014 and 
the purpose was to return Nigerian nationals that had overstayed. Eight other member states were 
included in the operation which were: Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, The Netherlands, Spain, 
and Sweden. 
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All the states which participated returned at least 1 Nigerian national and the total number returned 
was 62. The UK taking charge of a complex removal operation, on charted flights which poses other 
risks, is proving the head of the field that they are willing to take risks to fulfil the role of a securitizing 
actor, to truly participate in the field. Return operations at a national level have received some 
negative reactions from members of the public. One such incident was when a migrant that had 
decided upon voluntary removal died on a flight as he was deported from the UK. The Guardian 
published the headline: “Deportee asked for help on flight before dying, witness says” (2010). 
Incidents such as these prove the lengths that members of the external migration control field are 
willing to go to secure territories. The removal of migrants is a last resort as members of the field strive 
to securitize migration before it reaches the removal stages.  
The JOs completed by member states are not only for the returns of illegal over stayers but also 
preventing external migration. The externalisation of securitization is a trend that the external 
migration control field have followed since the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) (Garlick, 2006). As we have 
seen in the European Neighbourhood Project and the bilateral partnerships created with North African 
states the externalisation of control is a high priority for the field (Andrijasevic, 2010, Lavenex, 2006 
and Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009). An air border operation that took place in 2013 
demonstrates this. Joint Operation Focal Point 2013 Air: Frontex Evaluation Report (2014) was 
conceived as “Frontex identified different threats posed by irregular migration to the integrity of the 
European external air borders prior to the start of the joint operation… based on the agreed 
vulnerabilities identified bilaterally with Member States, Frontex nominated some Temporary 
European Focal Point airports while Third Country Coordination Point Airports were chosen upon their 
relevance in terms of operational cooperation” (2014, page 3). There are a number of points to 
highlight in this information. Firstly, the language that is used highlights the importance of 
securitization for the field. Words such as threats and vulnerabilities demonstrate the effect external 
migration has on member states. Stability of the field is essential for it to maintain its control over 
external migration. The externalisation of border security is evidence of this as it shows that if field 
security and stability is to be maintained it must stop external migration before it even reaches the 
territory.  
During this time ongoing civil and political disputes in North Africa were having a knock on effect to 
Frontex operations. The combination of threat and growing numbers in the movement of people over 
the southern European border build up into securitization operations. 32 airports were included in the 
operation all over Europe and it acted within the existing framework of the EU’s Integrated Border 
Management. This multilevel approach to the securitization of external migration exposes the lengths 
which members of the field are willing to go under the flag of securitization. The total cost of the 
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operation was €1,159,884 (approximately £881,732) a large amount of money for states who were 
coming out a recession and continuing the rhetoric of austerity domestically. The operation was seen 
as a success with the objectives being mostly achieved. For example, the ability to identify possible 
risks and threats, enhance border security and support to establish permanent structures that can 
remain after the operation finished. The narrative of the document highlights how broadly successful 
the operation was however the numbers of migration that were caught attempting to enter the EU 
were relatively small. What is most interesting about the operation was the importance placed on the 
gaining insight in the movement of specific groups of migrants, in particular the irregular movement 
of Syrian and Iraqi nationals. “The operation shed light on the activities of those involved in seeking to 
facilitate the irregular entry of migrants into the EU. It provided a deeper understanding of the routing 
and methodologies used by these criminal groups.” (2014, page 5). This is also reflected in the 
quarterly and annual reports produced by Frontex. In the Q1 report of 2010 the discussion of the 
facilitation of Vietnamese nationals attempting to enter the UK, it is the same rhetoric.  
The Annual Risk Analysis (ARA) 2010 also discusses the externalisation of controls to neighbouring 
states: “The bilateral collaboration agreements with third countries of departure on the Centre 
Mediterranean route (Italy with Libya) and the Western African route (which Spain signed with 
Senegal and Mauritania) had an impact on reducing departures of illegal migrants from Africa” (ARA, 
2010, page 12). The scale of the externalisation operations in terms of geographical area, monies spent 
and political negotiation is testament to the importance that the external migration control field place 
on securitization, and more specifically the externalisation of that securitization. There was a 
significant shift in the language used in the Frontex reports from Q4 2011 onwards. There are a 
number of key external factors that can be attributed to the increasing amount of securitization. 
Firstly, the civil and political changes in North Africa had a direct impact on the number of migrants 
crossing the southern border. “In the Central Mediterranean area, the large number of detections in 
2011, which suddenly increased following the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Libya” (ARA, 2013, page 5). 
Secondly, the type of migrant impacted upon the reaction by member states. Many who were crossing 
were not economic migrants but refugees, Italian authorities reported that there was also an increase 
in unaccompanied minors in the Central Mediterranean route, they accounted for 30% of those 
crossing. The overall reaction by the external migration control field was that of securitization. At the 
time Frontex had a strong definition of what it perceived as a threat, how it would consider itself 
vulnerable: “a ‘threat’ is a force or pressure acting upon the external borders that is characterised by 
both its magnitude and likelihood; ‘vulnerability’ is defined as the capacity of a system to mitigate the 
threat and ‘impact’ is determined as the potential consequences of the threat” (ARA, 2013, page 11). 
You would be forgiven for thinking that Frontex are attempting to deal with a military force. However, 
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this language is very reflective of that which was used during the Amsterdam negotiations 15 years 
prior to the Arab Spring. By using the first and sixth code the securitization language was identified 
because of the reactionary behaviours of the actors. The same narrative was repeated when Schengen 
was conceptualised and again when the A8 accession moved the external border further east. Unlike 
cooperation and manipulation which have slowly increased over the course of the fields history, 
securitization is the deepest and most established doxical behaviour of the EU.   
The doxical norm of securitization is supported by all faction’s field explicitly discussing the threats. 
One could argue that being so explicit is simply a way of legitimising the spending of just over 1 million 
euros however, there is a deeper connection to the doxical behaviours of the external migration 
control field. If we look back at the securitization practices during the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and 
more particularly the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) what we can correlate in the continuation of the norm. 
The doxical behaviour of securitization was a founding pillar of the external migration control field. 
In Piet Eeckhout’s book titled External Relations of the European Union: Legal and Constitutional 
Foundations (2005) he discusses the processes which led to the gaining of powers around the control 
of external migration leading up to the Treaty of Amsterdam. The original EEC (European Economic 
Community) had few provisions which expressly referred to external action other than those outlined 
in commercial policy. However, the articles of the original treaty establishing the EEC do have subtle 
hints towards the potential future of external migration control. Article 229 (now Article 302 EC) 
outlines that the commission should maintain it relationships with actors such as the United Nations, 
GATT and other international organisations that it has relationships with. The next Article (now Article 
303 EC) also reiterates that cooperation with the Council of Europe should also be maintained. Neither 
of the articles give a definitive and/or substantive argument or statement towards gaining or utilising 
any power to act under international law.  However, Article 238 (now Article 310 EC) states “the 
community may conclude with one or more states or international organisations agreements 
establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common actions and special 
procedures”. This article unlike those previously discussed give a little more specificity towards the 
possibility of external action. All these articles create an idea and feeling of implied powers. This is 
important when looking at the relationship of the external migration control field.  
As discussed previously capital is the key factor within the relations between actors in any given field. 
Implied powers allow actors to feel more important than they actually are in terms of their position 
with the field. As Adler-Nissen and Jenkins (2002) have discussed capital is what shapes an actor’s 
behaviour. The potential to gain more capital leads to that actor becoming more powerful and 
influential within that field. The implied association that Article 310 EC suggest was never clearly 
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defined. It highlights a structure but not how such an association would ever be utilised. At the time 
of negotiation, it was thought the article would be rarely, if ever, used. However, it was used 
immediately to conclude association agreements with Turkey and Greece. This is not the same as full 
membership the EC at that time. There were a number of agreements which were concluded on the 
basis of Article 310 EC which never implied possible membership. The Article was actually mostly used 
during the dismantling of member state colonies as a way of establishing political and economic links. 
The potential of these associations are perhaps reflected in the numerous external relations that the 
EU has with neighbouring states through schemes such as the European Neighbourhood Policy. There 
was a specific part of the agreement in which external migration was discussed. Title IV discussed a 
complex programme of legislative and administrative action which were to be implemented within a 
5-year period after the Amsterdam treaty. This Title is less interesting to analyse as it presupposes 
controls and says little about the underlying habitual behaviours of actors like the EU. It follows the 
rhetoric established by years of internal negotiation to establish the norms of the internal migration 
control field. What Article 310 EC offers is an insight into the possibilities of external migration control 
actually becoming external to the territory of the EU.  
From Doxa to Habitus: The Externalisation of Borders  
Externalisation of borders is something which needs to be discussed with looking at the securitizing 
actions of the UK. The externalisation of borders is a practice that is very difficult to trace in terms of 
being able confirm whether an actor has explicitly placed its border in another country. It also goes 
against the norms of international relations to believe that one state can place its sovereign border 
outside of its own territory without causing conflict with another state. However, if one takes the 
concept of implied power as discussed above the idea that a state could place its border in another 
country. Externalisation of borders happens when a state has exhausted or has failed to curb 
immigration. The UK in the early 2000s was suffering with a steep rise in immigration and a number 
of failed schemes in which to stem the flow. The Home Office’s Immigration and Nationality 
Directorate, Work Permits UK, Immigration Service all failed to lower the net migration figure in the 
UK. It was at this time that the UK looked elsewhere in terms of immigration control. Frontex was 
slowly establishing itself as a key factor in the control of migration from the south however the UK 
was securitizing external migration control through its own domestic policies. The document simply 
titled Immigration Control (September, 2006) published by the UK government was a response to the 
Home Affairs Committee Session 2005-2006. The document highlights a number of key areas of 
interest/issues in the control of external migration at the time. One of the most revealing areas of 
interest was the support of the development of the Biometric Visa Programme. It reveals the UK 
interest in the international management of external migration. It witnessed the advent of the “hub 
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and spoke” model of control. These hubs would be placed globally in areas of particularly high 
migration. From a regional hub smaller immigration offices would deal with the processes of visas pre-
entry into the UK. “Exporting the border effectively cuts down on the numbers of people travelling 
undocumented to the UK” (2006, page 18). The thinking behind the policy was that if prospective 
migrants can apply for entry into the UK before entering sovereign territory it would be possible to 
cut down on the number of illegal over stayers because they should have been assessed previous to 
gaining entry. The externalisation processes have also been witnessed in the progressive use of 
external migration control structures such as Frontex. Frontex is the closest the EU has managed to 
get to produce a uniform structure to manage external migration. The initial mandate of Frontex was 
as a policing mechanism and as a way in which member states with less developed structures could 
come together with states with more effect tools and economic power. These seemingly benign 
structures began to take a different form with the advent of the use of Rapid Intervention teams. “The 
basic idea behind rapid interventions are to bring assistance to a Member State that is under urgent 
and exceptional pressure. The pressure relates especially to large numbers of third-country nationals 
trying to enter the territory of a Member State illegally” (Frontex, 2016). The changes in the mandate 
of Frontex, therefore potentially changing the structures of the field. 
The UK government document Faster, Fairer, Firmer – a modern approach to Immigration and Asylum 
(July, 1998) revealed the extent to which the UK follows the securitizing norms of the EU. Effective 
returns are seen as vastly important for all members of the external migration control field. It is the 
tool in which if they have failed to stop a migrant reaching the EU they can remove them effectively 
and efficiently. The document acknowledged the “experience among EU member states” as a norm 
to work towards. This statement was in the context to returns. The Dublin Convention was signed in 
1990, however did not come to force until 1997. It created a system of returns for EU member states 
of failed asylum seekers. It was then extended by the Eurodac convention which created an EU wide 
data system for the retrieval and storage of the finger prints of asylum seekers. What it effectively 
does it create a database in which the removal of failed asylum seekers is eased by retaining biometric 
data. If a previously failed asylum seeker attempts to gain entry back into the EU, even if they present 
with false documents, authorities can assess a claim almost immediately. It has meant that an asylum 
seeker or refugee cannot enter one state be denied entry and then enter another European state and 
try and claim asylum again. Once a claim is placed that individual will only be given leave to remain in 
that one state and will not gain access to the right of freedom of movement until they pursue 
indefinite leave to remain through the granting of a visa. What is most compelling about the rights of 
refugees and asylum seekers in the EU is the active rhetoric of securitization as much as any other 
migrant group. Refugees and Asylum Seekers are protected by international law and must be given 
107 
 
leave to remain in a host country if it is assessed that returning that individual would cause them harm 
or worse death, rights which are protected not only by the Dublin Convention but also by under the 
UN Declaration of Human Rights, 1951. In the early 2000s the media narrative of “illegal” asylum 
seekers were popular especially in the tabloids of the UK. A judicial decision caused this kind of 
headline illegal and did little to change the social attitudes towards asylum seekers and refugees. This 
is because the more vulnerable groups of migrants, like refugees, asylum seekers, smuggling and 
trafficking victims are placed within the same narrative instead of being treated differently. Terms 
become almost interchangeable and this has been a growing trend not only in the media but within 
the policies of the UK and the EU.  
In 2005 the then Labour government, fronted by Tony Blair released a government document titled 
Controlling our borders: Making migration work for Britain; Five-year strategy for asylum and 
immigration (2005). The years leading up to the release of this document were positive in terms of 
the relationship that the UK were having with the EU. They were actively taking part in EU initiatives 
like Frontex. The years leading up to 2005 had seen rises in net migration in the UK and the 
government were feeling pressure from political opponents and the electorate to reduce the figures. 
This document covered all areas of migration control, including internal migration from the EU. What 
featured heavily was the narrative that the UK government would regain control of illegal over stayers 
and have stricter controls on those abusing the system. Tony Blair stated:  
 “There will be a new drive to prevent illegal entry, to crack down on illegal working and a 
tough policy of removals for those who should not be here. There will be on-the-spot fines for 
employers who collude with illegal immigration. We will fingerprint visitors who need visas, and those 
planning longer stays, before they arrive. We will, where necessary, use our powers to demand 
financial bonds from migrants in specific categories where there has been evidence of abuse, to 
guarantee their return home. And over time, we will move towards the point where it becomes the 
norm that those who fail can be detained, as asylum intake falls and removals become easier as we 
negotiate ever more effective returns agreements.” 
Tony Blair, Controlling our borders, 2005, page 8 
This paragraph from Blair’s introduction highlights a number of key points of interest. It demonstrates 
the layers of securitization that the UK has created over the years since the Maastricht Treaty. The 
one of the most dominate is the discussion on stopping abuse on the migration system before 
prospective migrants arrive in the UK. The other dominant narrative is the discussion of effective 
returns. This is evidence of securitization, as a doxic norm for the external migration control field and 
can be found at all level of governance in the UK. This is true of the EU at this time which was 
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attempting a number of external migration control measures externally and internally within the 
region. This mirroring shows that the actions of the head of the field are reflected in the actions of 
actors within the field that are not as influential. These narratives were continued in the section 
discussing the securing of the borders. Charles Clarke, who at this time was Secretary of State 
reiterated the need for further securitization at the borders of the UK.  
 “Over the next five years we will transform our immigration control. Using new technology, 
we will develop an integrated control before people enter the UK, at our borders and while they are 
in the country. We will fingerprint everyone when they apply for a visa. These fingerprints and other 
personal travel information will be checked against our own watch lists of those who present an 
immigration or security threat.” 
 Charles Clarke, Controlling our Borders, 2005, page 10 
Clarke takes the evidence of securitizing practices further by using more aggressive language. He uses 
the terms immigration and security threat in the same breath which is a difference from the tone of 
language that Blair used.   
Section 4 of Controlling our Borders is centred on the  
 “d) Action in Europe  
55. The EU has established a new border agency to co-ordinate control at the EU’s external border. 
This will substantially improve Europe’s capacity to deal with vulnerable crossing points and in 
particular to work to strengthen the EU’s new border to the East.” 
Exploring which actors are securitizing against external migration in the EU is important. As Bourdieu 
explains the doxical behaviour of actors in the field are what adds stability to the field. Stability is of 
great important to individual nation-states but when securitization is a stabiliser for multiple actors 
and when the perceived threat is so severe then the field, and the protection of it, takes precedence. 
As previously discussed in another chapter the EU and other member states in the field have 
securitized against migration since the treaty which formed the field, the Treaty of Rome, 1957. 
Stability comes when all actors within the field are actively taking part in the processes of securitizing 
alongside the maintenance of structures which have been built previously. This is one of the reasons 
why securitization quickly turned from a habitual behaviour to a doxical one. “Habitus only exists in, 
through and because of the practices of actors and their interaction with each other and the rest of 
their environment” (Jenkins, 2002, page 75). It becomes an integral part of their behaviour not just a 
manifest of it. It comes from an actor experiencing it and teaching it with practices being imprinted 
into the behaviour of actors. Every actor, therefore, becomes a producer and reproducer of the 
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behaviour. Of course the nature of the field being hierarchical the producers of the behaviours are 
more likely to come from those who dominate the field. “The existence of a field presupposes and, in 
its functioning creates a belief on the part of the participants in the legitimacy and value of the capital 
which is at stake in the field” (Jenkins, 2002, page 85). Interest in the field is historically legitimated 
but it is these same processes which produce the field itself. A property of the field is the “game” the 
inherent struggle that actors have within it to reproduce and adhere to the rules of the game. 
Securitization has become so established in the “game” that actors are willing to go above and beyond 
to evidence that they are willing to adhere to the established norms of the field. This is evident through 
the various hoops that prospective member states have to jump through in terms of external 
migration control when trying to achieve accession to the EU.  
The biggest issues for new states is the convincing the EU and its member states that enough has been 
done to protect the external borders. It is why the possibility of Turkish accession has been met with 
such hostility because it would mean the EU ‘s border ends no longer in the geographical area of 
Europe but with Middle Eastern states (europe.eu). Member states fear this would lead to a spike it 
migration from the region as Turkey is viewed as having insufficient borders to deal with the flow. It 
is almost a return to the Cold War era where Europe felt the need to have a sufficient buffer between 
itself and the former USSR. This is one of the reasons why the creation and maintenance of the ENP 
and work through the European Union External Action Service (EEAS) has been so crucial to the EU. 
Both of these initiatives and structures were born out of the long abandoned Barcelona Process. The 
Barcelona Process was initiated in 1995 as a means of creating stronger bilateral and multilateral 
relationships between 15 EU member states and 12 Mediterranean states. There were three broad 
structures of the process: 
 “Political and Security Dialogue, aimed at creating a common area of peace and stability 
underpinned by sustainable development, rule of law, democracy and human rights. 
 Economic and Financial Partnership, including the gradual establishment of a free-trade area 
aimed at promoting shared economic opportunity through sustainable and balanced socio-
economic development 
 Social, Cultural and Human Partnership, aimed at promoting understanding and intercultural 
dialogue between cultures, religions and people, and facilitating exchanges between civil 
society and ordinary citizens, particularly women and young people.” 
Europa.eu, 2016 
The Barcelona Process was the moment in which externalisation of border control, as an extension of 
the norm of securitization began. However, the Barcelona process soon became too cumbersome, it 
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lacked any direction and a breakdown of relations between those involved occurred however as 
previously mentioned the Barcelona Process may have been vastly scaled back but elements of the 
negotiations were redistributed to other structures. “With the introduction of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004, the Barcelona Process essentially became the multilateral forum 
of dialogue and cooperation between the EU and its Mediterranean partners while complementary 
bilateral relations are managed mainly under the ENP and through Association Agreements signed 
with each partner country.” (Europa.eu, 2016). This is evidence of the EU seeking avenues of 
securitization even when one fails. Securing partnerships with neighbouring states is seen as a vital 
action as it gives the EU implicit powers to place upon external actors. It places these actors within 
the sphere of influence imparted by the external migration control field. By placing them within the 
field the EU can practice a small amount of influence over them. It creates a “donkey – carrot” scenario 
whereby the EU can secure its external borders by giving aid and economic reimbursements and in 
return member states have securer borders. Securitization through externalisation happens at all 
levels of governance as can be witnessed in the relationships that some member states had with North 
African states. The UK did not only pursue the hub and spoke model in North Africa but also sought to 
fund a fence along the southern borders of Libya, a venture that drew interest from a number of 
member states. The former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi negotiations for the returned of 
third country nationals under the Friendship Agreement 2009 illustrates that members of the field are 
willing to potentially sacrifice their position in the field to securitize against migration.   
Securitization in the field of external migration control has come at a number of key junctures since 
the negotiations and subsequent enactment of the Maastricht Treaty (1992). Running up to this point 
migration from third countries was rising. However, the type of migrant was also changing. Previously 
migrants had tended travel to the UK and the EU as economic migrants. The rise of refugees and 
asylum seekers to the Europe was dramatically rising. The UK alone saw a sharp increase in the early 
1990’s: 
Numbers of Refugee and Asylum Claimants in the UK  
• 1979 – 1,563 
• 1985 – 5,444 
• 1990 – 22,000 (including dependents the figure rises to just over 30,000) 
• 1991 – 44,745 
Coleman, 1994 
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The steep rise from 1990 to 1991 can be accounted for by civil conflict in Eastern Europe and the 
majority of claims made in 1991 were rejected by the UK. However, it is significant in the narrative of 
securitization in the field of the EU external migration control field. It is a watershed moment because 
the negotiations for Schengen went hand in hand with the beginnings of negotiations to create a 
coherent external migration control policy. The narrative continued into the negotiations for the 
Treaty of Amsterdam where the early conception of Frontex was created. Whilst the regional 
behaviours of securitization developed, the domestic policy reflected the actions of the dominant 
actors in the field. This is evidenced in the number of policies that the UK created between 1997 up 
to 2014. Previous to this period there had only been very small changes to the policies since the 1973 
Immigration Act. There were also a number of external influences on the securitizing practices of the 
external migration control field such as the 9/11 terrorist bombings in New York and the following 
conflict caused a surge of refugee and asylum claims from those fleeing the conflict in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. It is worth acknowledging that the increase in securitization by the EU and member 
states, in particular against migrant movement from the Middle East was coupled with a growing 
cultural shift in attitudes toward Muslims in Europe. A growing political right wing movement, widely 
publicised in the media has stigmatized much of the migratory movements from the Middle East and 
North Africa. The financial crash of 2008 also impacted somewhat on the social and political attitudes 
of external migration. The perceived drag on welfare resources such as housing and healthcare that 
migrants cause has meant some strong changes to the policy landscape by many states within the EU, 
including the UK, who have adopted stricter policies in terms of entry, restricting access to services 
once in the destination country and placing more bureaucracy on migrants and/or refugees and 
asylum seekers once they gain entry.  
Conclusions 
Securitization in the external migration field has steadily increased over the past 14 years. As discussed 
in this chapter the rise in securitizing practices are because of a number of external political and social 
factors however there has been steady securitization regardless of events. As seen in the previous 
chapter the processes of securitization began before Maastricht in 1992 however the addition of the 
third pillar of control gave member states two elements to securitize against: the encroaching powers 
of the EU and regional doxical behaviours becoming cemented and the rise in net migration across the 
region all attributed to the rise in securitization. The analysis of UK government and EU policies have 
revealed the extent to which securitization has now creeped into every level of regional and national 
governance. Securitization as a political agenda is a very divisive tool for politicians at all levels of 
governance to use in order to win elections or favour. However as has been discussed the 
securitizations processes the UK and the EU have been through represent much more than a simple 
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want to be elected or remain in power.   The evidence of growing securitization practices is found in 
the changes in language used in association with external migration. In the early 1990s migration was 
normally for economic purposes or fleeing conflict as an asylum seeker or refugee. In following 
chapters, the evidence will be given on how the doxical behaviour of securitization has then split 
between manipulative behaviours and cooperative behaviours between the UK and the EU in context 
to external migration control. 
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Manipulation:  
How deviant is the UK? 
In the previous chapter the control of migrants travelling from North Africa and the securitization of 
these structures and practices was discussed. Securitization is a precursor for manipulation as an actor 
is more willing to do what it can to protect itself from perceived threats, even if this means the 
manipulation of established norms and structures in a field. This chapter will concentrate on the 
manipulative behaviours demonstrated by actors in the field of external migration control. 
Manipulation is not a behaviour or concept often discussed in International Relations. It had a brief 
period of popularity when academics such as de Rivera (1968), Janis (1982) and Riker (1986) sought 
to understand the link between psychology and international actor’s behaviour. Little has progressed 
from this period, however, it is an important behaviour as it signifies a distinctly negative and 
potentially destructive element of a relationship between actors.  
Manipulation can only occur between two actors who have a complex relationship and 
interdependence. If you abstract manipulation as a behaviour seen in individual human beings and 
attribute it to behaviours witnessed by international actors the potential for extreme changes to the 
international system is high. As Bourdieu discusses the field is a set of actors whose behaviours 
determines their position within it (Bourdieu, 1984). If manipulative behaviour has the possibility of 
allowing an actor to self-determine their position it is a viable outcome that any actor would try to 
change a situation, policy or negotiation to their advantage. In context to external migration control 
field, advantages that could be gained are changes to free movement, use of regional structures for 
national gain, reduction in the admittance of refugees, for example. Gaining advantage in these areas 
could also mean that states are able to reposition themselves closer to the most powerful actor of the 
field. Therefore, manipulative behaviour can have national and international advantages. The chapter 
will be discussing some of the theories that have developed out of the concept of negative behaviours 
of international actors and the effect this has on foreign policy. It will then demonstrate how 
manipulation can be recognised in the domestic polices of the UK, as well as bilateral and multilateral 
agreements it holds with Member States and the EU in the field of external migration control. The 
chapter will also analyse the relationship between the UK and Frontex by discussing the reports and 
operations that the UK participates in. The section below will clarify the use of the term manipulation 
and how this research recognises the difference between influence and manipulation. 
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One consideration to be made when investigating whether an actor is demonstrating manipulative 
behaviour is understanding what is manipulative and what is influential behaviour. At an international 
level certain states pertain to have influence over others. This is potentially for a number of reasons 
such as historical influence, economic dominance or military authority over other states, it can also be 
a combination of these. Influence is defined as affecting the mind or actions of another party (James, 
2013). The definition of manipulation is not that distant from influence, it is the action of managing or 
directing a person in a skilful manner in a subtle, devious or unjust way (James, 2013). Therefore, what 
is the defining feature that allows a researcher interested in manipulation to separate the two actions? 
James argues that influence is broadly considered a positive action. Manipulation on the other hand 
is seen as negative and subversive. The actions taken will also benefit the actor alone unlike influence 
where the action has the potential to improve the position for all those involved (James, 2013). Within 
a field of control, the two actions will have a profound effect on an actor’s position within it. If we take 
James’ definitions of influence it produces a positive outcome, then an actor will benefit from 
potentially favourable treatment by the actor that controls the field. If manipulation is negative this 
could undesirably affect the position of an actor in that field. Bourdieu explains that the structures of 
a field are designed to facilities the interaction within the field, therefore, why would an actor risk a 
loss of respect and at worst a position within the field but deviating from the norms (Bourdieu, 1991)?  
Doxical Behaviour 
It could be argued that the UK has been manipulating its position within the EU since its earliest 
conception so how has it managed to retain a position within the field of migration control? It has 
done this by positioning itself it very particular ways at key junctures when decisions have had to be 
made concerning external migration control. Rather than pushing wholly against norms and 
expectations the EU has created it often finds a half-way house in which it will please regional and 
domestic critics. Influence also denotes a particular level of hierarchy within the field. To have 
influence is to have power (indirectly or directly) over another actor. In terms of external migration 
control the UK has a large amount of influence because it is extremely vocal when it perceives 
migration as a threat to the socio economic fabric of the UK. These ideas will now be explored further 
in the chapter in context to legislation and agreements. 
Constructivism understands that a state or actors’ identity is variable and dependent on the on 
historical, cultural, political and social context it is in (Hopf, 1998). Hopf goes on to discuss that to be 
a EU member is to have multiple identities which are historically constructed (1998). Constructivism 
understands these identities are supported by social practices. In relation to field theory these 
identities are what positions actors within the field. The social practices which aid them become the 
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actions in which their position within the field is maintained. What Hopf discusses further is that 
elements of an actor’s identity that are “missing” have been purposefully omitted (1998). In context 
to this research the UK does not openly adhere to all the identities that other member states display 
in terms of external migration. The most obvious example being that it is not part of the Schengen 
area. The Schengen area was the development of the free movement ideal constructed in the Treaty 
of Rome (1957). Other member states were open (albeit with a small amount of negotiation) to 
enhancing this concept because it had become a socially constructed norm for EU citizens to be able 
to pass freely over each other’s borders. It would be flippant to suggest the UK’s absence from this 
well publicised identity marker is manipulative. As Hopf argues: “choices are rigorously constrained 
by the webs of understanding of the practices, identities, and interests of other actors that prevail in 
particular historical contexts.” (1998, page 177). Nowhere is this truer than in the identities and 
interests of the EU member states especially in context to the history of external migration. As 
discussed in the historical context chapter there has been a shared history of migration control 
between the actors in the field. The manipulative behaviour that the UK demonstrates is a learnt norm 
and/or behaviour. From the treaty which outlined the UK’s accession it is demonstrated that the UK 
had little interest in following the interests of the newly emerging union to the letter. In the Official 
Journal of the European Communities Special Edition, 27th March 1972 the UK was cited as 
recognising the difficulties of expansion versus the European interest of freedom of movement. The 
document also discusses the EEC (European Economic Community) has a different definition of what 
constitutes a national. The differentiation is heavily influenced by the colonial histories of the UK and 
other member states which is discussed at length in the first chapter. As discussed in the methodology 
chapter, the evidence of particular behaviours is to be found in supporting documents rather than the 
final policy document. This small difference in definition sets a precedent for behaviour in the field of 
migration control and although it does not affect external migration control directly the example has 
been set. Bourdieu understands norms in behaviour are historically constructed especially when they 
impact upon the structure of the field (1992). Structure building and the impact that has on 
relationships is evident in the EU/UK bond, historically and in modern negotiations. 
Manipulation as a distinct action within policy making practices has not been widely explored by 
researchers or academics within International Relations. What has been assessed are the impact of 
negative decisions made in relation to foreign policy making practices. Irving Janis built on the work 
of de Rivera (1968) and created the concept of Groupthink. Janis refers to Groupthink as “a 
deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgement that refers from in-group 
pressures” (1982, page 9). He explains that even those who are in a position of great power or 
responsibility face the same social pressures as anyone would. However, the decisions made at the 
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international level go far beyond that of a domestic social setting. What is missing from Janis’ analysis 
is the consideration of the domestic policy making process has on the international relations of a state. 
This is nowhere more evident than when you examine the processes and structures of external 
migration control in the EU. As migration control is a power that is partially centralised in Brussels and 
partially controlled by member states you naturally have the impact of domestic policy on the regional 
policy making process. The negotiations of treaties and agreements first have to be ratified and agreed 
on in member states.  No more so than with migration policy as it is so widely contested by a wide 
range of actors. External migration policy creation for EU member states is essentially a domestic act. 
However, it needs to coordinate with EU level treaties and policies and adhere to the doxa of the 
external migration control field. For example, any member state could not create a policy which would 
contravene EU conventions. This is a barrier to domestic policy making which the UK has come up 
against before. David Cameron has attempted to curb EU migrant’s rights to welfare which is against 
the convention of free movement. David Cameron has cited this is one of the reasons he has 
consistently missed the current government targets for lowering net migration in the UK. What this 
chapter will answer is if the UK government is manipulating regional level structures to manage the 
number of external migrations that come to the UK.  Hanrieder (1967) scanned over the concept of 
states as international manipulators in an article where he looked at the relationships between 
domestic and foreign policy making. He claims that: “Foreign policy - the more or less coordinated 
strategy with which institutionally designated decision makers seek to manipulate the international 
environment-generally meets with tenacious resistance, if not insuperable obstacles” (1967). What 
Hanrieder is describing in the act of a nation state using the creation of foreign policy to improve their 
situation. He claims that international actors have prescribed roles which they act out or what could 
be conceived as political essentialism.  
These prescribed roles are influenced by the sociocultural predispositions that guide the creation of 
foreign policy. If one applies this to the UK/EU structure it demonstrates that the UK plays the role of 
the interrogator within the field of external migration control. Therefore, the concept that the UK has 
the potential to manipulate structures and seek action for its own good rather than the good of the 
field is not beyond the realms of possibility. Janis argues that there are particular “defects” that groups 
develop especially when negotiating policy where there are lots of differing interests at stake. One of 
these defects is selective bias which is witnessed when actors consider external resources. These 
external resources are varied and can include experts (academic or professional), the media and 
charities to name a few, the number of external resources will be dependent on the issue that is being 
negotiated at that time. For example, there will be more external resources to consider if the whole 
field have an interest in the outcome rather than an issue where only the minority if those in the field 
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have a stake in the final outcome. External migration to the EU is an issue where many differing actors 
have a stake in the outcome of common policy. However even domestic policy can have a knock on 
effect in the creation of external migration control structure and it is these domestic policy interests 
which are contributing the manipulative behaviour of the UK in the field of external migration control. 
The Case of Frontex 
Migration is a national and internationally perceived threat therefore an actor may find it easier to 
manipulate the field, particularly if one or more other actors in the field can see a benefit in their 
action. UK manipulation of the field is evident in its use of Frontex. External immigration to the EU is 
seen as a threat which effects every member state individually as well as the integrity of the region 
itself (Geddes, 2000). Each member state strives for the best policy to curb immigration from its 
external borders. Coherent regional policy has been an ongoing struggle for EU member states since 
the conception of open internal borders (O’Dowd et al, 2003). The academic trend was to view Europe 
as a fortress (Geddes 2000, 2003 and 2008) however a fortress implies that the internal politics is 
stable and a fortress can be constructed because actors within it all agree its function. A fortress also 
implies a level of impenetrability but the increasing numbers of external migrants and refugees 
crossing the EU’s borders gives an account of a different situation. The closest structure to a region 
wide control of external movement in to the EU is Frontex. As has already been discussed within the 
Securitization chapter, Frontex’s primary function is to act as a quasi-military policing force that 
attempts to curb immigration from the south and the east of the EU (Houtum and Pijipers, 2006). As 
well as a deterrent they also aid member states in processing migrants, detention of clandestine 
migrants and the creation of specialised task forces. The task forces are created on a relatively ad hoc 
basis in reaction to high numbers of particular nationalities or international sporting events that 
attract third country nationals. Frontex defines their function as: 
 “While regular border control is the exclusive responsibility of the Member States, Frontex’s 
role focuses on coordination of deployment of additional experts and technical equipment to those 
border areas which find themselves under significant pressure. Frontex also builds the capacity of the 
member states in various areas related to border control, including training and sharing of best 
practices.” 
Frontex, 2016 
As described the task forces are created as a means of alleviating pressure from areas deemed to be 
at risk of high immigration, either as “illegal” immigration, people smuggling or trafficking. For 
example, they create task forces to help with higher levels of immigration during international sporting 
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events. The original premise of Frontex was as a regional protectorate for those who signed the 
Schengen agreement (Frontex, 2016). However, from the very earliest conception of Frontex, the UK 
has been a participant at many levels of this external migration control structure. The original 
structure of Frontex was a number of “hubs” each having their own specialisms. Like the description 
of the task forces, it illustrates one of the key functions of Frontex is a practice sharing process. The 
UK had one of these hubs in Dover. The justification for the Dover unit was the specialism of border 
checking that officials possessed in the processing centres in the port: “Centre of Excellence for border 
checks, located in Dover, United Kingdom (the aim of the Centre was to strengthen the EU external 
border by using modern search technology to combat illegal and, in particular, concealed 
immigration)” (Frontex, 2009). From this point onwards the UK participated in a number of differing 
task forces and practices that Frontex developed (which will be discussed at length further into the 
chapter). One might argue that the UK is simply participating because of its obligations to the EU. 
However, the participation of the UK goes beyond that of simple obligation. The data Frontex produces 
is varied, offering insights into their operations alongside detailed information pertaining to the 
movement across the EU’s southern border. The data analysed from Frontex has been coded alongside 
policy data from the UK to understand the domestic political impact on involvement in Frontex. What 
this section argues is, is the UK is using Frontex to pursue national/domestic gains rather than simply 
fulfilling the obligations of its position within the field of external migration control. The first 
suggestion of this manipulation is the financial contributions given to Frontex by the UK government 
since its creation in the mid 2000’s. There are two reasons why this is important. Firstly, investment 
in a mechanism that is not primarily designed to protect the borders of the state where the investment 
is coming from signals that the state in question perceives a threat from that external border. Secondly 
continued support even when your domestic government is beginning negotiations around a possible 
exit of the regional power which controls the structure are even more extraordinary. Having a stake 
in Frontex has evidently been important to the UK government.  
This is apparent in the discussions had by the House of Lords European Union Committee in the 9th 
Report of Session 2007 – 2008. The recommendation of the House of Lords committee was: “For the 
present the United Kingdom has to accept that, not being a full Schengen State, it cannot play a full 
role in Frontex. Subject to that legal limitation, the Government should ensure that the United 
Kingdom participates effectively in the development and operation of Frontex.” (House of Lords, 2008, 
page 54). In a published communication between a House of Commons Minister (who is not named 
in the document) and the European Scrutiny Committee the wishes of the House of Lords were 
reiterated “The benefits of participation include not only the deterrence and apprehension of illegal 
immigrants but also the acquisition of data and intelligence and the development of stronger links 
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with other countries' immigration authorities” (Committee Communicate, 2008). Using the code UK 
engagement with EU migration policy making for the Euro-Med area is a means of identifying UK 
commitment to use EU mechanisms to improve their own data and intelligence databases.  
This is the key to the UK manipulative behaviour, rather than joining Frontex to aid the entire external 
migration control field their actions are to benefit themselves. This could be dismissed as a single 
event; however, these sentiments were repeated two years later in a UK communique with the 
European Commission, who was seeking to extend the powers of Frontex; “It [the UK] is invited to 
attend the meetings of FRONTEX Management Board and takes an active part in them as a non-voting 
observer. In 2010, the Government will contribute €570,000 to the cost of joint operations and other 
activities in which the UK participates” (2010). This excerpt from the document highlights the key to 
the UK’s position within the field. The UK participates in the norms of the field, such as securitization 
through the expansion of Frontex, but also negotiate a position in which they can still have a voice 
within the management board. This opinion is supported by the reports published by Frontex. 
The quarterly and annual reports published by Frontex are an insight into the interests of the EU as 
well as member states who contribute to its function. They have been released by Frontex to showcase 
their activities and offer qualitative and quantitative data as a means of justifying its function as an 
external migration control mechanism (Frontex, 2010). The evidence found within these documents 
demonstrates the use of Frontex by the UK to stem migration to the UK. Many of its activities within 
these mechanisms could be classed as manipulative cooperation as they illustrate the UK’s want to 
control its own borders and in order to achieve this it needs to cooperate with other member states. 
The reports are written by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit (RAU) to “provide a regular overview of 
irregular migration at the EU external borders based on the illegal migration data provided by Member 
States border-control authorities in the context of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN)” (Frontex 
Q1 Report, 2010, page 6). The two elements of Frontex that need to be clarified here are the 
differences and similarities of RAU and FRAN. Frontex gives the definition of RAU as being:  
“Risk analysis is the starting point for all Frontex activities, from joint operations through 
training to research studies. In order to identify short- medium- and long-term trends, a wealth of data 
needs to be gathered and analysed. For this, Frontex monitors the global security environment, 
especially those political, economic, social, technological, legal and environmental factors which could 
affect border security. The agency collates data from Member States, EU bodies as well as from public 
media and other sources within and beyond Europe’s borders. Collated data is analysed with the aim 
to create as clear a picture as possible of the situation at the EU’s external borders.”  
Frontex, 2016  
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The FRAN is made up of multiple areas of regional border control and national border control both 
policing and military personnel. The reports also cover a large range of data from the external border 
controls it includes, detections of illegal border crossing, detections of facilitators, detection of illegal 
stay, refusals of entry, asylum applications and forged documents. Within these differing areas of the 
report it also publishes findings on smuggling and trafficking of humans alongside the movement of 
illegal goods such as alcohol, cigarettes and arms over the EU external border. In the first available 
report there were indications that the UK was using Frontex in order to gain improve their illegal 
immigration figures by using a mechanism that was not even designed for their use.  
Within the section of Detection of Facilitators in the Q1 FRAN report 2010 there is evidence of the UK 
not even having to use its own provisions in order to curb illegal immigration. The section of the report 
states that: “France highlighted the elimination of several facilitation networks specialised in the 
smuggling of Vietnamese nationals, the final destination being the UK” (Frontex Q1 Report, 2010, page 
14). The action taken to eliminate these networks was after a number of member states reported that 
Vietnamese nationals were being linked to cannabis production in a number of member states. To say 
the entire operation was just for the benefit of the UK would be naïve.  
The operation to curb the illegal movement of Vietnamese migrants to the UK is not the only evidence 
of Frontex’s operations benefiting the UK directly in terms of a reduction of the numbers of illegal 
immigrants that could have potentially reached the borders of the UK. The annual report in 2010 
mentions operations to curb Afghan nationals travelling through the Western Balkans to whose 
destination was “mostly towards the UK” (Frontex Annual Report, 2010, page 20). As well as the UK 
being a consideration in terms of border control hundreds of miles away from its own national 
borders. The data from the Frontex report demonstrates that UK interest in Frontex and the protection 
of external borders is extremely important for the UK, especially when migrants crossing those borders 
are destined for the UK. 
Bilateral Doxical Behaviour  
Le Touquet Treaty (2011) or less well known as the Agreement between the Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the French Republic concerning 
the Carrying of Service Weapons by the Officers of the UK Border Agency on French Territory in 
Application of the Treaty concerning the Implementation of the Frontier Controls at the Sea Ports of 
Both Countries on the Channel and North Sea is an agreement that the UK and France signed in Paris 
on the 24th May 2011 in conjunction with a Statutory Instrument (SI) (Number 2818, 2003). Before Le 
Touquet is discussed in terms of its impact it makes more sense to go back to 2003 and discuss SI 2818. 
SI 2818 was created to form part of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. The outline of 
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SI 2818 is: “This Order gives effect to the Treaty between the United Kingdom and France providing 
for the exercise of immigration control by the authorities of each State in the sea ports of the other 
State” (2003). The ports that are effected in the agreement is Dover in the UK and Calais, Boulogne 
and Dunkirk in France. All these ports have a high number of human movement in and out of them for 
example in 2014 10.8 million people crossed between Calais and Dover (Sea Passenger Final Statistics, 
2014). The SI details that these ports will have control zones in which each authority. The laws in which 
UK border agents act under in UK ports are the same in the French control zones that are outlined in 
this SI, which are as follows:  
“Application of criminal law to a Control Zone in France 
12.— (1) An act or omission which constitutes an offence under one of the following 
provisions of the 1971 Act shall also be an offence if it takes place in a Control Zone in France— 
(a) section 24A (1)(a) and (3)(a) (deception); 
(b) section 25 (assisting unlawful immigration to member state), but as if subsections (4) 
and (5) were omitted; 
(d) section 25A (helping asylum seeker to enter United Kingdom); 
(e) section 25B (assisting entry to United Kingdom in breach of deportation or exclusion  
order) (b); 
(f) section 26 (general offences in connection with administration of Act); and 
(g) section 27(c) (offences by persons connected with ships or aircraft or with ports) but 
as if the words “or aircraft” and “or disembarkation” were omitted.” 
(Statutory Instrument 2818, 2003) 
The instrument gives UK officers the powers to make arrests before the migrant has crossed to the UK 
therefore allowing officers to process beyond the UK sovereign territory. Similar to the controlled 
zones at Eurotunnel and Eurostar terminals (which are discussed later) they offer member states the 
opportunity to curb illegal movement into their territory before they have even arrived. SI 2818 
impacted different policies; Immigration Act 1971, The Terrorism Act 2000, The Immigration (Leave to 
Enter and Remain) Order 2000 and The Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2000. For 
a SI to cause alteration to so many other UK immigration policies reveals its significance. The Home 
Secretary at the time said “We are effectively moving our borders across the Channel.” (Daily Mail, 
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2003). The Le Touquet Treaty was a reaffirmation of the agreement as well as giving British and French 
officers the powers to carry a “service weapon” which is a telescopic baton that has been issued by 
the relevant authorities. (The discussion of this further securitization of the border was analysed at 
length in the Securitization chapter).  
The agreement and the treaty highlight the lengths in which the UK will go to protect its border, even 
if it needs to move it across the English Channel but it also shows its ability to manipulate other actors 
to create the best possible outcome. Its use of Frontex is evidence of regional structures being 
manipulated the agreement with French authorities shows the UK are willing to manipulate structures 
at a bilateral level. How are the UK authorities having a presence in France manipulative? The evidence 
shown so far is not enough to be sure that the UK uses its relationship with France to create an 
asymmetric capital gain. Alongside bilateral agreements with France the UK donates economic aid to 
the areas around the French seaports. An article in The Independent details the large amounts of 
money the UK is willing to give too other to “deal with” illegal immigration. “David Cameron is to agree 
to give an extra €20 million (£15.4 million) to France for policing and dispersing migrants attempting 
to reach the UK from Calais, a minister has said. In a radio interview before a Franco-British summit at 
Amiens in the Somme, the French Europe minister, Harlem Desir, said the extra funding came on top 
of previous British spending of €60 million (£47 million).” (The Independent, 2016). Physical presence 
by UK immigration officers as well as large donation to curb migration from France to the UK shows a 
willingness to keep bilateral relationships stronger in order to curb the number of migrants coming to 
the UK. One could argue that if the UK followed the norms of the field it would not have to manipulate 
the field of external migration control by picking and choosing which actors to make agreements with. 
Bourdieu labels this behaviour as actors attempting to “change the rules of the game”: “There can be 
a struggle to change the rules of the game… which consists in cheating on the game and establishing 
a tacit regularity that will become to rule” (Bourdieu, 2014, page 94). The UK are seeking to change 
the norms of the external migration control field by making smaller changes in the bilateral relations 
it has with member states. It is seeking to normalise manipulative behaviour at a lower level of 
governance to seek changes in other places in the field. This is not a behaviour that is limited to 
Member State interaction, it can also be found between NGOs and Member states like the UK and 
Frontex.  
The documents produced by Frontex dramatically changed in 2011. It was during this time that the 
political dynamics of North Africa changed. Previous to this the numbers of migrants crossing the 
southern Mediterranean border had been in relative decline but the civil uprisings predominantly in 
the North African states of Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, causing a steady growth in the number of migrants 
travelling as economic migrants or seeking refuge. The Frontex reports changed from a vehicle of 
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communication to advertise current and upcoming operations to a comprehensive analysis. There was 
a significant emphasis placed on external security factors and the language within the documents 
became much more security orientated. The executive summary in the 2011 Q1 report demonstrated 
this by opening the report stating: “For the first time since data collection began in 2008, detections 
of illegal borders crossings have exceeded those for the preceding quarter” (Frontex, Q1 2011, page 
5). During this period the UK took part in multiple Joint Operations (JOs) with Frontex, such as JO EPN 
Hermes Extension and JO Hera. The participation of the UK in such Joint Operations is evidence of its 
use of external migration control structures for its own purpose instead of pursuing the needs of the 
whole field. Rather than perusing the “immanent rules of the game” which would be to actively 
engage with the all of the operations. Manipulating the structure in order to benefit from the positives 
it can offer means “playing against these rules” (Bourdieu, 2014). This action illustrates how the UK 
gains from accessing regional structures whilst giving very little back, much like the small asymmetrical 
gains made through Le Touquet Treaty (2011).  
Control the movement of migrants from North Africa was not the only way in which the UK engaged 
with Frontex. Over the first three quarters of 2011 the UK also used Frontex controls to detect the 
crossings of Albanians into the UK on intra-EU flights following the visa liberalisation of Albanian 
nationals. The refusal of entry for Albanians was detected as an issue for Frontex due to the increased 
workloads of border guards (Frontex, Q3, 2011). The UK using a well-established control structure is a 
positive and interesting for two main reasons, firstly operations can be taken at a reduced cost as 
monies spent on operations can be split between all those that take part. Secondly it allows UK 
politicians to spread the accountability if operations fail to reduce the number of illegal immigrants 
entering the UK. The first positive is self-explanatory, however the idea of being able to place 
accountability onto other actors in the field is evidence of manipulation. Manipulation was identified 
by using the fifth code UK using regional mechanisms to control migration for the Euro-Med area, the 
regional relationships it has built afforded the UK a dominant negotiating position. It is a sign of 
habitual behaviour by the UK to spread accountability. Firstly, because it means other members of the 
external migration control field can be seen as incompetent and if they lack a higher position within 
the field already it has the potentially to be damaging to its reputation. During 2011 this is particularly 
evident due to the number of different perceived threats to the external border. Greece was painted 
as a scape goat for many member states during this time as they lacked the financial or legal structures 
in which to competently deal with the number of migrants crossing during the Arab Spring. The 
manipulation of a field of control is a way of securing your position at the expense of an others (Riker, 
1986). The UK has also used the Frontex to attempt to gain respect within the field of external 
migration control through the number of effective returns it completes. Previous to 2012 there was 
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little discussion within the Frontex data regarding the numbers of returns and the EU member states 
which executed the most returns (Frontex, 2012) 
In Q2 of 2012 Frontex reports that there were 67, 891 third country nationals that were subject to 
removal either by administrative or court order. The UK was the member states which ordered the 
most returns alongside Greece and Italy. For the effective return of third country nationals the number 
was slightly lower at 40, 299 and the UK conducted the largest number of returns, mainly to India and 
Pakistan. The difference between returns and effective returns is standard returns are orders either 
made by the judicial system or by the Home Office that could be ignored by the migrant. These orders 
do not always turn into effective returns because they are either appealed or the migrant in question 
absconds. Effective returns are perceived as more important because they actually remove the 
migrants from the states where they are then taken to an agreed safe third country or their state of 
origin.  Effective returning of illegal migrants from member states has the potential to gain a member 
states a better position within the field. If a state is seen as an effective returner they can build a better 
reputation. Established through bilateral relations and the use of EU structures the UK can return 
migrants more effectively. By raising their position in the field in one area of external migration control 
it allows the UK far more freedom to go against the other norms of the field. It becomes a play off 
between the UK not adopting all the norms of movement that the EU have built up and adopted but 
it secures its reputation through effective returns. 
Joint operations have been briefly mentioned in the above discussion of Frontex reporting however 
this section will focus on the joint operations that the UK have participated in, some of which it has 
also led. The UK has taken part in these joint operations since 2006. The operations it takes part in are 
either framed around the prevention of migrants entering the EU and potentially onwards to the UK. 
The data on the operations is limited due to the secrecy around military intelligence behind the 
creation of such agreements. The number of operations the UK has is 66 out of a total of 286 and the 
number the UK has led is 5. The operations it has taken part in tend to play to the strengths for 
example JO Poseidon (2006, although it was also repeated in 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010) which was 
a maritime operation that was “combating illegal immigration across the maritime borers of Member 
States of the EU” (Frontex, JO Poseidon 2006), the aim of the operation changed little year on year 
but it did change its location to the various focal points that Frontex concentrated on across the 
Mediterranean. The UK headed up two operations in 2010 called Nigeria (one which it hosted with 
Ireland). The aim of the operations was “to assist member states to jointly organize the return of 
person’s subject to an individual removal order from the territory of EU/Schengen Associated 
countries to their country of origin” (Frontex, 2010). These operations were not undertaken solely by 
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the UK they also included the participation of: Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Norway, 
Sweden, and Slovenia. 
The active participation of the UK with so many other states does on the one hand show a level of 
cooperation but also is evidence of manipulation. If the UK was a true co-operator it would do so at 
all levels of governance that the EU set as norms of the field. However, participation in operations that 
will reduce one of the largest migrant populations in the UK could be viewed as a selfish act. As 
discussed above in relation to the statistics in the Frontex reports the UK dominates the field of 
external migration control in relation to the return of migrants. The joint operations also expose that 
the UK actively uses Frontex in order to reduce the number of migrants that make it to the UK and to 
improve the effective return of third country nationals from the UK back to their country of origin. 
This awkward relationship between taking part in some parts of external migration control and not in 
others is a strange juxtaposition, which leads to the conclusion that the UK is out to manipulate the 
filed. Bourdieu would understand this as the UK gaining capital where it can in order to better its 
position in the field (Jenkins, 2002). What this research develops is the concept that manipulative 
behaviour which could also be described as habitual behaviour by Bourdieu, the idea that 
manipulation changes an actor’s position in the field mirrors Bourdieu’s concept of habitus.  
A consideration to make when discussing if there is evidence of manipulation is to see if the evidence 
illustrates if manipulation occurs within all levels of migration control. The UK’s unstable relationship 
with the EU is juxtaposed with periods of cooperation (see Cooperation chapter). However, the 
historically constructed field of external migration control in which the EU is most dominant can be 
challenged by particular member states. This is nowhere more evident than the relationship that the 
UK and the EU have. There are many examples where the UK and the EU have broken away from the 
historically constructed norms of the field (O’Dowdsmit 2003, Duff 1997 and Eilstrup-Sangiovanni et 
al 2006). However, the most widely discussed example is the rejection of the Schengen agreement by 
the UK. The UK rejecting Schengen was a blow for the integrity of the region. The whole ethos behind 
the EU is member states that are similar enough to find agreements across all areas of politics 
(Eilstrup-Sangiovanni et al 2006). What the UK managed to do was position itself very cleverly within 
the field of external migration control, it managed to create a position in which it was indispensable 
to the control of migration in terms of the funding it offers other EU actors in the field.  
From this position it can now easily manipulate EU policy at a domestic and regional level. Firstly, it 
would be best to define what is meant by manipulation of EU controls at a domestic level. The 
manipulation of EU policy at a UK domestic level is the UK legislature actively using “loop holes” in EU 
agreements for domestic gain. This gain can be categorised as either political, less immigration is 
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perceived by the UK electorate as a positive action, or financial, less immigration would mean a 
reduction in processing costs and welfare costs. “Loop holes” in EU agreements are areas of the policy 
which are vague or open to abuse by member states. Welfare provision is an area of politics which is 
controlled by national legislation therefore the EU has very little influence over decisions made unless 
it effects EU citizens. This is where domestic member states policies have to be mindful. The rights of 
EU citizens are bound by EU law. Any member state found contravening these laws can be prosecuted 
by the EU. However, the rights of external migrants and refugees, although bound by particular 
international conventions such as the UN Humans Rights Charter, are controlled by the state. In the 
first reading of the 2014 Immigration Act in the House of Commons (10th October 2013) the discussion 
over the use of EU legislation was quick to appear. On page 4 of the draft the use of biometric 
information was called an “enforceable EU right” protected under the 1972 Communities Act. What 
is most interesting is the use of the language by the writers of the Bill. Enforceable is a strong word 
often associated with negative connotations. If you are having to force an action on a migrant this is 
possibly going to be against that migrants will.  
The EU policy behind the collection of biometric data was principally to ease the movement of third 
country nationals that have gained a visa in one-member state and they wish to move to another 
member state. Primarily it was to make moving between member states that have signed the 
Schengen agreement easier. By using this right, the UK collection of this biometric information is 
manipulating the primary function of the EU right given to them by the most dominant member of the 
field. However, the use of identification is manipulated in other ways by the UK government. On page 
13 of the first draft there is a discussion around the adoption of EU rules in reference to EU identity 
documentation. A number of member states use identification cards. These cards can be used in lieu 
of passports to gain entry into other member states and have other functions such as eligibility to the 
welfare system of their country of origin. Within the first draft of the 2014 Immigration Act the use of 
these cards to limit access to housing and banking services was outlined. What the UK have managed 
to achieve it the use of an EU structure that was not even designed for this purpose. “Throughout the 
EU, some 30 million national eID cards are used by citizens to access a variety of public services such 
as claiming social security and unemployment benefits or filing tax returns.” (EU, 2008). This 
description contradicts what the UK is using the identity cards for. The UK is using them as proof for 
access to the private sector not the public sector, where migrants could be mistreated by businesses 
and landlords. The UK is using them to make the it more difficult for illegal immigrants that have made 
it through at a port or have overstayed previous visas to live in the UK. There is also evidence in the 
same document that the UK judicial system uses EU structures to aid deportation.  
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This you may think is not an unusual act however they are not using a piece of deportation policy they 
are using the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) to help deport immigrants they have 
deemed to be illegal. The use of the ECHR never made it to the final draft of the Act however the fact 
that it was discussed is of great consequence. It is evidence that the UK will attempt to use every 
structure the EU has to control the number of immigrants to the UK even if the primary use of that 
structure is altered. A fact that was exposed during the House of Lords debate of the act. On page 172 
the discussion centred on the obligation of the UK to the ECHR but that the House of Lords were using 
it to gain political ground. Manipulation of a convention that is there to protect the rights of human 
beings seems insensitive. Moreover, the UK is extremely clear on what it is and is not willing to sign 
up to.  
A Notice of Amendment demonstrated this very well: “this section applies if Her Majesty’s 
Government has agreed to the terms of an EU accession treaty” (2014, page 9). If the UK are following 
doxical behaviour patterns they would not use this language. It would be a presupposition that the UK 
would automatically agree to the terms rather than there being a question mark above such an action. 
What the UK are demonstrating here is a habitual behaviour trait. As discussed before habitual 
behaviours are evident when an actor is attempting to shift their position within the field. 
Manipulation of the ECHR is an extremely under handed way of producing an outcome it feels happiest 
with. For example, the number of illegal immigrants goes down thus pleasing the electorate and 
outwardly demonstrating to the EU that there are certain structures the UK are willing to agree to and 
apply to domestic level policy.  
Continuing the theme of habitual behaviours manipulating the field an example is the restrictions over 
Bulgarian and Romanian migrants. In the marshalled list of motions to be moved on consideration of 
Commons reasons and amendments, MPs explicitly quote the European Communities Act Number 2, 
Article 20 and Annexes VI and VII as allowing the UK government to restrict Bulgarian and Romanian 
migrants until 31st December 2018. This is further supported in a document issued by the Home Office 
Immigration Bill – ECHR Memorandum. The document states that the key principle of the ECHR is that 
it does not guarantee the right of an alien to enter or reside as long as state adheres to regional and 
international obligations they have the right to control entry (Notice of Amendment, 2014). This is not 
an isolated case where the UK has demonstrated attempts to only tentatively agree with EU 
structures, something which was a key feature of the 2014 Immigration Bill. It was also evident in the 
Faster, Fairer, Firmer report produced by the then Labour government in 1998. They admit to only 
being interested in the EU if it is in the national interest to do so: 
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 “Various rights to opt into such co-operation in a flexible way so as to preserve our particular 
approach when necessary while also participating in those areas of co-operation which we judge as 
important” 
and 
 “At EU level, the Amsterdam Treaty provides for co-operation in the development of minimum 
standards on the reception of asylum seekers. The government will participate in the development of 
such co-operation if it is in the national interest to do so.” 
UK Government, 1998, page 16 and 35 
The discussion within this document kept reiterating the need to cooperate when needed but the 
ultimate goal is to preserve national controls and to keep maintaining national level policy such as 
strengthening the Immigration (Carriers Liability) Act 1987 (page 24). The two sections from the 
document above illustrate that bilateral and multilateral cooperation will only occur if the UK agrees 
that it is in the national interest. As Jenkins discusses in his book Pierre Bourdieu (2002) the field is “a 
social arena within which struggles of manoeuvres take place over specific resources or stakes and 
access to them” (page 84).  Riker argues that; “it is always possible to manipulate the outcome by 
manipulating the agenda” (1986, page 110). If the UK can take charge of the agenda by Riker’s 
estimation they will be able to manipulate it. However, the manipulation that occurs between the UK 
and the EU in the field of external migration control is much subtler, but is it necessarily negative? The 
next section will discuss if UK manipulation benefits the field rather negatively effecting it. 
Manipulation of practices and structures is evident through the analysis and explanations given in this 
chapter so far. The argument has centred that the UK manipulates and either it causes a negative 
reaction from the EU or the UK’s position within the field is compromised. However, what if the EU 
allows the UK to be manipulative order for it to a) remain the most dominant actor and b) to allow the 
UK to believe it has more power that it actually has. The EU, as the external migration control fields 
dominant actor, allows the UK to act in an authoritative position because it means they do not take 
more evasive action against the stability of the field. This is currently evident in the negotiations for 
the UK’s position with the EU. (Which will be further explored in the conclusion). The manipulation of 
EU structures could also be considered as the only way the UK will engage with the region. If the UK 
was not “allowed” to manipulate or their manipulation is ignored the EU can still benefit from the UK 
itself. There is a great benefit to the EU in terms of the jobs, services and education sectors. Brexit 
would ultimately mean that of the UK left then EU citizens would not have access to these or access 
would be expensive or tightly controlled.  
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Bourdieu talks about habitus housing the interest or the capital of an actor in any given field (1984). 
The habitual behaviour of manipulation by the UK could be seen as beneficial for both the UK and the 
EU. The biggest positive is the economic input by the UK into structures such as Frontex. The UK has 
continually contributed to the finances of Frontex, an indication that its submission to the doxa of 
securitization is evident in its relationship with the actor. This habitual behaviour by the UK of course 
is a bonus for the EU. It means the EU through Frontex can fund more operations and controls to 
reduce the number of migrants crossing over the EU’s external border. As discussed previously, the 
work done by UK the take part and lead particular joint operations is not only beneficial to the UK it is 
arguably as beneficial for the EU. The other consideration is what if the EU is conscious enough to 
actually allow the UK to push against the norms of the field in order to gain the most from having them 
within the EU.  
Manipulative Cooperation 
The concept of manipulative cooperation counters the idea that the UK manipulatives purely for 
reasons of gain. Manipulative cooperation still has elements of selfish gain however it also has a 
deeper notion that the UK is attempting to develop a position in the field which it is happier to occupy. 
For example, at a summit between the UK and French authorities it was agreed that there would be a 
joint intelligence unit created in Folkestone, UK. In a joint statement issued by the states they said: 
 “At an International and European level we will work together to mobilise our partners within 
the framework of concrete and operational cooperation, both in the fight against illegal immigration, 
and in relation to asylum.” 
 Declaration on Immigration, 2010, page 2 
This declaration of working together has many positives for the UK government. Firstly, having the 
control centre on UK soil gives the government an upper hand in terms of the operations the unit may 
decide to operate. Secondly, it demonstrates that unlike the effect of manipulation on domestic policy 
which shows the UK as unable to interact with the EU at any level, unless it perceives it to be 
worthwhile, and potentially damaging the field of control. The consequences of the field collapsing 
could be the dismantling of the Schengen structure to large numbers of undocumented migrants 
travelling unchecked across the region. Bilateral agreements offer the UK a unique opportunity to use 
valuable resources without a great financial outlay. This is also demonstrated in the agreement the 
UK has with the Belgium government on the immigration controls on rail traffic between Belgium and 
the UK under the UK/Belgium: Agreement concerning immigration controls on the Channel Tunnel 
2014. The UK managed to use its semi dominant position in the external migration control field to 
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negotiate a deal whereby UK immigration officers would be present at the Eurostar check in area in a 
newly created “secured safety zone”. These zones are clear areas of train stations which are not 
publicly accessible. It integrates standard border controls into commercial ticket controls. Within the 
secured zone there would exist another area in which UK immigration officers will perform their 
duties. These controls do not impact passengers which are intra Schengen or those whose destination 
is the UK only. This seems a rather benign agreement however further within the document it displays 
the UK as the more dominant actor. Article 5 of the agreement states that if the UK refuses admission 
authorities in Belgium cannot refuse readmission therefore passing the responsibility of that migrant 
back to the Belgium authorities. The same applies to an immigrant that states they are intra Schengen 
when they are not.  
What is interesting about this article is that Belgium readmits immigrants that should have been 
detected by UK authorities within a “secured safety zone”. What the UK has managed to achieve is 
cooperative manipulation. It is outwardly portraying an image of cooperation whilst actually 
benefiting from shifting the accountability to other actors. Not only is shifting the accountability of 
the illegal immigration a plus point for the UK government but also has the potential to reduce the 
financial burden of such an interaction. However, this is not a new development. During the 
negotiations for the Channel Tunnel Agreements the UK managed to secure itself the better 
advantages. Much of the negotiations that the UK took part in centred on the consideration of the 
Channel Tunnel being a hot spot for migrants crossing from mainland Europe (Duff 1997). Using the 
Brussels “secured safety zones” as an example the UK can politically and socially place the blame on 
other actors for any illegal activity that occurs within this zone. This is a strong and extremely 
manipulative position to be in and also places a lot of pressure on a member state that does not have 
the resources to control migration in the same way the UK does. However, the UK is not always so 
closed off from offering financial support.  
Manipulative cooperation is an interesting concept as it means the UK still adheres to the norms of 
the field that have been a) historically constructed but also b) newer norms that the EU is attempting 
to impose upon members of the field such as the externalising of border controls to other states, as 
discussed in relation to the agreement between the UK and Belgium. According to Bourdieu adhering 
to the doxa of any field is essential because it allows an actor within it to still keep its positon and 
privileges within it (Jenkins, 2002). This is especially true of the UK as it has a relatively dominant 
positon within the field of external migration control. This is down to it being a key destination state 
for migrants but also the policing and military expertise it has in relation to external migration control 
(see discussion in the Frontex section of this chapter). It is also down to the authoritative position it 
holds as a previous colonial power and political dominance during the early post war era. It is a unique 
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position that no other member state holds. Member states such as France and Germany who have 
worked hard to create the norms of the field do not have the freedom that the UK has. The is down 
to the position the UK have managed to negotiate for themselves. Its uniqueness is owed to the 
different UK governments that have managed to create a field of external migration control where 
the UK has to do very little in terms of adhering to the main norms of the field. It has created a position 
whereby any positive actions are does take in the field are encouraged however in comparison to 
other contributions by other member states they have actually achieved very little. An example of this 
is the way in which the UK has positioned itself in the freedom of movement norm. It has afforded 
British citizens the best situation of being able to travel, live and work abroad. Currently there are 
around 2 million ex pats living in Europe, mainly retirees in France and Spain. However, the UK chose 
not to become part of the Schengen area which was the next development of the freedom of 
movement concept that had been established in the Treaty of Rome (1957).  
This juxtaposition in the relationship that the UK has with other actors, including the EU as an actor in 
its own right, exposes the manipulative behaviour the UK demonstrates. The manipulation centres on 
the need for the UK to gain more capital in the field. As previously discussed capital can come in many 
different forms. The capital for the UK in the field of external migration control is the reduction of 
migration to the UK. This has many benefits such as economic, less pull on the welfare structures, and 
political, domestic politicians and parties gaining more popularity when immigration is reduced. 
However, there is also gain to be made in cooperation with the EU, some of which is access to the 
standard positives of membership to a political and economic regional bloc but others are less obvious. 
By outwardly advertising themselves as cooperative the UK is allowed unfettered access to migration 
control structures that would not be available to it if it was seen to be absolutely non cooperative by 
the EU as head of the field. 
The concept of manipulation creates the question of how deviations in the field of external migration 
control are managed by the EU. Evidence of this can be illustrated by the current relationship the EU 
has with the UK. The last UK President of the EU was in 2005 with the next pencilled in for 2017. The 
current political discussion of Brexit and the refugee crisis are changing the dynamics of the field. 
Deviating from the field is a dangerous act and can lead to sanctions being placed upon offenders. 
These sanctions will differ depending on the kind of field an actor is in. In context to external migration 
control there have been examples of when deviation from the norm was penalised by the head of the 
field, the EU. An example of major shifts in the field in context to external migration control was the 
suspension of the Schengen agreement during the Arab Spring. The influx of refugees was so great 
that member states were unable to control numbers. (There will be further discussion of potential EU 
sanctions on member states in relation to the most recent/current refugee crisis in the Conclusion). 
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The suspension of Schengen would not have been taken lightly. As previously discussed the 
dismantling of internal borders is a key identity marker for member states. It is a historically 
constructed norm that is key to the foundations of the field as it is part of its fabric as set out in its 
main treaties. 
As Bourdieu discusses what is important to analyse when looking at the relationships that actors have 
in a field it is not the actors themselves that are analysed it is the structures, identities and behaviours 
that bind them that hold the greatest importance (Jenkins, 2002). Using the analogy from the 
Introduction, imagine the field as an electrical circuit it is not the components on the board which are 
important it is how each component relates to the other and the electricity that binds them all 
together and makes them work. Deviation in this example would mean something not working 
correctly on the circuit or its complete failure. The same goes for the field of external migration 
control. If one actor deviates from the norm it threatens the whole structure. If the deviating actor’s 
in discrepancies do not alter the field in any substantial way, then the behaviour will be largely ignored 
or very discreetly acknowledged but no negative actions would be taken. This is how the UK manages 
to not exactly follow norms of the field but maintain a relatively strong position with in the field in 
terms of decision making and the diplomatic capital (Adler-Nissen, 2008).  
Conclusions 
In conclusion the manipulation of EU external migration control structures by the UK is evident at all 
levels of governance. What has been most interesting to reveal from the data is the way in which the 
EU and its structures were negotiated and the effect that has gone on to have on the use of the EU by 
the UK in context to external migration control. Manipulation, as seen in this chapter, can come in 
many different disguises. This is done in a number of ways, firstly the UK’s use of regional level 
mechanisms, secondly the UK using its semi dominant position to hide its deception and thirdly the 
EU’s blindness and/or awareness of the deception the UK uses in order for it to benefit from regional 
mechanisms and structures.  The discussion of repercussions of bad behaviour has also illuminated 
the complexity of the historic norms that dominate the field of external migration control. What binds 
the EU and the external control field is a notion that as a group of states they are far stronger against 
perceived threats than they would be if they were a singular state. Manipulation of these perfected 
structures should cause disintegration of the structure of a field however the manipulations as 
evidenced in this chapter shows that experienced members of the field can get away with pushing the 
boundaries of the field. The UK has manipulated every migration control structure regardless of the 
level of governance that it comes from. As Bourdieu discusses the capital gained in a field can afford 
a member a higher position that could give it more power going forward in making decisions. In light 
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of the analysis in this chapter the UK has been manipulating its position since it joined the EEC in 1972. 
Throughout the varying changes from a purely economic union to a more globally dominant economic 
and political union the UK has managed to always get the best deal for itself rather than the best 
decision for everyone involved. Le Touquet Treaty is ideal evidence of this fact. The UK does not have 
to have the expense of processing migrants in the UK where they would have the possible opportunity 
to abscond from authorities. They can instead process them off shore in a state where it does not 
matter if they abscond as the repercussions would not be dealt with my UK authorities. This one treaty 
is not the only evidence, as discussed in the chapter the control zones in Brussels highlight that it is 
not only regional level structures that the UK is willing to manipulate. Overall the UK has historically 
constructed a manipulative position therefore the behaviour witnessed has simply become normal for 
other actors in the field, establishing itself from a very early point in EU history as the “awkward 
partner”. This was exacerbated by the key EU treaties being negotiated when the UK had a 
conservative government. If an actor such as France was to act the way, the UK has there would be a 
very different reaction in the field. Where does the relationship go from here? The ongoing refugee 
crisis and the possibility of a UK exit from the EU throw all these considerations into question. 
However, the negotiation that occurred in early 2016 and the tour that David Cameron did of all the 
heads of states of the EU show that the UK can still even on the brink of leaving the EU manage to 
make sure it has the best deal possible through negotiations bilaterally and multilaterally. These 
considerations will be discussed at length in the Conclusion. The next chapter will demonstrate that 
cooperation maybe another tool the UK uses in order to maintain its position within the field of 
external migration control.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
134 
 
Cooperation: 
A EU Dream or an Existing Reality 
In previous chapters we have explored the concepts of securitization and manipulation. These two 
concepts can have negative connotations and have the potential to signify the historical erosion of the 
UK and EU’s relationship and foundation of the field. The securitization chapter highlighted the 
different pace in which the UK and the EU wish to securitize against external migration, including the 
externalisation of borders. The manipulation chapter took the concept of securitization a step further 
and explored how the UK attempts to challenge and change its positon in the field. Cooperation, 
however, is a positive notion that denotes a supportive relationship.  
This chapter argues that manipulation and securitization are not the only behaviour the UK 
demonstrates. For a field to function cooperation is key in maintaining the balance and stability 
between the actor that control the field and those that contribute to it. Unlike the other concepts that 
have been explored, cooperation has the ability to stabilise and evolve a relationship between 
multiple actors or in the case of this research the UK and the EU. The focus of this chapter is to explore 
the cooperation that has evolved from the Maastricht Treaty (1992), analysis of pre 1992 
documentation can be found in previous chapters. Cooperation is not a word often associated with 
these two actors. The UK is viewed as an actor which antagonises the relationship between itself and 
the EU (Colonelli, 2015) and from this position it can manipulate or change the structure of the field 
by not adhering to norms. However, this is a one-dimensional view of the relationship between the 
actors and this chapter will illustrate that cooperation is more present within the field than a difficult 
relationship that is more commonly used.  
The Oxford English Dictionary definition of the word is “The action of cooperating, i.e. of working 
together towards the same end, purpose, or effect; joint operation” (OED, 2015). This definition shows 
the importance that cooperation is often to gain the same advantage or conclusion.  External 
migration control is one of the only political issues that gains the same reaction from all member states 
(EU, 2015). The rhetoric from both actors is to control external migration. The reaction is normally 
reactionary and is similar across all member states. An example of which is the restrictions placed 
open Romanian and Bulgarian migrants after their accession (The Migration Observatory, 2014). An 
external migration example is the increase in spending through mechanism such Frontex as number 
of migrants crossing the EU’s southern border increases at specific junctures such as the Arab Spring. 
Frontex Joint Operations will be explored in greater detail later in this chapter. This section of the 
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thesis will explore the cooperation that the UK and the EU exhibit through their policy documentation. 
It is significant to explore and illustrate the levels of cooperation that are evident between the two 
actors because it has the potential to change the way in which the field of external migration control 
in the EU is viewed as currently the UK rhetoric is not that of cooperation with the EU. 
Regional Cooperation through Bilateral Agreements  
It is important to analysis the different levels in which there is evidence of cooperation between the 
EU and the UK. Bilateral agreements offer an interesting cross section of the relationship between the 
two actors because it reveals the subordinate relationships that maintain the field at a domestic level. 
The media coverage of the 2014 Immigration Act and Theresa May’s ferment support of the Act as a 
decisive move towards a new era of state dominated control of external immigration control. As 
previously discussed in the Securitization chapter, the period leading up to the creation of the Act had 
been filled with a significant strengthening of the external migration control rhetoric. Whilst the media 
circus focussed on the UK based policy there were bilateral agreements that signified a continuing 
cooperation. In a document titled Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium, Concerning 
Immigration Controls on Rail Traffic between Belgium and the United Kingdom using the Channel Fixed 
Link (2014) both governments came to agreement on the best solution for external migration passing 
through the Channel Tunnel. The agreement is yet to be fully ratified however offers an important 
insight into the cooperation that exists in a time when, particularly when UK narrative, generally 
negative towards other actors in the field. It demonstrates that the cooperation in the field of external 
migration control is strengthening rather than weakening. At the beginning of the text it is outlined 
that the agreement is in line with all other bilateral and regional agreements concerning external 
migration control. One of the most important sections of the document reinforces that the agreement 
is not inclusive of passengers which are intra Schengen and whose destination is the UK only. This is 
of particular importance because it means the two actors are cooperating over a larger cohort of 
migrants rather than simply one identifiable group such as intra EU migrants.  
Article 5 of the policy outlines the roles of the actors which is that if the UK refuses admission the 
Belgium authorities may not refuse to readmit a refused migrant. This also stands if an immigrant 
completes a journey to the UK after stating they were an intra Schengen migrant and they were found 
to be dishonest upon reaching the UK. From an archetypal perspective this would indicate that the UK 
is abusing its superior position within the bilateral and regional relationship by not assessing a refused 
migrant themselves on UK sovereign territory. However, there are other considerations to be made in 
regards to this document. Within the agreement there is a plan to have a “secured safety zone” (page 
136 
 
4) which are clear areas of train stations which are not publicly accessible and border controls will be 
integrated into commercial ticket control. A clearly marked “control” zone will house an area in which 
UK Immigration Officers can perform checks on Belgium territory. This demonstrates a balance in the 
relationship because both actors are suppling support for the project in order for external migration 
to be controlled thus following the norm of the whole field.  
Similarly, a summit between the UK and France on the 2nd November 2010 produced a comparable 
agreement. The Declaration on Immigration (2010) is an example of how the UK also maintains its 
relationship with other actors in the field of European external migration control for example 
maintaining a specialised task force at Dover: “The creation of a Joint Intelligence Unit in Folkestone, 
dedicated to the fight against illegal immigration networks, has brought together British and French 
specialists and has allowed the exchange of information between our police forces to become 
standard practice” (gov.uk, 2010). Agreements on a smaller scale like this and the agreement with 
Belgium demonstrate how the dominant narrative of the field impacts upon more intimate 
relationships between non dominant actors. It gives opportunity to validate the constructed norms of 
the field and emphasis their importance. “At an international and European level we will work 
together to mobilise our partners within the framework of the concrete and operational cooperation, 
both in the fight against illegal immigration, and in relation to asylum” (2010) this was further enforced 
with comments such as “implementation of effective co-operation and “promote respect” (2010) in 
context to external migration specifically.  
The previous document details co-operation at a bilateral level, inclusive of regional agreements such 
as the Lisbon Treaty and existing Benelux agreements (Benelux represents Belgium, the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg). However, investigation of the 2014 Immigration Act transition through parliament 
demonstrates to us a different aspect of the UK government. It is key to point out that simple 
investigation of a policy document that has been given royal assent is not sufficient enough to find 
evidence of cooperation. Cooperation will only be found throughout the progression of the bill as 
considerations that could potentially affect the UK’s relationship with the EU will be taken at its 
creation and evolution through parliament. Evidence of cooperation at all levels of governance 
demonstrates how powerful the field is when controlling the behaviour and actions of actors within 
it. “There is no major area of public policy that does not feature at least to some extent on the EU’s 
agenda” (Nugent and Paterson, 2003, page 94). The power that the EU has as the head of the field 
and the structure that has been created around that power mean the EU features very heavily in all 
level of external migration control When the norms and dominant narratives seep down into national 
level governance it is clear that they are well established and respected by all actors within the field 
because they continue to be adhered to. 
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Domestic Policies and Cooperation   
The Home Office Asylum Policy Instruction – EEA/EU Asylum Claims Version 2.0 May 2014 gives 
guidance to how the Home Office will consider asylum of human rights claims from EEA, EU and Swiss 
nationals (EEA is inclusive of all EU member states as well as Lichtenstein, Norway and Iceland).  The 
policy guidelines are that asylum claims from the EEA and Switzerland must be considered. However, 
EEA regulations from 2006 say there are some circumstances where claims can be certified. The 
beginning of the document claims that this regulation is unsupported because an asylum claims from 
a citizen of and EU member state is clearly unfounded. However, as the document progresses it states 
that claims made by EU, EEA and Swiss nationals must be processed by officers accredited to make 
non suspensive appeal decisions. The document states that this ruling is made in accordance with 
obligation to the Protocol on Asylum for National of Member States of the EU or is also called the 
Spanish Protocol and that officers will “inform EEA/EU nationals of their free movement rights when 
they are not subject to removal action” (page 4). As well as confirming that these rules are in 
accordance with the existing Spanish Protocol they also list all the other policy it adheres to: 
 Immigration (EEA) Regulations 2006 
 Accession (Immigration and Worker Registration) Regulations 2004 
 Accession (Immigration and Worker Registration) Regulations 2004 SI 2004/1219 
 Accession of Croatia Regulations 2013 
 The Immigration Rules;  
o Paragraph 339NA (omission of substance interview) 
o Paragraph 339M (circumstances under which the Home Office can flatly refuse an 
asylum claim) 
 UK Borders Act 2007; foreign national offenders with sentences of 12 months or more are 
subject to automatic deportation. 
All of these different regulations demonstrate the level of cooperation at a domestic policy level. The 
more regulations and policy that the UK adhere to the more conscious they are of their position and 
a better standing when there are negotiations for new legislation. There is legislative need for the 
rules the government are “inviting claimants to withdraw their claim or provide written submissions 
(page 16). However further down the paragraph the government are keen to illustrate that they are 
bound by UK law and by EU law for EEA/EU claims to be protected under the right of appeal just like 
any other claim. Even when the UK appears to be diverging from the norms of the field it quickly 
reinforces that it does support the EU. 
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Cooperation between the UK and the EU has never been settled. From the initial rejection in 1961 by 
Charles de Gaulle who believed the UK in the EEC would bring too much influence from the US to 
possible Brexit, the UK and the EU have almost constantly contested one another’s position. The 
situation worsens when you have a Conservative government in power as they are more restrictive of 
external migration (Partos and Bale, 2015). Cooperation was the opposite of the mandate that the 
Eurosceptic coalition government were campaigning for. The mandate of the Conservative party 
during the 2010 election was to improve on the past governments mistakes and distance themselves 
from the EU. The 2014 Immigration Act had some of the most significant changes to immigration policy 
since the 1971 Immigration Act. The Act as discussed previously in a former chapter increased 
restrictions on migration from the Commonwealth and made it more complex for dependents of 
migrants that already lived in the UK to follow their relatives. The 2014 Act did not explicitly make 
external migration harder however it intended to make living in the UK illegally much harder by 
restricting access to banking and housing. Many of these changes had the potential to be in direct 
violation of EU regulations and laws. However deeper investigation of the Immigration Act’s path 
through parliament illustrated a different faction of the UK government. It reveals the UK is extremely 
conscious of following EU norms and adhering to the doxa that has been historically established by 
the EU from the Treaty on Rome onwards. Within the external migration control field, or within any 
field of power, it is extremely important that actors adhere to the norms set by whoever is the most 
powerful. Disruption within a field of power can mean erratic changes in well-established norms or 
within the context of international relations possibly military action or regional instability.  
Overall EU stability is key to the maintenance and reproduction of the external migration control field. 
One such document which demonstrates the UK seeking to cooperate with the EU is Faster, Fairer, 
and Firmer – A Modern Approach to Immigration and Asylum (July, 1998). It was presented by Jack 
Straw (the then Home Secretary) to the House of Commons as a means of addressing concerns 
surrounding the A8 states (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia) accession that had been agreed during the negotiations of the Treaty of Amsterdam. Jack 
Straw was determined to highlight the key benefits of immigration: “International travel is of 
enormous economic and social benefit to this country and reflects the United Kingdom’s position 
within the European Union” (page 4, 1998). This says little about the UK’s position in terms of 
migration control but what it explicitly states are the UK’s conscious decision to mention their position 
within the EU. Other statements like: “The government is also committed to implement European 
Community (EC) provisions on free movement for EC citizens” (page 16, 1998) exhibits the UK’s 
continued support of the doxical behaviour of free movement. This small section of text is not enough 
to reflect the depth of the UK’s commitment to cooperation regarding the external migration control 
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field. Faster, Fairer, and Firmer (1998) goes into greater detail around the commitments made by the 
UK in relation to external control. “We were the first country to ratify the Europol convention and 
supported the decision to give Europol a role in combatting illegal immigration… we shall continue to 
strengthen cooperation of this kind” (page 15-16, 1998). This display of support for newly created EU 
structures identifies the UK as a key factor in the creation of new norms in the field. This offers them 
a better position in which to manipulate the field but also demonstrates how quick the UK is to fall in 
line with new norms that are founded by the head of the field, the EU.  
Evidence such as the support of Europol coupled with the domestic use of the ECHR in the period of 
1998-1999 signifies a significant shift in the habitus created by the UK. Unlike supporting schemes and 
structures such as Europol, the adoption of policy shows evidence that the relationship is in far more 
established field. Cooperation can often be fragile if the relationship or behaviour is not supported by 
accompanying policy or some sort of official signed document. Simple differences in the terms used 
can signify cooperation in a relationship. Speech acts are more significant the more they are repeated. 
Within the document the UK reiterate the difference between sovereign frontier defences and EU 
defences which supports the change in language that was happening at this point of time in the history 
of their relationship. It was in the period of time that the Amsterdam Treaty was signed that agreed 
the accession of the A8 states and the early working groups that would go on to establish FRONTEX 
had been created. What were habitual behaviours previous to this point were now becoming doxical. 
Evidence of the doxical behaviour of cooperation is further supported by another statement made 
within the Faster, Fairer, and Firmer (1998) document. “Various rights to opt into such cooperation in 
a flexible way so as to enable us to preserve our particular approach when necessary while also 
participating in those areas of cooperation which we judge as important” (page 16, 1998). This 
statement demonstrates the UK’s want for cooperation however it still demonstrates the importance 
of preserving sovereign controls. This supports the idea that whilst the UK is willing to cooperate it is 
often at the expense of deepening the lines of cooperation and maintaining its own sovereign position. 
(These behaviours and concepts are better explored throughout the manipulation chapter).  
Cooperation and the significance it has on actor’s relationships within the field on control depends on 
the depth and breadth that cooperation can be witnessed. This is especially true of an institution such 
as the EU. The various structures that have been constructed since the Treaty of Rome (1957) have 
created many different ways in which other actors of the field connect with the wider regional 
structures in the field. It can mean that a member states or other actors that engage with the EU will 
interact with it at all levels from national police forces taking part in small operations to multilateral 
policing operations on a much larger scale. Cooperation at all levels is key to maintain stability in the 
external migration control field. Bourdieu discusses that the doxical and habitual behaviours of actors 
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in a field is the glue that holds that field together (Adler-Nissen, 2012 and Bourdieu, 2015). 
Cooperation as a doxical behaviour means that trait has been learnt, an unconscious submission to 
the doxa. It will also be more likely to spread across all areas of the institution and/or structure as the 
historical relationship becomes more established. This is evident within the Faster, Fairer, and Firmer 
document. The UK demonstrates support on multiple level not just the top line EU interaction such as 
participation in the European Commission and/or Parliament.  “We supported a recent Council of 
Europe recommendation encouraging member states to provide effective remedies before removing 
a failed asylum seeker” (page 33, 1998). It is also significant in so far as they have also positioned 
themselves as a means of encouraging other actors to also cooperate with the recommendations 
made by the most dominant actor of the field, the EU.  
Cooperation is evident in a multitude of statements made in the document: 
“The UK has also supported an EU resolution on unaccompanied minors who are nationals of third 
countries” (page 33, 1998). 
“At EU level, the Amsterdam Treaty provides for co-operation in the development of minimum 
standards on the reception of Asylum seekers. The government will participate in the development of 
such cooperation if it is in the national interest to do so” (page 35, 1998). 
“Including improved cooperation with our European Partners” (page 44, 1998). 
“Experience among EU member states has been of particular relevance” (page 45, 1998). 
Such an abundance of language within the document and the references to national interest 
demonstrate how important the UK views their position within the field. Cooperation can also be 
evident in the roles that actors take on within the field. “The presidency is responsible for driving 
forward the Council's work on EU legislation, ensuring the continuity of the EU agenda, orderly 
legislative processes and cooperation among member states” (consilium.europa.eu, July 2015). The 
presidency of the EU gives the key role of a co-operator on a rotational basis. The UK has taken on the 
role of the EU presidency 5 times in the past 13 years. It allows for single member states to take a 
superior role within the EU. It does not mean whomever has the presidency has any actual power to 
change structures within the institution but it does have the power to pressurize other member states 
to consider legislation that the presidency favours. In context to external migration control it allows 
states to introduce or push for legislation that may have been struggling to get heard. “We particularly 
promoted during the UK Presidency of the EU” (page 45, 1998). The key area which the UK promoted 
was the cooperation of EU member states to improve and evolve the structures which process the 
return of undocumented migrants to their countries of origin or safe third countries. During this period 
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(1997-1998) The Dublin Convention, agreed upon and signed in 1990 but did not come into force until 
1st September 1997, and over 1000 asylum seekers had been returned to safe third countries. From 
the Dublin Convention the EURODAC regulation was also established which created the EURODAC 
system. The system is an EU wide data system for asylum seekers fingerprints to be stored and became 
fully operational in 2003, around the same time that Frontex became fully functional. The regulation 
states that “when someone applies for asylum, no matter where they are in the EU, their fingerprints 
are transmitted to the EURODAC central system” (ec.europa.eu, June 2015). The combination of so 
many different structures means that cooperation between those that control or contribute to these 
structures are more likely to engage with them. If they did not the structure would collapse or become 
unstable. The 2014 Immigration Act demonstrates the effect of these structures on national policy 
making and the knock on effect to cooperation within the field of external migration control.  
Cooperation is not only present through regional level mechanisms such as Frontex but also domestic 
structures. The UK has played an active role in the creation on doxical and habitual behaviours in 
relation to EU governance of external migration through domestic mechanisms. Gallagher (2003) 
discusses the cooperation that the UK has built between itself and its closest EU partners in relation 
to controlling the ports in the south of Britain.  The creation of the European Liaison Unit (ELU) in the 
early 1990s as part of the Kent Police Force was unique to the UK. The unit was set up because of the 
exceptional positon of Dover and influence of “geographical, historical, economic, legal and the social 
factors and the complexities of trans-frontier police cooperation” (Gallagher, 2003). The unit was seen 
as a success and Interpol regarded the structure as a template for other police forces that wished to 
develop bilateral or multilateral relationships with other police forces across Europe (Gallagher, 2003).   
2014 Immigration Act: Following the Norms  
More recent experiences of the politics of external migration control would have you believe that 
cooperation is no longer a key priority for the UK government. From the election of the coalition 
government of David Cameron and Nick Clegg in 2010 cooperation seemed extremely far off. Not only 
in the context to external migration have control but also a possible complete exit of the UK from the 
EU.  Prior to the drafting of the 2014 Immigration Act there has been a growing trend of securitization 
towards external migration (which has been discussed in the previous chapters). The act was a change 
to the immigration policy in the UK. However, the transition of the act demonstrates a much deeper 
understanding of the regional impact, both of the UK on the EU but also of EU structures on UK 
legislature.    
At its original introduction (10th October 2013) Members of Parliament (MPs) were conscious in 
ensuring that the Act fell in line with EU norms and policy. Pages 12-14 of the Immigration Report 
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discussed the importance of “taking influence” from the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR) and reiterating that EEA citizens are “relevant nationals” to consider especially in context to 
the strengthening of external migration controls. One could take this for granted as simply a given and 
argue that of course the UK would consider EEA nationals as relevant. However, it is essential that an 
actor like the UK is explicit within the intention of new policy when the relationship with the head of 
the field is at stake. An example of which is a clause specifically outlining that EEA (European Economic 
Area) nationals are not liable for investigating regarding sham marriages which is in line with 
“subordinate legislation” from the EU (Immigration Report, 2013, page 39). Simply using the word 
subordinate reinforces the hierarchical nature of the external migration control field. In the early 
stages of the House of Commons Parliamentary Readings, this was reinforced by discussions on the 
importance of any new legislation being aware of the pressures of EU migrant’s rights. These examples 
show a submission by the UK government in the production of new legislation in context to the doxa 
external migration control field. There were far more subtle ways in which the UK government 
demonstrated cooperative behaviour. Evidence can be found of this in the discussion of migrants claim 
to the UK welfare system. MPs discussion centred on the contributory period before a migrant can 
claim UK income related benefits discussed how we compared favourably with other EU member 
states. These smaller mentions of how structures are alike signify a deeper level of cooperation.   
From subtle ways in which the UK demonstrate cooperation you can see some of the smaller more 
entrenched levels of cooperation to larger demonstrations of solidarity. The biggest act of cooperation 
the UK demonstrated throughout the progression of the Bill was the consideration of the ECHR and 
the UK’s obligation to its conventions. In the House of Commons debate the ECHR was called a 
“valuable tool” (page 129). The pressures of adhering to EU jurisdiction on domestic policy making 
was highlighted. This demonstrates the UK’s willingness to follow the doxa of the field Structures such 
as the ECHR have been highly controversial in the UK. The Guardian newspaper reported “David 
Cameron is committed to “breaking the link” between the European court of human rights and the 
supreme court to ensure the UK’s highest court remains the “ultimate arbiter of human rights”, 
Downing Street has said” (The Guardian, 1st June 2015). Outwardly the support for the ECHR has 
diminished since the General Election in 2010 however closer analysis of the 2014 Immigration Act 
reveals a far deeper appreciation for the established structures of the EU and a willingness to continue 
a cooperative relationship. Cooperation was a theme which ran through a number of different 
documents that supported the progression of the Act through both houses of parliament to Royal 
Assent in May 2014. One example was the House of Lords readings which mentioned the UKs 
obligation under the ECHR, in particular Article 8. Just in this one document ECHR obligations were 
mentioned sixteen times.  Article 8 of the ECHR specifically looks at the right to private and family life.  
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“Article 8 
Right to respect for private and family life 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is 
in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, 
public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 
European Convention on Human Rights, 2010, 7th Version 
It is a core value of the EU and it is key that the UK follows this norm as it is a foundational right of 
European citizens and of migrants who settle here. The original ECHR was established in 1957 so it has 
been significant for the entirety of the EU’s time as the most dominant actor in the field. Its significance 
is cemented by the length of time it has remained unchanged since its conception. As Jenkins argues 
core values of the field gives actors within it legitimacy but more importantly it values are the capital 
which the field uses to gain respect (2002). Adhering to a core value such as the right to private and 
family life gives the UK diplomatic capital. Adler-Nissen argues that this is capital is invaluable when it 
comes to regional negotiations (2012). The House of Lords not only muted a need to adhere to the 
UKs obligations under Article 8 of the ECHR but also to engage with the EU and its member states 
bilaterally and multilaterally on the issue of reception directives and asylum seekers access to the 
labour market. What is more interesting however is the impetus for the UK to restrict a migrants time 
in detention. The UK has no upper limit on the time a migrant can spend in detention unlike other 
core member states, France has a limit of 45 days and Germany 3 months. One Lord claimed that the 
UK was grossly underperforming in regards to the detention of migrants and was not in line with EU 
or UN mandates. There was a distinct push for the UK to follow the norms of the EU. This was reflected 
in the Impact Assessments of the Act which illustrated the full integration of EU norms into UK 
legislation making. “Does the implementation go beyond minimum EU requirements” is the statement 
that appeared in each Impact Assessment. One could argue that it is insignificant however the use of 
the term beyond minimum shows a continuous need to almost please the head of the field a trend 
that extended through the majority of the documents. 
Cooperation through Regional Mechanisms  
What has been discussed so far is the UK cooperating with the EU from a passive position of a national 
policy making. However, there is also evidence of UK engagement with regional level structures away 
from the national debate surrounding external migration control. Regional level cooperation is 
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significant because it is evidence of the UK acting correctly through doxical and habitual behaviours at 
all levels within the field. Frontex is one such mechanism in which the UK demonstrates it cooperation 
with other member states.  
Frontex promotes, coordinates and develops European border management in line with the 
EU fundamental rights charter applying the concept of Integrated Border Management. Frontex helps 
border authorities from different EU countries work together. Frontex’s full title is the European 
Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States 
of the European Union. The agency was set up in 2004 to reinforce and streamline cooperation 
between national border authorities.”  
Frontex, 2015 
As its mission statement shows it is an EU structure which is there to facilitate cooperation. The UK’s 
involvement with Frontex has been from the very beginning of its conception. As discussion earlier in 
the evaluation of the Faster, Fairer, and Firmer (1998) document see the beginnings of UK interest in 
regional border controls. This is not to say that the field of external migration control did not exist 
before but the manifestation is evidence of habitual behaviour of actors rather than doxical. 
Cooperation between member states when dealing with external migration control as a regional 
power has always had mixed results. More often than not internal differences render negotiations 
difficult and time consuming. However, the evolution of Frontex from a number of ad hoc centres to 
full external migration control structure was well managed with all member states including the UK 
seeking to ensure that Frontex was a success. “The objective of this project is to strengthen the EU 
external border by using modern search technology to combat illegal and, in particular, clandestine 
immigration” (2003). By having a common goal, the cooperation was strengthening thus making the 
field stronger as was as more effective external migration control which is beneficial for all actors. 
The UK was directly involved with the early stages of Frontex. The EU designed each ad hoc centre to 
be specialised in a particular field of external migration control. For example, the German Centre for 
Land Borders in Berlin was “for exchanging personnel and implementing common operations in 
selected points of the external borders, in order to harmonise and improve the practices of the 
competent national units, with Germany as the leading country” (Frontex, 2003). The UK had a 
different role to play the Centre for excellence in Dover was “for developing new technologies to 
facilitate controls at border crossing points and their surveillance, with the UK as the leading country” 
(Frontex, 2003). Engagement at the early stages of an EU managed structure is important to the 
perception of behaviour by the UK in the field by other actors within it. When early structures are 
established the behaviour is still habitual and not set meaning that actors within that field can 
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compete to be head of that field. The ad hoc centres represent the early stages of a sub field of EU 
external migration control. An early dominate position in the sub field could mean a greater dominant 
position in the main field. The UK has shown evidence both directly and indirectly either through 
management of an entire program or through funding of particular projects. The UK's initial proposal 
to the other ad hoc centres was to use technological expertise acquired through the work achieved by 
the centre, pooled with similar expertise from other Member States, to conduct specific short-term 
operations at the external EU border, managed from a virtual centre at Dover, where the majority of 
our expertise is located (Frontex, 2003). An example of this project is: 
“Project Denizis a UK-led, intelligence-focused project that seeks to take proactive 
enforcement action in Turkey, a major source and transit country for illegal maritime migration, and 
against the organisers behind it… The UK is meeting most of the costs of this project… The fact that 
the UK has initiated the project, and will certainly retain primacy in securing delivery notwithstanding 
any wider EU involvement, should give us opportunities to build further influence in the area”. 
Frontex, 2003 
The expansion of the ad hoc centres to a fully functioning sub structure of EU external migration 
control was gradual and by June 2010 Frontex was producing quarterly and annual reports. These 
reports are key to understanding the focus of Frontex during periods of high external migration from 
North Africa. They form part of the risk analysis undertaken by the institution and have detailed 
qualitative and quantitative data. Frontex FRAN (Frontex risk analysis) Quarterly and Annual reports 
house some of the most comprehensive data surrounding the movement of migrants, their origins 
and the method in which they entered the EU. Analysis within the document goes beyond that of 
evaluating the institution in isolation it also explores the impact of domestic member state policy on 
the wider framework of Frontex. For example, the FRAN Quarterly, April – June 2010 discusses the 
widespread decline of illegal immigration as being down to the Europe wide recession causing a 
decrease in the employment opportunities. The recession also had a knock on effect to the migration 
and asylum policies of member states. “Stricter migration and asylum policies in Member states, 
supported by much more effective collaboration with key third countries” (page 3, Frontex Q2, 2010). 
The UK and Norway were particular advocates of stricter controls at this time which has been 
discussed in the securitization chapter. However, you cannot simply view this statement as evidence 
of securitization. If the actions are the same across the whole field of control you have evidence of 
cooperation. For Bourdieu if there is a norm that is adhere to by the majority of field then it is either 
doxical or habitual. Cooperation exists in both spheres of behaviour.  
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The sharing of information is also evidence of cooperation in a field. Quantitative data of the number 
of visas issued and entry/exit figures are important with in the field of external migration control in 
order to be proactive or reactive in managing migratory flow. Management is a key area of 
cooperation in any political situation however it is greatly significant in migration control. If 
movement, including the issuing of visas can be controlled pre-entry to a sovereign state you reduce 
the risk of migrants overstaying visas and reduce the domestic administrative costs.  
“In 2009, 7% of the 11, 310, 000 EU visa applications were rejected (the rate for the UK visas 
was 19%). This proportion rose to 22% for applications made in Africa (25% for UK visas) and to 14% 
in South America (14% for UK visas issued on the American continent”  
(Page 11, Frontex Annual Risk Analysis, 2011).  
A simple glance at these statistics would tell you that the UK rejection rate for visa application are 
higher than that of the Schengen area member states. However, the use of the data is more interesting 
than the data itself. Frontex is predominantly an external migration control structure which service 
for the security of Schengen member states. The UK is not part of the Schengen area therefore the 
statistics from the UK of the percentage of overall and regional visa rejections should be a moot point. 
The significance of the inclusion of the data demonstrates the position of the UK in the external 
migration control field. It is evidence of a much greater role within the control of migration in the 
Mediterranean than perceived from the national narrative in early 2011.  
2011 was a turbulent year for external migration control, especially for Frontex, as well as other actors 
in the field. The political changes and civil unrest in North Africa during 2011 saw a rise in the number 
of migrants and asylum seekers crossing the Mediterranean. The figures for migrant and asylum 
seekers crossing were unprecedented especially in the winter months when migration tends to drop 
because of harsher weather conditions effecting movement. The numbers were the highest on record 
peaking at 41, 245 in Quarter 2 2011 (April-June) almost doubling the number previously recorded in 
the same period of 2010 which was 26, 878. These numbers are only representative of the numbers 
that were recorded, unofficial estimates have the numbers much higher into the hundreds of 
thousands. At this time the Frontex quarterly reports took a very different approach to the data that 
they showed. They became much more focused on migrants using false documents and the returns 
statistics of member states. From a simple analysis this demonstrates that the focus of the member 
states has changed because of political circumstances in neighbouring states there for reactive 
reporting for this period would be the norm. However, it represents a much deeper change in political 
activity surrounding migration control. The killing of Gadhafi in Libya meant that many member states, 
in particular Italy and the UK lost an ally in North Africa in terms of migration control. The two 
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European states have loosely relied upon Libya to control the popular migration route out of Tripoli, 
used by a large number of migrants including citizens from sub Saharan Africa and South East Asia on 
route to Europe. Cooperation was vital at the point in time, however cooperation was not always what 
was demonstrated by actors. The Schengen area was suspended for a short period of time in 2011 and 
member states seemed to be pulling each other apart instead of joining together. However, a common 
narrative did appear and was evident through the active returns policies of member states.  
 “In Q3 2011 a total of 37, 701 third country nationals were effectively returned to third 
countries. Of this total forced returns accounted for just 54%. The UK returned the most third-country 
nationals with over a quarter of the total (9, 940), followed by France (3, 747), and Greece (3, 639). 
Member states varied a lot in terms of the proportion of forced returns to voluntary returns. For 
example, the number of voluntary and forced returns from the UK were roughly equal, while in Greece 
all returns were forced.” 
(Page 26, Frontex Q3, 2011) 
Key issues such as returns are important within the field of external migration control. They are 
habitual behaviours that are demonstrated by members of the field. They are habitual because they 
are subject to relatively quick changes depending open the return directives of states and regional 
actors. The UK has demonstrated in the above citation that they are the most effective member state 
at returning illegal migrants. They have also demonstrated that their returns directives with third 
countries are also more superior because they have fewer forced returns than a state such as Greece. 
What this does is raise the UK within the field of migration control. If a state shows that it is effect in 
controlling returns and has effective returns system, then it can make habitual behaviours develop 
into doxical behaviours for future administrations and leaders. Effective returns became increasingly 
important from the period of Q3 to the present day. The Q4 report from 2012 shows evidence of the 
UK demonstrating dominance in setting the habitual behaviour for the external migration control field. 
“The UK was the member state conducting the largest number of returns, in this case by 5% compared 
to the previous quarter” (page 39, Q4 Frontex, 2012). “The UK conducted the largest number of 
returns in this case up by 7% compared to the previous quarter” (page 34, Q1 Frontex, 2013). The 
reports even state that the UK has been the member state to always have the highest number of 
returns (forced and voluntary). Bourdieu understands that habitual behaviour will allow an actor to 
gain more respect with the field. The UK in regards to the EU external migration control field often 
finds itself an outsider especially in context to the UK not being a member of the Schengen area and 
not adhering the Community Code on Visas. Where the UK loses dominance it the field it makes up 
for it in other areas such as effective returns policy. A dominant position through monetary 
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contributions (the UK has consistently contributed 9-10% of money given by EU member states) as 
well as actions such as the joint operations undertaken by participating member states. Joint 
Operations undertaken by the UK under the banner of Frontex will be discussed later in the chapter.  
From Quarter 1 2012 the Frontex Quarterly reports change branding. They move away from reporting 
about statistical data towards a dominance of securitization language. This follows a trend of domestic 
securitization in the UK as well, it was during this time that Tier 4 visas became stricter and changes in 
welfare provisions were outlined. This is significant because Frontex is representative of the member 
states that either contribute financially or politically to the organisation.  
“Frontex helps border authorities from different EU countries work together. Frontex’s full 
title is the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders 
of the Member States of the European Union. The agency was set up in 2004 to reinforce and 
streamline cooperation between national border authorities. In pursuit of this goal, Frontex has 
several operational areas which are defined in the founding Frontex Regulation and a subsequent 
amendment… Frontex also works closely with the border-control authorities of non-EU/Schengen 
countries — mainly those countries identified as a source or transit route of irregular migration — in 
line with general EU external relations policy.”  
(http://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/mission-and-tasks) 
A move away from discussing trafficking and smuggling of humans and the smuggling of goods to a 
discussion on the security of the region and how best to securitise against migration within an external 
migration control structure as important as Frontex signifies a dramatic shift in focal point for the 
whole region. The cooperation of the UK with other member states is hugely important when the 
threat from criminal organisations that arrange the illegal immigration of third country nationals is a 
multinational structure. In the Q2 2012 report there is a discussion of the break-up of a criminal 
organisation that facilitated the movement of Iranian migrations through Spanish airports. It is 
evidence of the distinct need for cooperation in the external migration control field. Member states 
are able to cooperate because of their submission to the doxa of the field. If Spain and the UK had 
different attitudes to stopping clandestine migration the operation to stop a criminal organisation 
would be extremely different as each state would have a different rhetoric and/or answer to solving 
the issue. The trait of working together is doxical because it has been enshrined in EU policy from the 
very beginning and has been developed since the Treaty of Rome (the progression of EU policy can be 
found in previous chapters). Doxical behaviour is evident through many different joint operations 
undertaken by member states that take part in operations organised by Frontex. 
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The UK took part in 66 joint operations between 2006 and 2014. The operations were extremely varied 
between land, sea and air, with a variety of different modus operandi. The first joint operation that 
the UK took part in was Operation Torino. It participated with: France, Germany, Italy, The Netherland 
and Spain. The operation’s aim was “monitoring threats at the external borders as a result of the 
increased number of air passengers travelling to the Winter Olympics in Turin. On the 17th October 
2007 external border management was discussed by members of the House of Lords. Our cooperative 
relationship with Frontex was part of the debate of effectiveness of external border controls put in 
place by the EU and the UK. The UK taking part in external operations at the cost of taxpayer have 
fallen out of favour, largely due to the economic downturn and negative feelings towards the EU 
within the UK, especially around the debate of Brexit. The House of Lords with the European Union 
Committee debated the UK’s position within Frontex in a debate on the 17th October 2007.  Mr 
Dowdall who was given evidence within the House of Lords gave this statement on the UK’s 
participations in Joint Operations;  
“We consider requests that will come to the UK, as indeed those requests come to other 
Member States as well, and we make a determination on whether we should get involved in those 
operations based on the risks that it is seeking to address, based upon the skills that our own people 
have and there the benefits that we can bring to an operation. But also, because often the requests 
that come through are not necessarily to deal just with people but also to deal with the provision of 
the equipment, we will provide some equipment to support those operations.” 
House of Lords, 17th October 2007, page 43 
The statement highlights the key position that the UK plays within Frontex in terms of support and 
cooperation with other member states. When discussing UK participation in any EU context it tends 
to have negative connotations. However, this discussion reveals a narrative that is never seen in the 
media or conversations in the UK. This quotation demonstrates the level of dedication made by the 
UK on Frontex. It also illustrates a certain level on constraint in terms of the assessment of what 
operations they would participate in. However, this is not unusual, any actor would consider the 
benefits and risks of partaking in any international operation. What does show UK level cooperation 
at a regional level not only passively though policy but also actively through regional mechanisms like 
Frontex. Participation in activities that include the whole or the majority of the field contribute to the 
stability of the region it also creates a more effective migration control. The two points are extremely 
important firstly because stability is essential for speech acts to be more successful. If the field of 
external migration in the EU is stable with all actors following the norms and cooperating on all levels 
of migration governance in that field the doxical behaviour of securitization will become embedded.  
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Participation at a regional level in mechanisms that control migration is good evidence of active 
cooperation between the UK and the EU. In the discussion above it was conferred that the UK would 
be approached to take part in joint operations that they deemed would be most appropriate. 
However, their active cooperation in Frontex goes as far as seeking operations to take part in and 
heading up operations themselves (see Table 1). An example of the UK actively seeking to take part in 
Operation Agelaus. The operation was “to raise awareness about and gather data on the entry of 
unaccompanied minors (under 18) to the EU. Previous lack of comparable EU records meant that 
before the project, this phenomenon went largely unnoticed” (Frontex, 2007). Mr Dowdall also 
discussed the UK’s participation in Agelaus he said; “Operation Agelaus was actually promoted by one 
of our officers who is based full time in Frontex” (House of Lords, 2007, page 43).  
Table 1 
UK led Frontex Operations 
Operation 
Name 
Year Description of Operation 
Nigeria 2010 Jointly organise the return of person’s subject to an individual 
removal order to their country of origin. 
 
Nigeria 2010 Jointly organise the return of person’s subject to an individual 
removal order to their country of origin. 
 
Nigeria 2011 Jointly organise the return of person’s subject to an individual 
removal order to their country of origin. 
 
Focal Air Points 2012 Local support for implementation of Air Border activities, enhance 
organizational capacities and effective operational cooperation with 
3rd countries. 
Nigeria 2012 Jointly organise the return of person’s subject to an individual 
removal order to their country of origin. 
JRO to Nigeria 2014 Jointly organise the return of person’s subject to an individual 
removal order to their country of origin and facilitating harmonized 
and effective monitoring and achievement of EU directives. 
Information taken from http://frontex.europa.eu/ 
151 
 
There are two key points to be taken from this statement. The first is that the UK actively promoted 
participation in a regional level operation and secondly the UK has a full time member of staff 
stationed within the organisation. The stationing of a full time member of staff within Frontex is an 
interesting finding, mainly because the UK is only an associate member to Frontex. In the management 
of Frontex they are invited to attend meetings regarding decisions of the direction of the organisation 
however they are not obligated to attend. This was put under scrutiny by the House of Lords.  
 “We have associate membership of Frontex… Whilst we do not have a vote on the board, what 
I can do it to provide input into the discussion that and debate that takes place at the Management 
Board… Therefore, we do have an ability to influence the decisions that are taken by the board. The 
UK operations are well respected and, therefore our view is sought and we are listened to.” 
House of Lords, 2007, page 40 
The discussion within the House of Lords is evidence that through cooperation the UK is able to gain 
more power through influence within the external migration control field. Bourdieu understands that 
such a strong position within a field of power means that an actor can influence the behaviours of 
other actors within the field and have the potential to change the structures of the field, adjusting or 
reinventing the norms of the field. This is evident when even with associated membership the UK host 
operations with other full members.  
The Joint Return Operation (JRO) to Nigeria was organised by the UK in early 2014. In the 
documentation supporting the operation Frontex commented on the UK’s “readiness to organise” the 
JRO. The main objectives of the operation were to: 
 “Providing added value in the interest of the EU = efficient and effective return by using 
charter flights. 
 Using well developed 3rd Country relations of a Member State and for the benefit of more 
Member States. 
 Optimizing the capacity of charter flights for national and EU benefit. 
 Sharing best practices and respecting human dignity when carrying out forced returns. 
 Facilitating harmonized and effective monitoring and achievement of EU directives” 
Frontex, 2014 
Out of the 161 staff that took part in the JRO the UK provided 104 staff. The proportion and dedication 
of the UK to participate can be viewed in two ways. Either the participation is active cooperation 
following doxical behaviours or it is manipulative cooperation. The concept of manipulation has been 
discussed in the previous chapter however there is a fine line between adhering to norms of the field 
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and using the norms to selfishly gain advantage within the field. Cooperative manipulation is a where 
the UK is using selfishly using its semi dominant position within the field to attempt to gain more 
control. This is extremely difficult for the UK to achieve because it does not have full voting rights 
within Frontex or adhere to a number of EU directives surrounding the control of migration through 
external borders (such as the EU Returns Directive, 2014). When it can gain any level of control it will 
pursue that opportunity. As Adler-Nissen discusses capital exchange can change an actor’s position 
within the field. As discussed previously the UK seeks to offer equipment as well as expertise to help 
Frontex with a number of different operations. This exchange in capital between the UK and an active 
organisation that controls external migration is evidence of cooperative manipulation. The UK appears 
to being cooperating at all level of external migration control governance whilst benefiting empirically 
from a reduction in the number of illegal immigrants in the UK whilst attempting to gain a more 
dominant position within the field.  
Conclusions 
Cooperation between the UK and the EU is a well-established behaviour within the field of external 
migration control. However, this is a phenomenon that was unexpected at the beginning of this 
research project. Cooperation was a common concept and behaviours that linked all the actors that 
were analysed but the breadth and depth of the agreed integration was surprising. In this chapter 
there has been evidence of cooperation at all level of external migration control. What was even more 
surprising was the level of active cooperation rather than passive. Passive cooperation would be 
simply following the policy and adhering to structures placed upon them by the EU. Active cooperation 
is the UK pursuing operations and ways in which to participate in. Throughout this chapter there has 
been significant evidence to show that the UK actively cooperates with the EU at almost every possible 
level. The one area in which they do not cooperate is the UK’s participation in the Schengen area. 
However, the UK makes up for this in contributions to external migration control through mechanisms 
such as Frontex. Passive and active cooperation will inevitably impact on the positon of the UK in the 
field of external migration control.  
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Conclusion 
This thesis has investigated the external migration control field of the EU. It has considered the 
different policies and their supporting documents to understand the different the behaviours of 
securitization, manipulation and cooperation presented by the UK and how this effects its relationship 
with the EU, alongside other relevant factors such as Frontex. The conclusion will explore the insights 
gained from the research, discussing the weaknesses and limitations of the research and the new 
knowledge that has been gained. It will then discuss the unique contributions of this research as well 
as how this research could be developed for future projects. This conclusion will reaffirm the use of 
such a complex theoretical approach, illustrating how the complexities of the external migration 
control field have been unpacked to reveal a deeper understanding of the UK’s relationship with the 
EU in context to external migration control.  
Cooperation more important than Securitization?  
This project has discovered unique insights into the relationship between the UK and the EU in context 
to external migration control. Firstly, that the field of external migration control is older than the 
Maastricht Treaty and the introduction of the third pillar, which is where most of the securitization 
literature places the beginnings of the relationship. The contextual exploration into historical treaties 
and legislation enacted by the UK and EU demonstrate that external migration control has been a 
consideration of both actors much earlier than first anticipated. The British Nationality and Status of 
Aliens Act (1914) and the Treaty of Rome (1957) demonstrate the beginning of the doxical behaviours 
that we now see in the field. This is important as it means that the doxical behaviours of the UK, EU 
and the field are far more entrenched then a couple of decades which strengthens them, makes them 
more difficult to challenge and even harder to change.  
Secondly that cooperation is far more prevalent within the legislation, structures and mechanisms 
than initially thought and at all levels of governance. After analysing the data, such as the 2014 
Immigration Bill, Le Touquet and Frontex cooperation between all actors within the external migration 
control field can be identified the use of Frontex by the UK. The funding of Frontex by the UK is 
interesting itself, as Frontex was developed to protect states within the Schengen area. Whilst the UK 
did not have voting powers its decision to lead 6 Joint Operations for Frontex demonstrates a level of 
cooperation unseen in other areas of the UK and the EUs relationship. It illustrates the UK is willing to 
cooperate and follow the doxical behaviour of security to maintain a dominant position with the field.   
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Thirdly acts such as Le Touquet allow the UK to illustrate that they are willing to conform to the doxa 
and habitus but on their terms and often to their advantage. Manipulation, whilst often difficult to 
identify, allows for the UK to function within the field of external migration control without having to 
fully commit to all EU policy, such as Schengen. For the UK this is a relatively powerful position as it 
can pick and choose which policies and legislation it chooses to adopt. However, one of the most 
thought-provoking findings from this research is how conscious the UK was of maintaining a good 
relationship throughout the debates surrounding the 2014 Immigration Bill, for example. Both Houses 
of Parliament were acutely aware of the structures of the EU when discussing the legislation. It 
illustrates an awareness albeit at times for selfish reasons of the field that the UK must act within. 
Another fascinating finding was the mirroring between the developments of Frontex as an external 
migration control mechanism and how the UK became more involved as these changes went from 
Frontex being a splintered EU initiative into a larger almost militarised migration control actor. It 
demonstrates that the UK are willing to cooperate with EU programmes in relation to migration 
control, however, this is often done by proxy through mechanisms like Frontex and not explicitly seen 
in their relationship as depicted by the media.  
The cooperation of the external migration control field has been witnessed in proxy rather than 
explicitly in a common policy in reaction to the refugee crisis. It is evidence of a combination of 
securitization and cooperation creating a buffer zone in which the control can be externalised. The 
trend of spending money externalising migration control to states which border the EU has been 
favoured over the resettlement of refugees within the safer environment of the EU. Refugee camps 
managed by the UNHCR and other charities at the borders of Turkey and Syria, have seen the 
destabilisation of these areas. Some of the securitization behaviour witnessed has been down to the 
way in which refugee settlement works in the EU. Once a refugee claims asylum in a state they do not 
have the freedom of movement rights given to a citizen of the EU. They must remain in that state until 
the claim for asylum is processed. As discussed in the Securitization chapter the external migration 
control field norm is to take the fingerprints of refugees whilst their claim is being processed. It allows 
member states to return migrants that may have absconded from one state and return to where their 
claim is being processed (europa.eu). Often refugees will have a particular state in Europe which they 
have in mind to travel to, which is influenced by friends and family which may already be settled there. 
This can be a lengthy process and the ongoing externalisation practices of keeping refugees settled at 
camps at the border of Europe is a more palatable situation for members of the field to control. 
Cooperative securitization is evidence of the influence a field can have over external actors, whether 
those actors be others states, regions, institutions or groups of people. As well as cooperative 
securitization, there has been evidence of members of the external migration control field working 
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together in a more humanitarian effort rather than a security effort. Although the EU as a whole has 
only taken roughly 6% of the current Syrian refugee population the effort behind fair and even 
distribution of refugees has been a long process (UNHCR, 2016). The ongoing Syrian refugee crisis is a 
topic of research that would create an interesting research project as the differing reactions by actors 
in the field highlight the continuing impact of domestic migration policy on community politics even 
after 25 years as a political unit.  
Unveiling the UK as a Cooperative Actor  
Before conducting this research, I was aware of the securitizing behaviours of the UK and the EU in 
relation to external migration control through previous research that I had conducted during my 
undergraduate and master’s degrees when I looked at the EU’s policies around the subject of human 
trafficking. Alongside this the media portrayal of migration, be it economic, human trafficking, asylum 
seekers or refugees, has been mostly around the theme of securitization whether that be in country 
or the externalisation of several controls, especially in the UK with the reconstruction of the UKVI and 
the UK Border Force. What this research has shown me is that there are other behaviours present in 
the control of external migration by both the UK and the EU, that shape the policies of both actors 
more than I conceived previously. Before undertaking my literature review I had only considered 
securitization as a unit of analysis as this is what had been most prevalent in previous research and 
my general understanding of the area. However, as I analysed the data, the UK legislature and the 
Frontex documents, such as the quarterly reports, I found that it was a much more complex web of 
behaviours.  
When I undertook the legislative review that formed much of my contextual chapter I also found that 
the relationship at a bilateral and multilateral level was more established than I had first conceived. 
When I first undertook this project, I thought that the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the introduction 
of the third pillar would be the start of the relationship between the two actors in context to migration 
control, however, the contextual reading enabled me to understand that the relationship went further 
back than I had first thought. This project also demonstrated to me the extent to which the UK involves 
itself with external migration control. From previous research I understood the overarching 
involvement of the UK, for example Frontex, however the depth of the research into its relationship 
with the EU and bilateral relationships with states such as France and Belgium have demonstrated to 
me the lengths in which the UK will go to protect its borders from external migration.  
The prevalence of cooperation within UK legislation and its participation in regional level policies such 
as the ENP, also challenged the way in which I view the relationship between the UK and the EU. This 
allowed me to approach the data sets with a much broader outlook rather than simply looking for 
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securitization language. It has enriched the researched to look beyond what the mainstream literature 
and narrative provides. Whilst securitization is still an important part of the story, manipulation and 
cooperation allow for a broader understanding of how external migration control in structured and 
mechanisms maintained by the UK and the EU.  
Deviant or Doxical – The Manipulation of Mechanisms  
Manipulation was a core behaviour that arose from the data analysis and out of all the behaviours 
that this research wished to illustrate, this was the most elusive to find. This was because it is not a 
behaviour that is encourage by any actor in the field, unlike cooperation and securitization which are 
widely published and supported actions. The evidence of the UK being a manipulative actor within in 
the external migration control field was found in two areas; firstly, in bilateral agreements with other 
EU member state and secondly within its use of mechanism maintained by the EU and other member 
states, namely Frontex. The two pieces of data that demonstrated this the most was Le Touquet Treaty 
and the bilateral agreement for secure zones in Brussels with Belgium. They both illustrated that the 
UK wished to follow the established norm of securitization but wanted to achieve it outside of their 
borders. This is important because if the UK is seen to be following the norms of the field the most 
dominate actors are more likely to give the UK more leverage when negotiating multilateral 
agreements. The agreements also highlighted the UK placing accountability to other actors within the 
field. For example, movement through the secured zones in Brussels is the responsibility of Belgium 
authorities and any migrant found to have incorrect documentation or no right to remain will be 
returned to authorities in Belgium, not British border authorities. The continued funding of Frontex 
and the encouragement of its expansion and development by the UK government is another example 
of manipulative behaviour. Manipulation is predominantly a doxical behaviour, in the context to this 
research, manipulation of structures such as Frontex have afforded the UK a position in which it can 
secure its own borders whilst using resources from other states.  
The current political climate between the UK and the EU could see further manipulation of the 
structures of external migration control. The political fallout from the EU referendum decision could 
have a profound impact on the external migration control field. To leave the EU, the UK must enact 
Article 50 to start the bureaucratic processes of leaving. The new Prime Minister Theresa May has yet 
to reveal a timeline in which this will occur, with some political commentators hinting that it may not 
be until the end of 2016, some arguing that it may never happen at all (Guardian, 2016). However, 
there has been calls from France and Germany for the triggering of Article 50 to happen much sooner 
than the UK. Hollande and Merkel are pushing the May to start proceedings for disruption to the rest 
of the EU to be minimal (Reuters, 2016). Whatever the inevitable outcome will be, there are several 
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different ways this could affect the structure of the field. The most substantial would be a breakdown 
of the field, with all actors reconsidering their position within it. The UK leaving could change the 
approach in all member states, funding could be taken from projects and the mechanisms of migration 
control could change irrevocably. This is extremely unlikely to happen the withdrawal of one-member 
state will not cause a domino effect.  
Another scenario would be that the UK remains an actor within the field considering that their decision 
to leave places them far lower in the hierarchy as their leaving causes whatever diplomatic capital 
they must disintegrate. This is a far more likely situation as the UK is already afforded special privileges 
to join joint projects like Frontex as they are not part of the Schengen agreement. The UK also holds 
several bilateral agreements with EU member states that are unlikely to be affected. However, this is 
not to say they will not be affected. States that have agreements with the UK may feel they do not 
wish to uphold arrangements with a state that is not part of the wider community. So, little is known 
about what will follow in the next few months and years as there is no precedent to look toward. 
Another scenario could be that nothing changes in relation to external migration management. 
However, this is another unlikely situation as all policies between the UK and the EU will have to be 
reconsidered and renegotiated. 
The use of mechanisms was highlighted through this research as an important behaviour of actors. 
The use of national mechanism can highlight habitual and doxical behaviours. The national level 
mechanism that offered the most evidence of the UK attempting to construct more control over the 
movement of external migrants over the EU’s southern border was the document Faster, Fairer, 
Firmer released by the UK government in 1997 outlining the policies of the new Labour government 
in which they reiterated their support of future external migration controls by Frontex. The most 
convincing evidence is the UK using the UKVI to aid Frontex and other member states in the return of 
migrants that have overstayed visas or are voluntary returners. The use of these mechanisms that 
would normally be for the sole use of the Home Office and the UKVI however the use of them in a 
Frontex JO is evidence that the UK will use all levels of governance it can to control migration across 
the Mediterranean. The use of national level mechanisms is also illustrating the UK’s willingness to 
cooperate to achieve the aims and adhere to the norms of the field. It is a way in which the UK can 
gain diplomatic capital within the field as well. If the UK is seen to be aiding the securitization of the 
Mediterranean, then it will be given respect by other members of the external migration control field. 
If the UK ever need to then use other mechanisms that it did not have initial access to then it has 
manipulated a position where it can negotiate to use other actor’s structures when it suits them. 
Frontex JO’s are a key element of the examination of the UK’s behaviour as the original conception of 
Frontex was to protect the borders of states that had signed the Schengen Accord, which the UK was 
158 
 
not a signatory. The UK negotiating a position onto the board of Frontex is evidence of its diplomatic 
capital and it’s wanting to gain a superior position within the field of external migration control.  
The deployment of EU practices by the UK illustrates the complex structures of the field and the 
extension of sovereign control to regional powers and external states in North Africa. Within the 
Cooperation chapter there was a discussion around the Barcelona Process and the ENP, these are 
ways in which the external migration control field extend their control into neighbouring states. 
Through these processes actors within the field can control external migration from North African 
states, alongside passing sovereign controls to actors outside of their territories. For example, the 
encouragement of North African states to participate in economic activates with the EU comes with 
the caveat that they must help to stem the flow of migrants. As discussed in previous chapters, these 
agreements are not always at a multilateral level they can also occur at a bilateral level. This has been 
illustrated in the negotiations that took place between the UK and Libya and Italy and Libya, as 
discussed earlier in the thesis. Members of the external migration control field do deploy EU practices 
to extend sovereign control to North African states, however the structures of control as explored in 
the data demonstrate the external migration control field is more interested in retaining sovereign 
control within the field. This is because that states within the field are nervous to give up sovereign 
control to the EU, let alone to actors that do not adhere to the norms of the field. Externalising 
sovereignty is habitual behaviour that is only used when it is a last resort for the field to gain control 
during periods of temporary high migration from North Africa.  
What has been demonstrated in this thesis is the (re)structuring of sovereignty can be witnessed in 
the behaviours and relationships of actors in the field of external migration control. If we use Bourdieu 
to explain the influence of migration controls, we can see that over many years of negotiations and 
policy building the UK has retained much if its own sovereignty, but small amounts have been given 
away for them to maintain a good position within the field. Acts such as Le Touquet Treaty give 
researchers glimpses of the attempts of the UK to maintain a regional position in which they can be 
respected however this comes at the price of losing a small amount of sovereignty. Another example 
would be the UKVI offices that are run by private companies are entrusted with the responsibility of 
controlling who crosses the border. Sharing intelligence through Europol and agencies such as Frontex 
are evidence that the UK is willing to restructure its sovereignty to follow the norms of the field. Across 
the EU sovereignty has been restructured in a similar way with controls being externalised to allow 
for migration checks to happen pre-entry into the free movement zone. The Securitization chapter 
explored data that showed how member states and the EU as whole are seeking to expand migration 
controls out to neighbouring states. Another example that has been demonstrated throughout the 
whole of this thesis is the EU’s reliance on Frontex to police its borders. The evolution of Frontex from 
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a scattered group of small agencies into the large-scale policing force, arguably a military force, that 
we see today is evidence of a restructuring of the sovereign boundaries of the EU.  
The evidence that has been discussed illustrates that the UK cooperates with the EU, even if it with 
manipulative tendencies. This research has revealed behaviour that has largely been ignored as the 
normal rhetoric is the UK’s poor relationship with the EU, however the evidence presented has 
illustrated that this is not the case in context to external migration control. This has been 
demonstrated through discussing that the UK is willing to adhere to the norms of the external 
migration control field, either by offering financial support to mechanisms like Frontex or by creating 
domestic policies that support its position within the field. Even manipulative behaviour is evidence 
that the UK is willing to hold it position within the field, or even try to improve to through capital gain.   
Cooperation is Key 
This project has given me a unique perspective in several different ways about the UK and EU’s 
relationship in context to external migration control. Firstly, the UK deploys and utilised EU structures 
and mechanism to control migration control far more than generally understood. This also is 
intertwined with the history between the two actors in regard to migration control over the past 100 
years. These learnt doxical behaviours have more hold over the actions of the UK and contribute to 
the creation of domestic as well as bilateral or multilateral legislation and policy. Alongside this the 
UK is far more open to cooperating with its European counterparts, as contrary to media beliefs the 
same end goal of curbing external migration into the EU, in particular from North Africa and the Middle 
East. Whilst the right wing narrative in the UK views migration control as a domestic issue which should 
only be legislated domestically in reality the control on migration posits all levels of governance for 
the UK. The use of Frontex is at the forefront of this in so far as the involvement and participation in 
operations through a mechanism that was not even designed for the UK is a particularly unique 
perspective. The depth of analysis in regards to the Frontex reports and the participation of UK in JOs 
is unique to this research and affords it a view into how ingrained the behaviours of securitization are 
for the UK.  
Looking In from the Outside  
The theoretical approach and framework of this thesis should go on to develop IR theory more 
broadly. I believe the development of IR theory has stagnated and the advancement of the use of 
theoretical frameworks from outside the discipline, such as Bourdieu, can evolve the way we think 
about international relations. The concept of using a field as an analytical format could be applied to 
many different areas of IR research, such as environmentalism and terrorism, particularly if you are 
160 
 
looking to analyse the relationship between different actors and the structures that keep them 
together. Beyond that I think Bourdieu would develop the how we think about the structure and 
agency model. The concepts of doxa and habitus allow us to look at not only how constructed norms 
form the world around us but also that in the right conditions that these structures can change if the 
field allows it. The concept of capital, in all forms discussed throughout the thesis, could change the 
way in which we view diplomacy, not only as a tool for an actor to gain but as part of a wider exchange 
of multiple forms of capital across a complex field. From this PhD there should be a wider and more 
honest conversation about external migration control and the extent to which the UK engaged with 
EU structures, especially Frontex. Firstly, within the academic community as so much of the literature 
remains within the category of securitization. What this thesis has shown is that there are more 
behaviours that have as much as a contributing factor to the advancement and maintenance of 
migration control structures and mechanisms. Behaviours such as cooperation and manipulation have 
as much of an impact on the relationship between the UK and the EU therefore need to be considered 
alongside more dominant themes such as securitization. Secondly within the media narrative as so 
much information published around external migration control in and around Europe is subjective and 
led by political narrative it is imperative that a more open discourse is started.  
Weaknesses and Limitations 
There are weaknesses and limitations to this research. Firstly, this research does not pull apart the 
complexities of human movement. It only looks at human migration rather than looking at it in all its 
factions such as, economic migration, asylum seekers, refugees and human trafficking for example. 
Whilst this does not undermine the findings of this research it does mean that we still do not 
understand if the behaviours of securitization, manipulation and cooperation are applicable to all 
human movement or whether there is a spectrum of behaviours that could be attributed to each 
classification of migration. A limitation of this research is that is does not compare the UK with another 
EU member state such as France or Germany to see if these behaviours are unique just to the UK. 
However, as the UK has such a unique relationship with the EU it would be challenging to analyse the 
policies of other states in relation. Ireland, Norway and Iceland are perhaps the most obvious choices 
as they are also not part of the Schengen Agreement. Another limitation of this research is that it only 
explores external migration, whilst this is a limitation I think it would be another large scale research 
project that would need to undertake this work. I think that the theoretical and methodological 
frameworks would be replicable to analyse internal migration control and it would afford and 
interesting comparison to see what the differences are in the doxical and habitual behaviours.  
Current Climate 
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This research has primarily focused on external migration that moves from North Africa into Europe. 
Although the analysis has only reached to 2014 it would be ignorant to not discuss the current refugee 
crisis. This section of the conclusion will offer a small commentary on the current crisis in relation to 
this piece of research then have suggestions on the possible policy outcomes and future research that 
could be conducted around this area. Firstly, the response from the field of external migration control 
will be examined. As in previous chapters the field of external migration control is made up of actors 
and structures which maintains the controls that have evolved. What has been witnessed over the 
past 18 months is a continuation of previous trends as discussed in this thesis. Securitization has been 
the main priority for all those within the field. This has been for several reasons firstly the nature of 
the migration and the countries of origin where they are travelling from. Much of the movement has 
been Syrian refugees fleeing the ongoing civil unrest. The figures for the numbers moving have been 
unprecedented, especially during the winter when crossing the sea and land borders becomes even 
more dangerous due to extreme weather conditions (Frontex ARA, 2016). Growing Islamophobia in 
Europe and ISIS links to recent terrorist bombings and attacks in Paris and Brussels has fuelled the 
societal unease about the settlement of refugees which has influenced the political policy towards the 
current crisis (RT, 2016). This has driven the securitization practices of the field. It has also allowed for 
newer actors to take more of a pivotal role in the actions taken towards external migration control 
and continue the doxical behaviour which has dominated the field which in turn reinforces that this 
behaviour is correct to the rest of the field.  
The closure of much of the Eastern European border alongside the reduction of naval aid for refugees 
has added to the negative securitizing reaction of the field. Much of the “on the ground” response has 
been to confront the current crisis with military personal rather than with aid workers. The reduction 
of naval aid through control mechanism such as Frontex works against several the norms witnessed 
in the field previously (Frontex ARA, 2016). Frontex had been used as a mechanism which would put 
people the journey of travelling across the Mediterranean however the reduction reflects the reactive 
policy making the external migration control field. It is evidence of the doxical structure of the field 
changing. As previously discussed doxical changes occur when the field is pushed to make drastic 
changes to its normal behaviour. This has been reflected in the relatively small number of refugees 
that have been accepted by European states and a sluggish international effort for settlement of 
refugees from Syria. Of the current 11.8 million displaced persons from Syria, Europe has only settled 
6% of that number (Al Jazeera, December 2015). The focus to keep refugees at camps at the borders 
in non-member states such as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey has been 
favoured. The media has also followed the securitizing practices of society and the state by naming 
the current refugee crisis, a migrant crisis. This stokes the practices of states by allowing them to hide 
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behind a common narrative of simply dealing with large number of migrants rather than explicitly with 
refugees.  
Future Research 
The framework from this research could be used again for a post-doctoral project in which the 
proceeding months up to the referendum and those after it are analysed to assess the impact on the 
external migration control field. This research would follow on from the work discussed in this thesis, 
analysing policy documentation from 2015 onwards from all actors of the external migration control 
field. From this you would be more likely to be able to predict the future of the field. You would also 
be able to witness any disintegration in the field on the run up to the referendum as campaigning may 
have had a negative effect on the diplomatic capital of the UK.  
From this research there several avenues of future research. The first would be to look at other areas 
of EU policy in which there could be crossover, such as environmentalism and terrorism. Whilst these 
are newer areas of research it would be interesting to see if the analytical framework functions in 
other policy areas. Another area of research would be to look at other areas of human movement 
such as the US-Mexican border and how that effects both actors behaviour bilaterally and 
multilaterally through trade agreements such as NAFTA. The application of the theoretical framework 
would work well on a case study such as this because it would allow a researcher to understand how 
the doxa and habitus has been formed and how they continue to effect the production and 
maintenance of migration controls across Central and North America. Another avenue for future 
research would be to investigate the behaviour of manipulation in a lot more detail. I think this a vastly 
under researched area of IR and would create interesting interdisciplinary research between the field 
of Psychology and IR and could be applied to several areas of IR research.  
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